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Economic Governance on Trial: High Courts and Elected Leaders in Argentina and Brazil

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Diana Kapiszewski
Diana Kapiszewski*
Affiliation:
Georgetown University dk784@georgetown.edu
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Abstract

Beginning in the 1980s, social and political actors across Latin America turned to courts in unprecedented numbers to contest economic policies. Very different patterns of high court–elected branch interaction over economic governance emerged across the region, with crucial implications for economic development, democratic governance, and the rule of law. Building on both institutional and strategic accounts of judicial politics, this article argues that high court “character,” a relatively stable congeries of informal institutional features, channels interbranch struggles into persistent patterns. Two case studies illustrate the argument. In Argentina, the high court's political character encouraged a pattern of court submission to elected leaders marked by periodic bouts of interbranch confrontation over economic governance. In Brazil, the high court's statesmanlike character induced interbranch accommodation. This study demonstrates that even in politically unstable settings, institutional features can shape law and politics.

Type
Research Article
Information
Latin American Politics and Society , Volume 55 , Issue 4 , Winter 2013 , pp. 47 - 73
Copyright
Copyright © University of Miami 2013

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