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The 2022 Russian intervention in Ukraine: What is its impact on the interpretation of jus contra bellum?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 May 2023
Abstract
This article examines the precedential value of Russia’s ‘special military operation’ against Ukraine in February 2022 for the purpose of interpreting the rules of jus contra bellum. Following the methodology set down by the ICJ in its Nicaragua judgment, self-defence is identified as the legal basis explicitly invoked by Russia in order to justify its operation in Ukraine. The authors then examine closely the reactions by third states with respect to the legality of Russia’s military operation and establish that the legal arguments put forth by Russia – including, more specifically, an innovative reading of the right to self-defence of entities unilaterally recognized as states – have been overwhelmingly rejected by third states. On that basis, the authors conclude that this precedent does not challenge the established understanding of the prohibition to use force in international relations and of its exceptions.
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- © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law in association with the Grotius Centre for International Law, Leiden University
References
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7 UNSC, Draft Res., UN Doc. S/2022/155 (25 February 2022); UNSC, Verbatim Record, (25 February 2022) UN Doc. S/PV.8979 (25 February 2022), 6.
8 UNSC, Res. 2623, UN Doc. S/RES/2623 (27 February 2022), adopted by 11 votes in favour, one vote against (Russia), and three abstentions (China, India, United Arab Emirates); see UNSC, Verbatim Record, UN Doc. S/PV.8980 (27 February 2022), 2.
9 UNGA, Res. ES-11/1, UN Doc. A/RES/ES-11/1 (18 March 2022). The discussions at the eleventh emergency special session of the UNGA relating to the intervention in Ukraine can be found in the following documents: UNGA, Verbatim Record, UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.1 (28 February 2022); UNGA, Verbatim Record, UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.2 (28 February 2022); UNGA, Verbatim Record, UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.3 (1 March 2022); UNGA, Verbatim Record, UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.4 (1 March 2022); UNGA, Verbatim Record, UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.5 (2 March 2022).
10 See UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.5, ibid., at 14–15.
11 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Dec. ‘2.3 Situation in Ukraine’, Doc. CM/Del/Dec(2022)1426bis/2.3 (24 February 2022), available at search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectID=0900001680a5a1f1.
12 European Union, ‘Russia’s Aggression Against Ukraine: Press Statement by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell’, 24 February 2022, available at www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/russias-aggression-against-ukraine-press-statement-high-representativevice-president-josep_en.
13 OSCE, ‘Joint Statement by OSCE Chairman-in-Office Rau and Secretary General Schmid on Russia’s Launch of a Military Operation in Ukraine’, 24 February 2022, available at www.osce.org/chairmanship/512890.
14 NATO, ‘Statement by NATO Heads of State and Government on Russia’s Attack on Ukraine’, 25 February 2022, available at www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_192489.htm; ‘Statement by NATO Heads of State and Government’, 24 March 2022, available at www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_193719.htm.
15 African Union, ‘Statement from Chair of the African Union, H.E President Macky Sall and Chairperson of the AU Commission H.E Moussa Faki Mahamat, on the Situation in Ukraine’, 24 February 2022, available at www.au.int/sites/default/files/pressreleases/41529-pr-english.pdf.
16 ECOWAS Commission, ‘Communique on the War in Ukraine’, 27 February 2022, available at www.ecowas.int/?p=53740.
17 Pacific Islands Forum, ‘Pacific Islands Forum Secretary General Puna-Statement on Ukraine’, 28 February 2022, available at www.forumsec.org/2022/02/28/remarks-pacific-islands-forum-secretary-general-puna-statement-on-ukraine/.
18 OAS, ‘Statement from the OAS General Secretariat on the Russian Attack on Ukraine’, 24 February 2022, Doc. E-008/22, available at www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-008/22.
19 CARICOM, ‘CARICOM Statement on the Situation in Ukraine’, 24 February 2022, available at caricom.org/caricom-statement-on-the-situation-in-ukraine/; ‘Statement of the Conference of CARICOM Heads of Government on the War and Humanitarian Crisis in Ukraine’, 3 March 2022, available at www.caricom.org/statement-of-the-conference-of-caricom-heads-of-government-on-the-war-and-humanitarian-crisis-in-ukraine/.
20 Nordic Council, ‘President of the Nordic Council Condemns Russia’s Attack on Ukraine’, 24 February 2022, available at www.norden.org/en/news/president-nordic-council-condemns-russias-attack-ukraine.
