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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 November 2008
The completion in 1986 of the Documents diplomatiques français, 1932–1939 permits a review of French Far Eastern policy during that troubled time characterized by J.-B. Duroselle as ‘la décadence.’ This massive documentary collection, however, still dose not provide a full picture of the forces which shaped French East Asian policy in the years before the outbreak of the Pacific War. Understandably focused upon European developments, it begins and ends, from the Far Eastern perspective, in medias res; that is, after the outbreak of the Manchurian crisis and before the Japanese occupation of Indochina. Moreover, like other compilations of what statesmen and diplomats said to each other, this one slights economic factors and, though to a lesser extent, the role of public opinion. Even taken in their own terms, the documents perhaps reveal more about what others said and did to the French than about what they themselves accomplished. That points to a more fundamental problem, for one can question whether anything so gelatinous as the French responses or lack thereof to developments largely beyond their control can even be described as ‘policy.’ Still, although much more work in archives and private papers will be necessary before the entire story can be pieced together, these documents do shed light on what passed for French policy in East Asia during the years before the outbreak of World War II.
1 Duroselle's, J.-B.La Déadence, 1932–1939 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1979) concentrates, quite rightly, upon the European scene. But given the increasingly interlocked power relations of the 1930s, his scant number of reference to East Asia, as well as the lack of any mention of the Brussels Conference (November 1937), is baffling. The problem appears to spring from his conviction that Indochina simply could not be defended. Taken in itself, that opinion is very probably correct. Certainly it was voiced at the time, as Duroselle indicates (p. 267), by Admiral Raoul Castex. But while others might well have shared this view, nobody in a position of power dared voice it, let alone act upon it. Castex's notion of falling back upon a bloc composed solely of France and her African possessions can be traced at least as far back as Onésime Relus' Lâchons l'Asie, Prenons l'Afrique (1904) which produced a violent reaction on the part of French imperialists committed to endeavours in the Far East.Google Scholar See Laffey, John F., ‘Imperialists Divided: The Views of Tonkin's Colon's Before 1914,’ Histoire sociale/Social History, IX, 19 (05 1977), pp. 92–113, p. 103. Other continuities reaching back to the turn of the century will appear later in this article.Google Scholar
2 For the French stake in East Asia on the eve of World War II, see the old, but still very useful Levy, RogerRoth, Andrew, French Interests and Policies in the Far East (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941).Google Scholar For the decline in the ability of one of the major forces behind economic imperialism to influence policy, see Laf-fey, John F., ‘Lyonnais Imperialism in the Far East, 1900–1938,’ Modern Asian Studies, 10, 2 (1976), pp. 225–48, 240–8. As for public opinion, the ambassadors in Tokyo, always suspicious of governmental orchestration, did try to take it into account. It proved more difficult to do so in the case of China.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
3 Account of a Meeting of 09 6, 1932, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Commission de publication des documents relatifs aux origines de la guerre 1939–1945, Documents diplomatiques français, 1932–1939, Ire série (1932–1935), I (9 juillet–14 11 1932) (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1964), pp. 275–80, p. 277. Henceforth these works will be cited as DDF with the date of publication.Google Scholar
4 Report of the French Delegation to Geneva, July 9, 1932, ibid, pp. 7–9, p. 9.
5 René Massigli, Associate Delegate at the Disarmament Conference, to Edouard Herriot, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sept. 22, 1932, ibid, p. 360.
6 Note of the Chinese Legation in Paris, Sept. 19, 1932, ibid, pp. 348–9, p. 348.
7 Massigli to Herriot, Sept. 23, 1932, ibid, pp. 376–7, p. 377.
8 Note of the Department (French Service of the League of Nations), Nov 18, 1932, DDF, Ire s., II (15 novembre 1932–17 mars 1933) (1966), pp. 22–6, p. 23.Google Scholar
9 Note of the Asia-Oceania Sub-Division; ‘Japan, China and the French Interests Involved in the Sino-Japanese Conflict,’ June 15, 1933, ibid, pp. 444–9, p. 444. For the roots of this kind of thinking, see Laffey, John F., ‘Racism and Imperialism: French Views of the “Yellow Peril,” 1894–1914,’ Third Republic/Troisième République, I, I (Spring, 1977), pp. 4–52.Google Scholar
10 DDF, Ires., II, p. 145.Google Scholar
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., p. 449.
