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The First Liability Insurance Cartel in America, 1896–1906


This article studies the rise and fall of the first liability insurance cartel in the United States. In 1886, insurance companies in America began selling liability insurance for personal injury accidents, primarily to cover business tort liability for employee accidents at work and non-employee injuries occasioned by their business operations. In 1896, the leading liability insurers agreed to fix premium rates and share information on policyholder losses. In 1906, this cartel fell apart.

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Marc Schneiberg and Tim Bartley , “Regulating American Industries: Markets, Politics and the Institutional Determinants of Fire Insurance Regulation,” American Journal of Sociology 107 (2001): 111–15, 138

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Law and History Review
  • ISSN: 0738-2480
  • EISSN: 1939-9022
  • URL: /core/journals/law-and-history-review
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