21 See J. A. Green, C. Henderson and T. Ruys, ‘Russia’s Attack on Ukraine and the Jus Ad Bellum’, (2022) 9 JUFIL 4; A. Haidar et al., ‘Statement by Members of the International Law Association Committee on the Use of Force’, Just Security, 4 March 2022, available at www.justsecurity.org/80454/statement-by-members-of-the-international-law-association-committee-on-the-use-of-force/; G. Blum and N. Modirzadeh, ‘The War in Ukraine and International Law – Harvard Law Professors Gabriella Blum and Naz Modirzadeh Analyze the Russian Invasion and the Global Response’, Harvard Law Today, 2 March 2022, available at today.law.harvard.edu/the-ukraine-conflict-and-international-law/; C. F. J. Doebbler, ‘Russia’s Use of Force Against Ukraine: An International Law Perspective’, Jurist, 2 March 2022, available at www.jurist.org/commentary/2022/03/curtis-doebbler-russia-use-of-force-against-ukraine/; T. D. Gill, ‘Remarks on the Law Relating to the Use of Force in the Ukraine Conflict’, Articles of War, Lieber Institute, 9 March 2022, available at www.lieber.westpoint.edu/remarks-use-of-force-ukraine-conflict/; H. Hannum, ‘International Law Says Putin’s War Against Ukraine is Illegal. Does That Matter?’, The Conversation, 25 February 2022, available at www.theconversation.com/international-law-says-putins-war-against-ukraine-is-illegal-does-that-matter-177438; J. Kleffner et al., ‘Perspective: This is Why the Russian Invasion of Ukraine is Unlawful’, Swedish Defense University, 9 March 2022, available at www.fhs.se/en/swedish-defence-university/stories/2022-03-09-perspective-this-is-why-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-is-unlawful.html; M. Milanovic, ‘What is Russia’s Legal Justification for Using Force against Ukraine?’, EJIL:Talk!, 24 February 2022, available at www.ejiltalk.org/what-is-russias-legal-justification-for-using-force-against-ukraine/; M. N. Schmitt, ‘Russia’s “Special Military Operation” and the (Claimed) Right of Self-Defense’, Articles of War, Lieber Institute, 28 February 2022, available at www.lieber.westpoint.edu/russia-special-military-operation-claimed-right-self-defense/; M. Sterio, ‘Russia v. Ukraine: The Limits of International Law’, Intlaw Grrls, 28 February 2022, available at www.ilg2.org/2022/02/28/russia-v-ukraine-the-limits-of-international-law/; M. Weller, ‘“A Perversion of both the Facts and the Law” Russian Attempts to Invoke International Law Dismantled’, 9 March 2022, available at www.cam.ac.uk/stories/weller-ukraine; I. Wuerth, ‘International Law and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine’, Lawfare, 25 February 2022, available at www.lawfareblog.com/international-law-and-russian-invasion-ukraine; F. Zarbiyev, ‘Of Bullshit, Lies and “Demonstrably Rubbish” Justifications in International Law’, Völkerrechtsblog, 18 March 2022, available at www.voelkerrechtsblog.org/of-bullshit-lies-and-demonstrably-rubbish-justifications-in-international-law/.
22 Institute of International Law, ‘Declaration of the Institute of International Law on Aggression in Ukraine’, 1 March 2022, available at www.idi-iil.org/en/declaration-de-linstitut-de-droit-international-sur-lagression-en-ukraine/.
23 ILA, ‘ILA Statement on the Ongoing and Evolving Aggression in and Against Ukraine’, 3 March 2022, available at www.ilajapan.org/doc/ila_statement_on_situation_in_ukraine.pdf; for the statements adopted by numerous ILA branches condemning the Russian attack against Ukraine, see ILA, available at www.ila-hq.org/index.php/news.
24 ASIL, ‘Statement of ASIL President Catherine Amirfar Regarding the Situation in Ukraine’, 23 February 2022, available at www.asil.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/ASIL_Statement_Situation_in_Ukraine.pdf.
25 ESIL, ‘Statement by the President and the Board of ESIL on the Russian Aggression Against Ukraine’, 24 February 2022, available at www.esil-sedi.eu/fr/statement-by-the-president-and-the-board-of-the-european-society-of-international-law-on-the-russian-aggression-against-ukraine-2/.
26 SFDI, ‘Communiqué de la SFDI sur l’agression de l’Ukraine par la Fédération de Russie’, 25 February 2022, available at www.sfdi.org/actualites/communique-de-la-sfdi-sur-lagression-de-lukraine-par-la-federation-de-russie/.
27 German Society of International Law, ‘Statement of the Board and Council of the German Society of International Law (DGIR) on the Russian Attack on Ukraine’, 24 February 2022, available at www.voelkerrechtsblog.org/dgir-statement-on-the-russian-attack-on-ukraine/.
28 Belgian Society of International Law, ‘Statement About the Situation in Ukraine’, available at www.bgir-sbdi.be.
29 Even in the case of the Iraqi war of 2003, the condemnations were not so numerous; see the various texts listed in (2003) 36 RBDI 248 ff.
30 See Weller, supra note 21.
31 See Sterio, supra note 21; Hannum, supra note 21.
32 See Blum and Modirzadeh, supra note 21; Doebbler, supra note 21.
33 Cf. T. M. Franck, ‘Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States’, (1970) 64 AJIL 809.
34 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment of 27 June 1986, [1986] ICJ Rep. 98, para. 186 (emphasis added).
