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Article 21 of the Rome Statute and the ambiguities of applicable law*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2009

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Extract

Article 21 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court determines, according to its very wording, the ‘applicable law’. It reads as follows:

‘ 1 . The Court shall apply:

(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence ;

(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict;

(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally recognized norms and standards.

2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions.

3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender as defined in Article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status..’

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press 2002

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References

1. Among the vast literature concerning the ICC, see especially Barboza, J., ‘International Criminal Law’, 278 Hague Recueil (1999) pp. 144 et seq.Google Scholar; Cassese, A., ‘The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections, 10 EJIL (1999) pp. 144 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar; de Guzman, M. McAuliffe, in Triffterer, O., ed., Commentary of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Baden Baden, Nomos 1999) pp. 435 et seq.Google Scholar; Pellet, A., ‘Applicable Law’, in Cassese, A., Gaeta, P. and Jones, J., eds., The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; A Commentary (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2002) pp. 1051Google Scholar; Saland, P., ‘International Criminal Law Principles’, in Lee, R.S., ed., The International Criminal Court. The Making of the Rome Statute (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 1999) pp. 213 et seq.Google Scholar

2. Chaumont, C. ‘La signification du principe de spécialité des organisations internationales’, in Mélanges offerts à Henri Rolin: Problèmes de droit des gens, (Paris, Pedone 1964) pp. 5566.Google Scholar

3. Contra, see the interesting article by Santulli, C., ‘Qu'est-ce qu'une juridiction internationale? Des organes répressifs internationaux à l'ORD’, 46 AFDI (2000) at pp. 6771.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4. See Pellet, op. cit. n. 1, pp. 1059–1062.

5. See for instance Art. 98.

6. Pellet, op. cit. n. 1, at p. 1074.

7. Cf., infra p. 12.

8. Supra pp. 9, 12.

9. McAuliffe de Guzman, op. cit. n. 1, at p. 445.

10. See McAuliffe de Guzman, loc. cit. n. 1.

11. See Pellet, op. cit. n. 1, at p. 1080; cf., Arsanjani, M., ‘The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, 93 AJIL (1999) at pp. 18 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Barboza, op.cit. n. 1, at p. 145.

12. See Verhoeven, J., ‘Vers un ordre répressif universel? Quelques observations’, 45 AFDI (1999) at pp. 55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

13. Art. 17, para. 1(a), Statute.

14. See Simma, B. and Paulus, A., ‘Le rôle relatif des différentes sources du droit international pénal: dont les principes généraux de droit’, in Ascensio, H., Decaux, E. and Pellet, A., eds., Droit international pénal (Paris, Centre de droit international de Université 2000) pp. 55 et seq.Google Scholar

15. See McAuliffe de Guzman, op. cit. n. 1, at pp. 438–439.

16. See Crawford, J., ‘The ILC's Draft Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal’, 88 AJIL (1994) p. 147.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

17. Cf., for instance L. Condorelli, in Ascensio et al., op. cit. n. 14, at p. 246.

18. For such a restrictive interpretation of the nulla principles, see Condorelli, ibid., at p. 248.