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Rethinking Regime Politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2018

Matthew E. K. Hall
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Abstract

Many recent studies of “regime politics” argue that judicial review is ultimately used to promote the interests of the dominant governing regime. I explore this claim by evaluating whether the invalidation of federal laws by the US Supreme Court fits the empirical expectations of the regime politics approach. I find that the Court frequently invalidates statutes when (1) the ideology of the Court diverges from that of the sitting elected branches (suggesting that the Court does not fear sanctions or nonimplementation), and (2) the ideology of the sitting elected branches converges with that of the elected branches that enacted the statute (suggesting that the Court is defying the sitting elected branches). My findings suggest that the Court does not primarily use judicial review to promote the interests of the dominant governing regime.

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Articles
Information
Law & Social Inquiry , Volume 37 , Issue 4 , Fall 2012 , pp. 878 - 907
Copyright
Copyright © American Bar Foundation, 2012 

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