14 ibid.
15 Damien de Martel, Ambassador to Japan, to Joseph Paul-Boncour, Minister of Foreign Affairs, March 13, 1933, Ibid, p. 800.
16 Wilden, Auguste, Minister to Peking, to Paul-Boncour, April 21, 1933, DDF, Ire s., III (17 mars–15 juillet 1933) (1967), pp. 274–5, p. 275.Google Scholar
17 Paul-Boncour to the Diplomatic Representatives of France in Peking, Tokyo, London and Washington, April 29, 1933, ibid., p. 375.
18 Leaving an interview with a despairing Soong, the French Minister noted the number of police, with drawn revolvers, who surrounded him and reflected that ‘in the disorder and jostling which, on these occasions, are inevitable, the least incident can provoke a killing.’ Wilden to Paul-Boncour, May, 3, 1933, Ibid., pp. 413–14, p. 414.
19 Baudet, Philippe, Chargéd'affaires at Nanking, to Wilden, July 17, 1933, DDF, Ire s., IV (16 juillet–12 novembre 1933) (1968), pp. 12–14, p. 12.Google Scholar
20 Ibid., p. 13.
21 Note of the Asia-Oceania Sub-Division, Oct. 2, 1933, Ibid., pp. 470–1, p. 471.
22 Japanese concern at this point tended to focus upon the activities of Dr Ludwig Rachjman, the League's representative in China. But their suspicion of him was easily matched by that of the French Chargé d'affaires in Peking who believed, realistically enough, that the plans of Rachjman and his associate, Jean Monnet, for a banking consortium which would draw upon Chinese and foreign capital to finance the projects of the National Economic Council, faced enormous obstacles. A nastier note sounded when the serious social failings of Rachjman and his wife entered into the balance: they had refused to join the circles in Shanghai and Nanking closed to Chinese, had adopted the Chinese view of the unequal treaties, had expressed shock at the troops in the foreign concessions, ‘and when they saw at Nanking the warflags of the various powers floating over the Yangtze, four hundred million Chinese almost came to appear, in their eyes, as an oppressed minority.’ Henri Hoppenot, Chargéd'affaires at Peking, to Louis Barthou, Minister of Foreign Affairs, April 19, 1934, DDF, Ire s., VI (13 mars–26 juillet 1934) (1972), pp. 297–301, p. 301.Google ScholarAlthough marked by affection for Rachjman, Monnet's, JeanMemoirs (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1978) reveal next to nothing about his own activities in China.Google Scholar
23 Declaration of the Japanese Government, APril 17, 1934, DDF, 1re s., VI, pp. 274–5, p. 275.Google Scholar
24 Fernand Pila, Ambassador, to Japan, to Barthou, April 23, 1934, ibid., pp. 330–2, p.331. Pila was a member of a Lyonnais family concerned with East Asia since the nineteenth century. For the activities of his father, see Laffey, John F., ‘Les racines de I'impérialisme français en Entrême-Orient,’ Bouvier, Jena and Girault, René (eds), L'ompérialisme français, d'avant 1914 (Paris: Mouton, 1976), pp. 15–37.Google Scholar
25 Barthou to André Lefebvre de Laboulaye, Ambassador to the United States, April 28, 1834, DDF, Ire s., VI, pp. 375–6, p. 376.Google Scholar
26 Pila to Barthou, Sept. 17, 1934, DDF, Ire s., VII (27 juillet–31 octobre 1934) (1979), pp. 479–81, p. 480.Google Scholar
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 In a discussion with the French ambassador, Sir Victor Wellesley, the head of the Foreign Office's Far Eastern section, noted that, while there were those who looked back to the Anglo-Japanese alliance with nostalgia and sought its renewal, ‘this suggestion has no chance of being accepted, as much because of the opposition of liberal opinion, as because of the consequences it would have in relation to the United States.’ Charles Corbin, Ambassador to Great Britain, to Gaston Doumergue, President of the Council, Oct. 12, 1934, ibid, pp. 723–5, p. 725.