35 Ibid., at 109, para. 207.
36 See Zarbiyev, supra note 21.
37 Ibid.
38 See, for example, Green, Henderson and Ruys, supra note 21; Schmitt, supra note 21; Gill, supra note 21; Wuerth, supra note 21; Hannum, supra note 21.
39 ‘Statement of the Presidium of the Russian Association of International Law’, 4 March 2022 in Russian and 7 March 2022 in English, available at www.ilarb.ru/html/news/2022/7032022.pdf.
40 See Nicaragua judgment, supra note 34, at 109, para. 207. See also E. Henry, ‘Alleged Acquiescence of the International Community to Revisionist Claims of International Customary Law (with Special Reference to the Jus Contra Bellum Regime)’, (2007) 18 Melbourne Journal of international Law 279.
41 See UN Doc. S/2022/154, supra note 5; Russian Federation Letter to the ICJ, supra note 6.
42 See UN Doc. S/2022/154, ibid., at 1; Russian Federation Letter to the ICJ, ibid., at 4, para. 15.
43 See UN Doc. S/2022/154, ibid., at 5–6.
44 UNSC, Verbatim Record, UN Doc. S/PV.8974 (23 February 2022), at 12; see also UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.1, supra note 9, at 7; UNGA, Verbatim Record, UN Doc. A/76/PV.58 (23 February 2022), 14.
45 IIFFMCG, Report, September 2009, Vol. III, at 437–8, available at www.mpil.de/en/pub/publications/archive/independent_international_fact.cfm.
46 Ibid., vol. I, at 24, para. 23. See also vol. II, at 287: ‘The protection of nationals abroad does not constitute an independent exception to the prohibition of the use of force, and therefore does not provide a legal basis justifying a military intervention.’
47 See, for example, P. C. Tange, ‘Netherlands State Practice for the Parliamentary Year 1998-1999’, (2000) 31 NYIL 190.
48 Allegations of Genocide case, Provisional Measures, Order of 16 March 2002, Declaration of Judge Nolte, para. 6, available at www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/182/182-20220316-ORD-01-05-EN.pdf. For an analysis of the NATO intervention in Kosovo see, among many, O. Corten, The Law Against War (2021), 529–32; D. Franchini and A. Tzanakopoulos, ‘The Kosovo Crisis – 1999’, in T. Ruys and O. Corten (eds.), The Use of Force in International Law – A Case-Based Approach (2018), 594.
49 See, for example, UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.5, supra note 9, at 12: ‘They are still bombing the citizens of Donbas, and they do not intend to stop at 14,000 dead, the vast majority of them in the Luhansk and Donetsk people’s republics. The aims of our special operation, declared on a basis of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, are being carried out and will be achieved.’
50 Gill speaks of ‘Russia’s (implicit) reliance on some or all’ of the possible justifications of resort to force aside from self-defence; see Gill, supra note 21. Milanovic asserts that ‘there is something like a humanitarian intervention argument’ in the justifications put forth by Russia; see Milanovic, supra note 21.
51 Allegations of Genocide case, Application instituting proceedings submitted by Ukraine, 26 February 2022, at 2–3, paras. 8–9, available at www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/182/182-20220227-APP-01-00-EN.pdf.
52 See Russian Federation Letter to the ICJ, supra note 6, para. 15 (emphasis in original).
53 Ibid., para. 20 (emphasis added).
54 See Green, Henderson and Ruys, supra note 21, at 24.
55 Allegations of Genocide case, Provisional Measures, Oral Proceedings, Verbatim Record 2022/5, 7 March 2022, Doc. CR 2022/5, at 29, para. 50 (‘Russia did not have any right whatsoever, by virtue of the convention, to engage in the military action launched on 24 February 2022’), and at 28, para. 44 (‘nothing in the convention authorizes a State to penetrate by force the territory of another State in order to put an end to, prevent, or punish genocide’) (our translation; official translation unavailable at the time of writing). See, more generally, ibid., at 27–30, paras. 41–52.
56 Lithuania, 19 July 2022, 5, para. 16; New Zealand, 22 July 2022, 3, para. 11; United Kingdom, 1 August 2022, 12, para. 32; Germany, 1 September 2022, 11, para. 36; USA, 7 September 2022, 15, para. 31; Sweden, 8 September 2022, 12, paras. 33 and 13, para. 38; Italy, 12 September 2022, 8, para. 27; Poland, 15 September 2022, 12, paras. 30 and 14, para. 35; Denmark, 16 September 2022, 6, para. 23; Finland, 21 September 2022, 7, para. 29; Estonia, 22 September 2022, 9, para. 33; Spain, 28 September 2022, 7, para. 30; Australia, 30 September 2022, 15, para. 41; Portugal, 7 October 2022, 10, para. 30; Luxembourg, 11 October 2022, 9, para. 29; Croatia, 13 October 2022, 8, para. 31; Czech Republic, 21 October 2022, paras. 28–9; Norway, 10 November 2022, 8, paras. 22–3; Bulgaria, 11 November 2022, 9–10, paras. 21, 10, paras. 23 and 11, para. 28; Malta, 24 November 2022, 7, paras. 25 and 9–10, para. 31; Slovenia, 24 November 2022, paras. 25 and 30; Slovakia, 1 December, 13, para. 49; Belgium, 2 December, 14, para. 46; Cyprus, 9 December, 6, para. 25; Liechtenstein, 15 December 2022, para. 20. All the documents are available on the website of the Court www.icj-cij.org/en/case/182.
