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Why Did Kant Conceive of the Critique of Pure Reason as a Critique? Comments on Gabriele Gava’s Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2024

Karin de Boer*
Affiliation:
KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

Abstract

My response to Gabriele Gava’s Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of Metaphysics (2023) focuses on Kant’s conception of the role of critique in the Critique of Pure Reason. On my account, Gava’s emphasis on the constructive elements of the Critique downplays the critique of former metaphysics elaborated in all three parts of the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements. After some comments on Kant’s conception of the Critique as a doctrine of method, I support this view by discussing the relation between transcendental philosophy and transcendental critique, Kant’s analysis of the faculties, and his transcendental deduction of space.

Type
Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Kantian Review

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References

De Boer, Karin (2020) Kant’s Reform of Metaphysics: The Critique of Pure Reason Reconsidered. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
De Boer, Karin (2024) ‘Kant’s Transcendental Turn to the Object’. Studi Kantiani (forthcoming).Google Scholar
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