30 Note of the Naval Staff (Naval Armaments Study Section), Oct. 11, 1934, ibid, pp. 710–15, p. 712.
31 Ibid, p. 713.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., p. 714.
34 Ibid.
35 Note of the Asia-Oceania Sub-Division, Jan 28, 1935, DDF, Ire s., IX (16 janvier–23 mars 1935) (1980), pp. 148–9, p. 149.Google Scholar
36 Wilden to Pierre Laval, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Feb 6, 1935, Ibid, pp. 273–4, p. 274.
37 Wilden to Laval, Feb. 21, 1935, Ibid, p. 392.
38 Wilden to Laval, March 7, 1935, Ibid, pp. 514–15, p. 514.
39 Note of the Asia-Oceania Sub-Division, March 16, 1935, ibid, pp. 553–4, p. 554.
40 Barbier, J.-B., Chargé d'affaires in Tokyo, to Laval, Nov. 12, 1935, DDF, Ire s., XIII (16 octobre–31 décemnre 1935) (1984), pp. 319–20, p. 319.Google Scholar
41 Pila to Pierre Etienne Flandin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, March 6, 1936, DDF, 2e série (1936–1939), I (1re janvier–31 mars 1936) (1963), p. 473.Google Scholar
42 Flandin to Pila, March 10, 1936, Ibid., pp. 486–7, p. 486.
43 Pila to Flandin, March 14, 1936, Ibid., pp. 553–4, p. 553.
44 Note of the Department, March 30, 1936, Ibid, pp. 708–10, p. 709.
45 Note of the Asia-Oceania Sub-Division, Sept. 28, 1936, DDF, 2e s., III (19 juillet–19 novembre 1936) (1966), pp. 428–30, p. 429.Google Scholar
46 Krammerer, Albert, Ambassador to Japan, to Yvon Delbos, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dec. 14, 1936, DDF, 2e s., IV (20 novembre 1936–19 janvier 1937) (1967), pp. 234–5, p. 234.Google Scholar
47 Ibid.
48 Note of the Asia-Oceania Sub-Division, Dec. 21, 1936, ibid, pp. 302–3, p. 303.
49 Henry, C.-A., Ambassador to Japan, to Delbos, April 28, 1937, DDF, 2e s., V (20 fevrier–31 mars 1937) (1968), pp. 604–10, p. 607.Google Scholar
50 Ibid., n. 1, p. 610.
51 Lieutenant Colonel Ch. E. Mast to Edouard Daladier, Minister of National Defense and War, June, 16, 1937, DDF, 2e s., VI (1er juin–29 septembre 1937) (1970), pp. 133–9, p. 138.Google Scholar
52 Lieutenant Colonel G. Sabbatier to Daladier, July 30, 1937, Ibid, pp. 251–5, p. 252.
53 Ibid, p. 255.
54 Delbos to Corbin, July 13, 1937, Ibid, pp. 370–1.
55 Note of the League of Nations Sub-Division, July 14, 1937, Ibid, pp. 381–3, p. 381.
56 Ibid, p. 383.
57 C.-A. Henry to Delbos, Sept. 12, 1937, Ibid, pp. 761–2.
58 Note of the Asia-Oceania Sub-Division, April 21, 1938, DDF, 2e s., IX (21 mars–9 juin 1938) (1974), pp. 450–4, p. 451.Google Scholar
59 Ibid.
60 With the ‘tacit assent’ of a China which had been assured by France that ‘its rights remained reserved,’ plans were being made for the gunboat Marne to land a civilian mission in the Paracels to construct signal and navigation works. Note of the Asia-Oceania Sub-Division, Oct. 5, 1938, DDF, 2e s., VII (29 septembre 1937–16 janvier 1938) (1972), pp. 38–41, p. 38.Google Scholar
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid, p. 39.
