We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2024
Thomas Aquinas's use of the terms libero, libertas, and liberum arbitrium in the Summa theologiae gives us a wealth of information about free will and freedom. Human beings have free will and are masters of themselves through their free will. Free will can be impeded by obstacles or ignorance but naturally moves toward God. According to Servais Pinckaers, our freedom can be that of indifference (the morality of obligation) or that of excellence (the morality of happiness). The difference is that of free will moving reason versus reason moving free will. The freedom of indifference is the power to choose between good and evil. The will is inclined toward neither and freely chooses between them. The freedom for excellence is the power to be the best human being we can be. Here the rules, or what makes for a good human being, are the grounding for freedom. One who observes these rules has the freedom to become excellent. According to Aquinas, intellect and will have command over free will. This then is true freedom, and on this Aquinas and Pinckaers agree. We do not have freedom of indifference, we have freedom for excellence. Anything else makes us slaves.
1 This is a cursory survey, rather than an exhaustive exploration. In researching this, I have come to the conclusion that it would take a full dissertation or book in order to treat this subject adequately. I hope that this survey will whet the appetite by touching on major themes and issues.
2 Summa theologiae, Latin version, textum Leoninum (Romae: 1888), http://www.corpustomisticum.org; and English version, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Bros., 1947).
3 Pinckaers, Servais, Sources of Christian Ethics, trans. Sr.Noble, Mary Thomas O.P., (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1995)Google Scholar.
4 Some exceptions will be discussed at the end of this section.
5 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 24, a. 1, ad. 3; II-II, q. 52, a. 1, ad. 3; II-II, q. 95, a. 5, co.; III, q. 34, a. 2, arg. 3.
6 Ibid., I-II, q. 113, a. 3, ad. 1; II-II, q. 10, a. 12, co., and ad. 1; III, q. 27, a. 6, co.
7 Ibid., indifferent, II-II, q. 14, a. 3, arg. 3; III, q. 18, a. 4, arg. 3; flexible, II-II, q. 19, a. 11, co.; changeable, II-II, q. 137, a. 4, co.
8 See especially, ibid., II-II, q. 137, a. 4, co.
9 Ibid., II-II, q. 95, a. 5, co.
10 Even a psychotic person is admitted to be rational by psychiatrists, though we would scarcely call their decisions, or the belief system that allowed them to make such choices, moral. Examples that come to mind are serial killers and Charles Manson.
11 Ibid., I-II, q. 113, a. 3, ad. 1.
12 Ibid., II-II, q. 50, a. 2, co.
13 Ibid., II-II, q. 24, a. 10, ad. 3.
14 Aquinas, Thomas, Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, rev. ed., trans. Litzinger, C.I. O.P., (Notre Dame, IN: Dumb Ox Books, 1993)Google Scholar, book 3.
15 Ibid., book 3, lecture 1.
16 Ibid., book 3, lecture 3.
17 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 113, a. 3, ad. 1; II-II, q. 10, a. 12, co., and ad. 1.
18 Ibid., II-II, q. 2, a. 9, arg. 3. See also, I, q. 82, a. 3, co (the intellect assents of necessity to things connected to the first principles).