57 See Zarbiyev, supra note 21: ‘This is nothing more than a shameless attempt made for the purposes of a pending litigation to preclude the finding of jurisdiction.’
58 UN, Report of the International Law Commission, UN Doc. A/73/10 (2018), at 134 (Commentary to Conclusion 6, para. 5) and 141 (Commentary to Conclusion 10, para. 4).
59 Allegations of Genocide case, Provisional Measures, Order of 16 March 2022, at 11, para. 45.
60 Ibid., at 5, paras. 18 and 13, para. 59 (emphasis added), available at www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/182/182-20220316-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf. The Court also stated (ibid., at 13, paras. 57–8): ‘A Contracting Party may resort to other means of fulfilling its obligation to prevent and punish genocide that it believes to have been committed by another Contracting Party, such as bilateral engagement or exchanges within a regional organization. However, the Court emphasizes that, in discharging its duty to prevent genocide, “every State may only act within the limits permitted by international law”, as was stated in a previous case brought under the Convention (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 (I), 221, para. 430). The acts undertaken by the Contracting Parties “to prevent and to punish” genocide must be in conformity with the spirit and aims of the United Nations, as set out in Article 1 of the United Nations Charter. In this regard, the Court recalls that, under Article 1 of the United Nations Charter, the purposes of the United Nations are, inter alia, “[t]o maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace”.’
61 Allegations of Genocide case, Provisional Measures, Order of 16 March 2022, Declaration of Judge Bennouna, para. 2 (see also paras. 7, 8), available at www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/182/182-20220316-ORD-01-02-EN.pdf.
62 Allegations of Genocide case, Provisional Measures, Order of 16 March 2002, Separate Opinion of Judge Robinson, para. 29, available at www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/182/182-20220316-ORD-01-04-EN.pdf. Without disagreeing substantively, Judge Xue noticed that ‘the legal grounds that the Russian Federation invokes for its military operations are Article 51 of the United Nations Charter on self-defence and customary international law. Nowhere has the Russian Federation claimed that the Genocide Convention authorizes it to use force against Ukraine as a means of fulfilling its obligation under Article I thereof to prevent and punish genocide’; Declaration of Judge Xue, para. 3, available at www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/182/182-20220316-ORD-01-03-EN.pdf.
63 See Nicaragua judgment, supra note 34, at 109, para. 207.
64 Ibid., at 134, para. 268.
65 Latvia, 21 July 2022, 16, para. 51; U.K., 1 August 2022, 21, para. 58; USA, 7 September 2022, 15, para. 29; Sweden, 8 September 2022, 15, paras. 47 and 16, para. 48; Romania, 30 March 2022, 10, para. 43; Poland, 15 September 2022, 9, para. 23; Denmark, 16 September 2022, 9, para. 38; Finland, 21 September 2022, 5, para. 23; Australia, 30 September 2022, 20, para. 52; Portugal, 7 October 2022, 12, para. 40; Norway, 10 November 2022, 10, para. 30; Cyprus, 9 December 2022, 7, para. 29.
66 O. Corten, ‘Opération Iraqi Freedom: peut-on admettre l’argument de l’“autorisation implicite” du Conseil de Sécurité?’, (2003) 36 RBDI 205.
67 For the 2008 conflict, see IIFFMC Report, supra note 45, vol. I, at 21, para. 17; vol. II, at 27. For the 2014 conflict see, for example, UNSC, Verbatim Record, UN Doc. S/PV.8714 (19 March 2014), at 9.
68 See IIFFMCG Report, supra note 45, vol. III, at 437–8.
69 Ibid., vol. II, at 283–4.
70 Ibid., vol. I, at 24, para. 22.
71 See, for example, UNSC, Verbatim Record, UN Doc. S/PV.3988 (23 March 1999), at 2–3; UNSC, Verbatim Record, UN Doc. S/PV.3989 (26 March 1999), at 5–6.
72 See UNSC, Verbatim Record, UN Doc. S/PV.8233 (14 April 2018), at 25.
73 See, among many, N. Hajjami, La responsabilité de protéger (2013), 558; Corten, supra note 48, at 490–540; C. Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (2018), 40–64; Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (2017), 75–7.