63 Ibid, p. 40.
64 Ernst Lagarde, Member of the French Delegation to the Consultative Committee on the Far East, to Delbos, Oct. 7, 1937, ibid, pp. 55–9, p. 57.
65 Delbos to C.-A. Henry, Oct. 25, 1937, Ibid, p. 226. The ban did not apply to French war materials ordered by the Chinese before July 15, 1937 nor to French and foreign materials which had left their ports of loading before Oct. 13, 1937.
66 C.-A. Henry to Delbos, Oct. 30, 1937, Ibid, pp. 284–5, p. 284.
67 C.-A. Henry to Delbos, Nov. 1, 1937, Ibid, pp. 298–9, p. 299.
68 Note of the Minister (Delbos), Nov. 6, 1937, Ibid, pp. 346–50, p. 348.
69 Ibid.
70 ibid, p. 346.
71 Jules Henry, Chargé d'affaires in Washington, to Delbos, Nov. 7, 1937, ibid, pp. 355–7, p. 355.
72 Jules Henry to Delbos, Nov. 11, 1937, ibid, pp. 390–2, 390, 391.
73 C.-A. Henry to Delbos, Nov. 13, 1937, ibid, p. 416.
75 C.-A. Henry to Camille Chautemps, Minister of Foreign Affairs par interim, Dec. 3, 1937, ibid., p. 594.
76 C.-A. Henry to Delbos, Jan. 13, 1938, ibid, pp. 901–3, p. 903.
77 Delbos to the Diplomatic Representatives of France in Tokyo and London, Jan. 21, 1938, DDF., 2e s., VII (17 janvier–30 mars 1938) (1973), pp. 32–3, p. 33.Google Scholar
78 Ibid.
79 Petit, Admiral, Commander in Indochina, to César Campinchi, Minister of Marine, May 6, 1938, DDF, 2e s., IX, pp. 653–5, p. 654.Google Scholar
80 Note of the Asia-Oceania Sub-Division, April 21, 1938, Ibid, pp. 450–4, p. 453.
81 An Interview of the Secretary General, May 20, 1938, Ibid, pp. 806–7, p. 807.
82 Daladier, Edouard, Minister of War, to Georges Bonnet, Minister of Foreign Affairs, May 23, 1938Google Scholar, ibid, pp. 863–5, 863–4.
83 Bonnet to Emile Naggier, Ambassador to China, June 3, 1938, Ibid., pp. 1009–10, p. 1010.
84 Communication of the Japanese Embassy in Paris, Oct. 26, 1938, DDF, 2e s., XII (3 Oct.–30 Nov. 1938) (1978), p. 387.Google Scholar
85 Bonnet, to Henry, C.-A., Jan 14, 1939, DDF, 2e s., XIII (1er décembre 1938–31 janvier 1939) (1979), pp. 650–1, p. 650.Google Scholar
