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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 January 2018
The article by Jenny McEwan and St. John Robilliard ((1981) 1 LS 267) is entitled ‘Recklessness’, but the argument makes it plain that the authors not only are staunch supporters of the extended meaning now given by the House of Lords (under the leadership of Lord Diplock) to the notion of recklessness, but give their approval also to the extended meaning that Lord Diplock would like to give to the notion of intention. While most of those who are concerned with the criminal law would now like to see its severity alleviated, if only to reduce the pressure on the prisons, Lord Diplock and his two academic allies want to notch criminal liability up a degree (or to keep it notched up) in two respects. They want foresight of probability without purpose to be placed or kept within the notion of intention (instead of within the notion of recklessness), and they want part of inadvertent negligence to be placed or kept within the notion of recklessness (instead of within the notion of negligence).
1. Working Paper on Offences against the Person (HMSO 1976) para. 90.
2. [1981] 2 WLR 509.
3. See Lemon [1979] AC at 638.
4. Sheppard [1981] AC at 405C.
5. A few references to recklessness may be found in the older cases, but they are exceptional.
6. [1975] AC 55.
7. It need hardly be said that those who adhere to what I have called the fictitious meaning of intention also agree with what I have called the natural meaning. A person who tries to produce a result that he regards as highly unlikely intends it.
8. (19761 AC 182.
9. [1967] 2 QB 981.
10. I put aside reckless driving, which I regard as being in a special position.