74 See UN Doc. S/2022/154, supra note 5, at 6.
75 Russian Federation, President of Russia, ‘Address by the President of the Russian Federation’, 21 February 2022, available at www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828: ‘I consider it necessary to take a long overdue decision and to immediately recognize the independence and sovereignty of the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Lugansk People’s Republic.’; UNSC, Verbatim Record, UN Doc. S/PV.8970 (21 February 2022), 11.
76 See UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.1, supra note 9, at 7.
77 See Kleffner et al., supra note 21; Gill, supra note 21; Wuerth, supra note 21.
78 See, for example, L. Visser, ‘Intervention by Invitation and Collective Self-Defence: Two Sides of the Same Coin?’, (2020) 7 JUFIL 292.
79 Institute of International Law, Tenth Commission, Sub-Group C – Military Assistance on Request, Res. (Session of Rhodes, 8 September 2011), Art. 2(2), available at www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2017/06/2011_rhodes_10_C_en.pdf. See also Green, Henderson and Ruys, supra note 21, at 22.
80 See UN Doc. S/2022/154, supra note 5, at 6.
81 See UN Doc. S/PV.8974, supra note 44, at 11; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.1, supra note 9, at 8.
82 See Russian Federation Letter to the ICJ, supra note 6, at 5, para. 19.
83 UNSC, Res. 2202, UN Doc. S/RES/2202 (17 February 2015), at 2–3, Ann. I, Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements (12 February 2015).
84 Ibid., at 5, Ann. II, Declaration of the President of the Russian Federation, the President of Ukraine, the President of the French Republic and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany in support of the ‘Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements’ (adopted on 12 February 2015).
85 Ibid., at 1.
86 C. Ryngaert and C. Griffioen, ‘The Relevance of the Right to Self-Determination in the Kosovo Matter: In Partial Response to the Agora Papers’, (2009) 8 Chinese Journal of International Law 573; C. Tomuschat, ‘Secession and Self-Determination’, in M. Kohen (ed.), Secession: International Law Perspectives (2006), 23, at 38–42.
87 See IIFFMCG Report, supra note 45, vol. II, at 138.
88 See, among many, O. Corten and A. Lagerwall, ‘La doctrine de la “sécession-remède” à l’épreuve de la pratique récente’, in J. F. Akandji-Kombe (ed.), L’homme dans la société internationale – Mélanges en hommage au Professeur Paul Tavernier (2013), 187; K. Del Mar, ‘The Myth of Remedial Secession’, in D. French (ed.), Statehood and Self-Determination (2013), 79.
89 See IIFFMCG Report, supra note 45, vol. II, at 279.
90 See Dinstein, supra note 73, at 72–5; Gray, supra note 73, at 68–73. For an overview of the discussions on this issue during the adoption of UNGA Res. 2625 (XXV) and 3314 (XXIX) see T. Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter (2010), 390–4.
91 See, generally, Franchini and Tzanakopoulos, supra note 48.
92 Island of Palmas (Netherlands, USA), Award, (1928) 2 RIAA 838.
93 See E. Lieblich, ‘The Soviet Intervention in Hungry – 1956’, in Ruys and Corten, supra note 48, 48.
94 See G. Hafner, ‘The Intervention in Czechoslovakia – 1968’, in ibid., at 143.
95 See G. H. Fox, ‘The Vietnamese Intervention in Cambodia – 1978’, in ibid., at 242.
96 See Corten, supra note 48, at 257.
97 M. Arcari, ‘Panama Canal’, in R. Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2012), vol. VIII, at 38–9, paras. 7–9. Hersch Lauterpacht mentions Panama’s recognition by the US as raising the question of premature recognition, which Lauterpacht considers as violating international law even pre-1945; H. Lauterpacht, ‘Recognition of States in International Law’, (1944) 53 Yale Law Journal 385, at 391, 405.
98 See UNGA Res. 68/282, UN Doc. A/RES/68/282 (27 March 2014) (100 votes in favour, 11 against, and 58 abstentions). For an analysis of this precedent see O. Corten, ‘The Russian Intervention in the Ukrainian Crisis: Was Jus Contra Bellum “confirmed rather than weakened”?’, (2015) 2 JUFIL 17; A. Lagerwall, ‘L’aggression et l’annexion de la Crimée par la Fédération de Russie: Quels enseignements au sujet du droit international?’, (2014) 1 Questions of International law 57; P. C. R. Terry, ‘The Recognition of New States in Times of Secession: Is State Recognition Turning into Another Means of Intervention?’, (2014) 20 Asian Yearbook of International Law 53. In the words of Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘Local leaders in Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk declared independence from Ukraine to establish the right to voluntarily join Russia or request assistance against Ukraine. The problem … is that the control exercised by pro-Russia parties has only occurred through unlawful Russian intervention. Russia’s violation of Article 2(4) vitiates the legality of any invitations by groups taking control of Ukrainian regions.’; M. E. O’Connell, ‘The Crisis in Ukraine – 2014’, in Ruys and Corten, supra note 48, at 866.