86 Bonnet, to Henry, C.-A., Feb. 10, 1939, DDF, 2e s., XIV (1er Fevrier.–15 mars 1939) (1980), p. 163.Google Scholar
87 C.-A. Henry to Bonnet, Feb. 14, 1939, Ibid., pp. 195–6, p. 195.
88 Note of the Asia-Oceania Sub-Division, Feb. 17, 1939, ibid, pp. 239–40.
89 Bonnet to Frédéric Knobel, Chargé d'affaires at Shanghai, Feb. 20, 1939, ibid., pp. 239–40. Varenne, Alexandre, a former Governor General of Indochina, wanted to go considerably farther. In his view, it was necessary to finish once and for all with these methods of ‘perpetual evasions and subterfuges which have not succeeded…in attracting to us…the consideration of Japan, and which, on the other hand, begin to merit us on the part of China an attitude if not hostile, at least reserved, which is only too justified’. Having no illusions about the strength of the French forces in Indochina, he recommended looking north: ‘Reservoir of men, immense resources in materials, such can be this south China to which we are bound tightly by interests which have become common, and which only asks to show this community of interests by closer and closer accords, even by military cooperation.’ The Quai d'Orsay still showed no interest in this kind of thinking.Google Scholar Note of Alexander Varenne, Feb. 25, 1935, ibid, pp. 380–5, 380–1, 383.
90 Note of the Direction politique, March 31, 1939, DDF, 2e s., XV (16 mars–20 avril 1939) (1981), pp. 338–40, 339–40.Google Scholar
91 Bonnet to Corbin, April 7, 1939, ibid., pp. 500–1, p. 500.
92 Communication of the Embassy of China, April 13, 1939, ibid., pp. 604–7, p. 605. Plans for Franco-Chinese economic cooperation were elaborated in the spring of 1939. Industrial centres producing war materials, fertilizers and chemical products were to be founded in south China, especially in Yunnan, with the understanding that China ‘will engage itself not to create, in the southern provinces, industries capable of competing with our own without first coming to an accord with them.’ Indochina itself, especially Tonkin, was to be further industrialized. While the ports of Tonkin were to be improved, the rail and road networks there were to be developed in such a fashion as ‘to drain toward Indochina a part of the trade of south China. Finally, ‘economic advantages,’ most notably in regard to wolfram, tungsten and tin, were to be reserved to France ‘in return for the facilities which she will provide the Chinese government.’ The French, however, still drew the line at military cooperation: ‘As long as there is a chance of Japan remaining neutral in the case of generalized conflict, we cannot conduct military conversations, to which the Chinese government will doubtlessly give publicity and which will provoke immediately the sharpest reactions on the part of the Tokyo government.’Google Scholar Note of the Asia-Oceania Sub-Division, May 25, 1939, DDF, 2e s., XVI (1er mai–24 juin 1939) (1983), pp. 554–5; Note of the Asia-Oceania Sub-Division, June 6, 1939, ibid., p. 681.
93 Bonnet to C.-A. Henry, May 12 1939, ibid., pp. 328–9, p. 329.
94 Ibid.
95 Bonnet to Henri Cosme, Ambassador to China, May 2, 1939, ibid., pp. 6–7, p. 7.
96 Bonnet to René Doynel de Saint-Quentin, Ambassador to the United States, May 13, 1939, ibid, pp. 353–4, p. 354.
97 Bonnet to Corbin, June 17, 1939, Ibid., p. 880.
98 Ibid.
99 Final Report of the Franco-British Conference at Singapore, June 27, 1939, DDF, 2e s., XVII (25 juin–12 aou 1939) (1984), pp. 42–55, p. 44.Google Scholar
100 With the concessions in China and the maritime traffic in the South China Sea relegated to non-essential status, the military men defined their essential concerns as Singapore, Penang, the communications between Singapore and southern Indochina, the entire Indochinese coast, and Hongkong. Just how the withdrawal from the South China Sea might be squared with the defense of Hongkong was left unexplained.
101 Ibid, p. 54.
102 Note of René Cassin, July 13, 1939, Ibid, pp. 338–41, p. 338.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Cosme to Alexis Léger, Aug 5, 1939, ibid., pp. 734–6, p. 736.
108 Ibid.
109 Coulondre, Robert, Ambassador to Germany, to Bonnet, Aug 28, 1939, DDF, 2e s., XIX (26 aoû–3 septembre 1939) (1986), p. 178.Google Scholar
110 Note of the Asia-Oceania Sub-Division, Aug 26, 1936, ibid, pp. 48–50, 49, 50.
111 Saint-Quentin to Bonnet, Aug. 30, 1939, ibid., pp. 222–3, p. 223.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
