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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 January 2016
The article looks at the role of Italy in the decision-making arena of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), analysing the initiatives it put in place to address and influence the construction of a common defence. The article aims to explain the ability or inability of Italy to build up a consensus around its proposals. By studying two initiatives in the field of European defence and security, it seeks to determine the factors which resulted in the differing outcomes of Italian actions at the European level.
1. CFSP is the institutional mechanism created by member-states to coordinate their activity in foreign policy and put into motion common action on behalf of the EU. The ESDP is the mechanism created to provide a military instrument to support external action by the EU.Google Scholar
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83. The attention of political parties and public opinion was focused more on the Anglo-Italian document on the welfare state. Interview, Rome, 6 June 2003.Google Scholar
84. See Eurobarometer surveys.Google Scholar
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87. Albright's article is reproduced in: Rutten, ‘From Saint Malò’.Google Scholar
88. Reproduced in: Rutten, , ‘From Saint Malò’.Google Scholar
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102. Interview, Rome, 17 June 2003.Google Scholar
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