1 Especially the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States (G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) of Oct. 24, 1970); the Declaration on the Definition of Aggression (G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX) of Dec. 14, 1974) and the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes (G.A. Res. 37/10 (XXVII) of Nov. 15,1982). In the 7th paragraph (unnumbered) of the Preamble of The Hague Declaration, a complete listing of these and other documents was included.

2 S. 3, Para. 5, of the operative part of The Hague Declaration.

3 According to a decision made at the meeting in The Hague the following countries will be members of this Committee: Yugoslavia (President), Nicaragua, Iraq, Indonesia, Senegal, Angola and Iran.

4 S. 4, Para. 3, of the operative part of the initial draft of the Declaration.

5 The most immediate antecedent of The Hague Declaration is Para. C of Annex VI of the Final Document of the Conference of the Non-Aligned Ministers of Foreign Affairs, U.N. Doc. A/43/667.S/202112(1988).This was recalled in a preparatory document distributed by the Permanent Mission of Zimbabwe to the United Nations, in which the main objectives of the meeting were listed. According to this text, one of those main objectives was “ to encourage the acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ”. If this is compared with the text that was finally adopted in The Hague, it could well be said that in this respect, the meeting failed to achieve one of its aims.

6 In a very recent study on the optional clause, B. Bailey lists the more significant advantages of this mechanism. With respect to many of the member states of the Non-Aligned Movement, the following paragraph is very appropriate: “Article 36(2) also has a practical benefit in that it provides a relatively inexpensive and quick method to bring a dispute to adjudication when compared with arbitration which can be expensive for the parties. This factor perhaps accounts, in part, for the significant acceptance of the Optional Clause by African States some of which have made broad acceptances with few or no reservations. The quick and easy access to the Court, which has particular expertise in boundary disputes, seems particulary well suited to the likely need of African States in adjudicating potential disputes”. B. Bailey, The Optional Clause Reconsidered: Its Nature and Potential as a Future Source of Jurisdiction 45–47 (1987). See also for a general assessment of the optional clause, Rosenne, The Law and Practice of the International Court 103 (1985).

7 The following paragraph of a recent study undertaken by the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee is, in particular, relevant here: “An impression has somehow or other gained ground over the years that the proceedings before the International Court of Justice are of a so complex a nature that they can be handled only by European experts as a result of which governments are found vying with each other in the engagement of the services of lawyers from the European capitals for preparation of their pleadings and particularly for presentation of oral arguments. It needs to be emphasized that the proceedings before the Court could in most cases be handled by the partieš own legal experts and once this is understood and accepted the proceedings before the Court would cease to be a nightmare in terms of legal costs which it has been for some years”.Afro-Asian Legal Consultative Committee, Role of the International Court of Justice. Possible Wider use of the Court by Agreement of States Parties, U.N. Doc. 1/40/682 (1985) at 26.

8 See supra note 7, at 7.

9 Without making an exhaustive list, the most recent cases which relate to this are: Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) 1982 I.C.J. Rep. 18; Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriyav.Malta) 1985 I.C.J. Rep. 13; and, in a very specific sense, the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14. It is also interesting to note that many of the cases which are currently before the Court could be added to this list.

10 Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court 3 (1958).

11 B. Bailey, supra note 6, at 10–11.

12 Rosenne, supra note 6, at 103. See also L. Gross, Compulsory Jurisdiction under the Optional Clause:History and Practice, in L. Damrosch (ed.), The ICJ at a Crossroad 41–42 (1987).

13 1988–1989 I.C.J.Y.B. 60–95 (1989). It is worth noting that of the seven countries chosen to be part of the Ministerial Committee only two of them, Nicaragua and Senegal, have issued the declaration under Art. 36(2) of the Statute of the ICJ.

14 See Rosenne, supra note 6, at 419: “The chief importance of the system of compulsory jurisdiction is psychological”. See also Waldock, Decline of the Optional Clause, 1955–1956 British Yearbook of International Law 245, where he refers to the “multiplier effect” of the declarations.