99 UNGA Res. 3314, UN Doc. A/RES/3314(XXIX) (14 December 1974), Ann. ‘Definition of Aggression’, Art. 1.
100 See Corten, supra note 48, at 158–9.
101 See UN Doc. S/PV.8970, supra note 75, at 12.
102 See notes 83–5 and accompanying text, supra.
103 See UN Doc. S/2022/154, supra note 5, at 6; see also Russian Federation Letter to the ICJ, supra note 6; UN Doc. S/PV.8974, supra note 44, at 11–12.
104 See UN Doc. S/2022/154, supra note 5, at 5–7.
105 See Nicaragua judgment, supra note 34, at 109, para. 207.
106 See Corten, supra note 48, at 403–35.
107 UNGA – UNSC, Letter Dated 3 October 2022 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. A/77/505 – S/2022/738 (7 October 2022), Ann.: Address by the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, on the occasion of the signing of treaties on accession of Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics and Zaporozhye and Kherson regions to the Russian Federation. The UNGA Res. adopted on 12 October 2022 (see note 109, infra) speaks of the ‘attempted illegal annexation’. This language is in reality more political than legal and points to a misunderstanding between the reality of the annexation itself and the question of whether there is a change of sovereignty over the annexed territories as a result of the annexation. The first of course does not imply the second. In our view, there was an annexation by Russia of the four eastern Ukrainian regions as much as there was an annexation of Crimea in 2014. This of course does not alter the fact that this annexation is illegal or that the sovereignty over these regions still belongs to Ukraine. The term ‘forcible annexation’ better reflects the text of Art. 3 of UNGA Res. 3314, which speaks of ‘any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another state’. Along the same lines, the UNGA Res. ES-9/1 of 5 February 1982 refers to the ‘effective annexation’ of the Syrian Golan Heights by Israel and the consolidation of the ‘annexation’ of occupied Palestinian territories. Naturally, the absence of adjectives like ‘attempted’ or ‘purported’ cannot be read as implying that these annexations are any less unlawful or any less unsuccessful in operating any change of sovereignty over the annexed territories.
108 UNSC, Albania and United States of America: Draft Resolution, UN Doc. S/2022/720 (30 September 2022); the result of the vote was ten in favour (Albania, France, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States), one against (Russian Federation), and four abstentions (Brazil, China, Gabon, India); UNSC, Verbatim Record, UN Doc. S/PV.9143 (30 September 2022), 4.
109 UNGA, Res. ES-11/4, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine: Defending the Principles of the Charter of the United Nations (12 October 2022); UN Doc. A/RES/ES-11/4 (13 October 2022). The discussions relating to the adoption of this resolution can be found in the following documents: UNGA, Verbatim Record, UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.12 (10 October 2022); UNGA, Verbatim Record, UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.13 (12 October 2022); UNGA, Verbatim Record, UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.14 (12 October 2022). The resolution was adopted by 143 votes in favour, five against, and 35 abstentions; see UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.14, at 12.
110 See UNSC, Verbatim Record, UN Doc. S/PV.9161 (21 October 2022), 14–7; UNSC, Verbatim Record, UN Doc. S/PV.9175 (31 October 2022), 7–9; UNSC, Verbatim Record, UN Doc. S/PV.9195 (16 November 2022), 14–7; UNSC, Verbatim Record, UN Doc. S/PV.9202 (23 November 2022), 10–13; UNSC, Verbatim Record, UN Doc. S/PV.9208 (6 December 2022), 10–13; UNSC, Verbatim Record, UN Doc. S/PV.9216 (9 December 2022), 6–9, 18.
111 See note 9 and accompanying text, supra.
112 The abstaining states were the following: Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burundi, Central African Republic, China, Congo, Cuba, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, India, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Senegal, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, Zimbabwe; see UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.5, supra note 9, at 15. It should be noted that the United Arab Emirates, which had abstained during the vote for the resolution condemning the Russian operation before the Security Council (see note 7, supra), voted in favour of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly.
113 See UN Doc. A/RES/ES-11/1, supra note 9, paras. 2, 3, 7.
114 ‘Ukraine’s application against Russia before the international Court of justice: joint statement, made on behalf of Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall islands, Micronesia, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, European Union’, 20 May 2022, available at www.gov.uk/government/news/ukraine-joint-statement-on-ukraines-application-against-russia-before-the-international-court-of-justice. See the interventions mentioned in note 56, supra.
115 See UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.1, supra note 9, 11 EU member States, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Norway, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, San Marino, Andorra, Monaco, and Liechtenstein; see also ibid., 13 Denmark (on behalf of Nordic countries: Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden), 14 France, 15 Georgia, 16 Poland, 17 Austria, 19 Czech Republic, 20 Switzerland, 21 New Zealand, 23 Bulgaria, 24 Italy; see UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.2, supra note 9, 2 Slovakia, 6 Liechtenstein, 7 Slovenia, 9 Ireland, 16 Greece, 19 Albania; see UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.3, supra note 9, 11 Luxembourg, 14 Spain, 19 Hungary, 20 Malta; see UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.4, supra note 9, 1 Andorra, 3 Moldova; see UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.4, supra note 9, 5 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 13 Romania, 13 Montenegro, 15 Cyprus, 15-16 Portugal, 17 North Macedonia.
116 See UN Doc. S/PV.8979, supra note 7, 9 Ghana; see also UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.3, supra note 9, 6 Ghana; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.4, supra note 9, 11 Niger, 16 Zambia; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.5, supra note 9, 3 Djibouti; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.2, supra note 9, 4 Fiji (on behalf of the member States of the Pacific Islands Forum – Australia, the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu); UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.3, supra note 9, 5 Palau, 7 Micronesia, 8 Australia, 11 Papua New Guinea, 18 Samoa, 23 Marshall Islands; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.1, supra note 9, 28 Singapore; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.2, supra note 9, 10 Japan, 23 Israel; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.5, supra note 9, 2 Myanmar, 22 Nepal, 23 Jordan; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.2, supra note 9, 5 Indonesia.
117 See UN Doc. S/PV.8979, supra note 7, 5 Mexico; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.2, supra note 9, 10 Mexico; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.1, supra note 9, 22 Panama (also on behalf of Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic); UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.2, supra note 9, 1 Uruguay, 13 Barbados, 14 Bolivia and Costa Rica, 16 Ecuador, 17 Peru, 18 Guatemala, 21 Chile; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.3, supra note 9, 3 Paraguay, 4 Dominican Republic and Suriname, 5-6 Antigua and Barbuda, 9 Guyana and Jamaica, 12 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 14-15 Belize; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.4, supra note 9, 4 Grenada, 6 Trinidad and Tobago; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.5, supra note 9, 6 USA; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.1, supra note 9, 27 Canada.
118 See UN Doc. S/PV.8979, supra note 7, 4 UK; see also UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.1, supra note 9, 15 UK; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.2, supra note 9, 3 Belgium.
119 See UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.2, supra note 9, at 14.
120 See UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.4, supra note 9, 10 Germany.
121 Ibid., 9 Argentina.
122 See UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.3, supra note 9, 2 Colombia.
123 See UNGA, Res. ES-11/4, supra note 109, last preambular para. and operative paras. 3, 4.
124 UNSC, Verbatim Record, (27 September 2022) UN Doc. S/PV.9138, 7. See also UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.12, supra note 109, 22 Liechtenstein; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.13, supra note 109, 18 New Zealand.
125 See UN Doc. S/PV.9138, supra note 124, 10. See also UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.13, supra note 109, 14 Cyprus, 15-16 Greece and 16 Liberia.
126 See UN Doc. A/RES/ES-11/1, supra note 9, para. 10.
127 See UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.2, supra note 9, 4 Netherlands.
128 Ibid., 8 Croatia.
129 Ibid., 6 Liechtenstein; other States used more vague terms, see ibid., 2 Slovakia, 3 Belgium, 9 Ireland, 10 Japan, 19 Albania; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.3, supra note 9, 11 Luxembourg; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.5, supra note 9, 6 USA. See also UN Doc. S/PV.9175, supra note 110, 4-5 Albania, 5 UK, 6 France, 7 Ireland, 15 Poland, 16 Latvia, 17 Germany.
130 See UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.4, supra note 9, 17 Bangladesh.
131 See UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.3, supra note 9, 18 Philippines; see also UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.2, supra note 9, 13 Maldives; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.3, supra note 9, 5 Brunei Darussalam, 18 Capo Verde, 21-22 Kuwait; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.4, supra note 9, 4 Nepal, 14 San Marino, 18 Vanuatu; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.5, supra note 9, 16-17 Sierra Leone.
132 See UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.1, supra note 9, 25 Brazil.
133 See UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.12, supra note 109, 12 Latvia also on behalf of Estonia, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, 13 Fiji, 14 European Union and Turkey, 15 Singapore and Costa Rica, 16-17 Poland, 17 Indonesia, 18 Malta and the Netherlands, 19 Luxembourg, 20 Albania, 21 Austria, 23 Switzerland, 24 United Kingdom, 24-5 Mexico; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.13, supra note 109, 1 Guatemala, 2 Ireland, 3 Italy and Romania, 4 Bulgaria, 5 Ecuador and Slovakia, 6 Republic of Korea, 7 Australia,7-8 Chile, 8 Vietnam, 9 Colombia and Czechia, 11 Moldova and Micronesia, 11-12 Croatia, 12 Hungary, 13 Spain, 14 Argentina, 15 Portugal; 16-17 Belgium, 17 Japan and Georgia, 17-18 Azerbaijan, 19 Slovenia and Uruguay, 20 Papua New Guinea, 22 Montenegro, 23 Ghana, 24 Cambodia and Democratic Republic of the Congo, 25 Palau, 26 Timor-Leste and Germany; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.14, supra note 109, 1-2 Canada, 4 France, 6 USA, 10 Nepal, 10-11 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 12 Angola and Saudi Arabia, 13 Algeria and South Africa, 14 Pakistan and Egypt, 16 Bangladesh, Thailand and Mauritius, 17 Brazil, 18 Bolivia.
134 See UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.1, supra note 9, 22-23 China; and see UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.5, supra note 9, 16. See also UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.4, supra note 9, 8 Vietnam, 11 Thailand; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.14, supra note 109, 5 China.
135 See UN Doc. S/PV.8979, supra note 7, 7 India; see also UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.2, supra note 9, 20–1; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.5, supra note 9, 18; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.14, supra note 109, 15. Along the same lines see UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.4, supra note 9, 12 Nicaragua; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.5, supra note 9, 23 Iraq; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.14, supra note 109, 17 Cuba.
136 See UN Doc. S/PV.8979, supra note 7, 11; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.5, supra note 9, 18 UAE; see also UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.4, supra note 9, 20 DRC and Nigeria, 21 Mauritius, 21-22 Tunisia, 22 Qatar; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.5, supra note 9, 1 Solomon Islands, 2 Pakistan, 4 Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Cambodia, 5 Azerbaijan, 12-13 Serbia, 20 Algeria.
137 See UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.5, supra note 9, 19 Iran; see also ibid., 20 Tanzania, 21 South Africa.
138 See UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.3, supra note 9, 17.
139 Ibid.
140 See UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.4, supra note 9, 8 Venezuela (who was not present during the vote on resolution ES-11/1); see also ibid., 12 Nicaragua.
141 See UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.4, supra note 9, 16. See also UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.5, supra note 9, 5 Belarus.
142 See UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.5, supra note 9, 19.
143 See UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.2, supra note 9, 20 (emphasis added).
144 All the States that voted against the resolution explained their position. Among the 35 States that abstained, the following 21 States chose not to take the floor and thus remained completely silent on their vote: Angola, Armenia, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
145 UNGA, Verbatim Record, UN Doc. A/76/PV.59 (23 February 2022), 22 Marshall Islands. See also ibid., 1 Czech Republic. Along similar lines see UN Doc. A/76/PV.58, supra note 44, 8 EU (on behalf of the European Union (EU) and its states members; North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iceland, Norway, Georgia, and Monaco align themselves with this statement), 10 Lithuania (on behalf of the eight Nordic-Baltic countries – Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Norway, Sweden), 14 Japan, 17 Turkey, 18 France, 20 Liechtenstein, 24 Croatia, 24-25 Netherlands, 26 Switzerland and New Zealand, 27 Italy; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.2, supra note 9, 8 Turkey, 16 Costa Rica; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.4, supra note 9, 5 Korea.
146 See UN Doc. A/76/PV.59, supra note 145, 2 Australia; see also ibid., 2 Moldova, 4 Romania and Bulgaria, 7-8 Palau, 8 Guatemala, 9 Uruguay and Peru, 11 Slovakia, 12 Austria, 13 Republic of Korea, 15 Kenya and Slovenia, 16 Singapore, 17 Ireland and Malta, 18 Luxemburg, 19 Spain, 21 Greece, 23 Portugal, 25 Cyprus; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.1, supra note 9, 19 Austria; UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.3, supra note 9, 19 Hungary.
147 See UN Doc. A/76/PV.59, supra note 145, 25 Dominican Republic; see also UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.2, supra note 9, 1 Uruguay.
148 See UN Doc. A/76/PV.59, supra note 145, 14 Belgium; UN Doc. A/76/PV.58, supra note 44, 22 Canada.
149 See UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.2, supra note 9, 16 Greece.
150 See UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.3, supra note 9, 9.
151 See UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.13, supra note 109, 21-22 Syrian Arab Republic, 24 Democratic Republic of the Congo; see UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.14, supra note 109, 13 Algeria, 15 Egypt, 16-17 Mauritius, 17 Cuba, 18 Bolivia, 20 Democratic Republic of the Congo; UNGA, Verbatim Record, UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.15 (14 November 2022), 17 Syrian Arab Republic, 17-18 Nicaragua, 19 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 22 South Africa, 23 Cuba, 25 Islamic Republic of Iran, 29 Venezuela.
152 UNGA, Res. ES-11/5, Furtherance of Remedy and Reparation for Aggression Against Ukraine (14 November 2022); UN Doc. A/RES/ES-11/5 (15 November 2022), para. 2.
153 Ibid., para. 4.
154 See UN Doc. A/ES-11/PV.15, supra note 151, 30.
155 See notes 9 and 10 and accompanying text, supra.
156 See note 109 and accompanying text, supra.