19 Ibid., I-II, q. 113, a. 8, ad. 3.
20 Ibid., I-II, q. 113, a. 7, co, and ad. 2.
21 Ibid., II-II, q. 25, a. 3, co.
22 Ibid., III, q. 18, a. 4.
23 For example, ibid., III, q. 15, a. 1, ad. 5: “A penitent can give a praiseworthy example, not by having sinned, but by freely bearing the punishment of sin. And hence Christ set the highest example to penitents, since He willingly bore the punishment, not of His own sin, but of the sins of others” (Ad quintum dicendum quod poenitens laudabile exemplum dare potest, non ex eo quod peccavit, sed in hoc quod voluntarie poenam sustinet pro peccato. Unde Christus dedit maximum exemplum poenitentibus, dum non pro peccato proprio, sed pro peccatis aliorum voluit poenam subire); and, ibid., III, q. 41, a. 2, co.: “Christ of his own free-will exposed Himself to be tempted by the devil, just as by his own free-will He submitted to be killed by his members; else the devil would not have dared to approach Him” (Christus propria voluntate se Diabolo exhibuit ad tentandum, sicut etiam propria voluntate se membris eius exhibuit ad occidendum, alioquin Diabolus eum advenire non auderet). See also, ibid., III, q. 22, a. 2, ad. 1; and ad. 2; III, q. 47, a. 4, ad. 2.
24 Ibid., II-II, q. 88, a. 4, ad. 3: habebat firmatam voluntatem in bono, quasi comprehensor existens.
25 See also, Pinckaers, Sources of Christian Ethics, p. 389, referencing Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, q. 25, a. 2. The connection between I-II, q. 25, a. 2, and the will is not obvious; and Pinckaers fails to enumerate it. I-II, q. 25, a. 2, is a discussion of the concupiscible passions and their relation to love; will is not mentioned. Aquinas says that concupiscence is “movement towards good,” and love is “the aptitude … of the appetite to good.” Then we must go back to I, q. 80, a. 1, the appetite is our desire for something; q. 82, a. 1, “the will must of necessity adhere to the last end which is happiness”; a. 2, ad. 1, “the will can tend to nothing except under the aspect of good”; and a. 5, ad. 2, the will has a “desire for good”; q. 82, a. 3, the concupiscible power is a power of the sensitive power, but the will is a higher power than the sensitive power, so the concupiscible power obeys the will. Now we have the connections. The will desires good, an appetite is a desire, and the concupiscible appetite obeys the will. Then we can go back to q. 25 and make the connection that the love and desire of the concupiscible passions is the faculty of the will.
Pinckaers goes on to say that “at the origin of the voluntary movement there exists a spiritual spontaneity, an attraction to the good…. One could speak of the will as imposing itself only in the case of some resistance to be overcome. This could be interior, issuing from our sensibility, or exterior, on the part of others” (pp. 389–90). It would be interesting to examine the passages where Aquinas says that Christ exercised his will and see if there is something that He is overcoming.
26 Further study would be needed in order to see whether the translators are adding something to Aquinas's thought on human will and free will or are consistent with it. Even though Aquinas says, in ibid., I, q. 83, a. 4, that free will is will, there seems to be some distinction between the two.
27 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 59, a. 3, ad. 1; II-II, q. 78, a. 1, arg. 7, II-II, q. 106, a. 6, ad. 3. Also see the discussion on will, love, and desire in note 25 above.
28 Ibid., II-II, q. 19, a. 6, arg. 2; II-II, q. 44, a. 1, arg. 2.
29 Ibid., II-II, q. 52, a. 1, ad. 3.
30 Ibid., III, q. 2, a. 10, co.; III, q. 46, a. 1, arg. 3.
31 Evil, ibid., II-II, q. 19, a. 1, arg. 1; death, III, q. 50, a. 2, arg. 1.
32 Ibid., II-II, q. 6, a. 1, co.
33 Ibid., II-II, q. 67, a. 4, ad. 2.
34 See, for example, ibid., I-II, q. 83, a. 1, ad. 1; III, q. 50, a. 1, co., III, q. 50, a. 3, arg. 2, III, q. 51, a. 3, arg. 1, III, q. 52, a. 7, co., III, q. 52, a. 8 s.c., and co.
35 Ibid., II-II, q. 44, a. 1, arg. 2, II-II, q. 44, a. 1, ad. 2.
36 Ibid., II-II, q. 117, a. 2, co.
37 Ibid., II-II, q. 67, a. 4, co.
38 Ibid., II-II, q. 88, a. 8, ad. 2.
39 Ibid., II-II, q. 104, a. 6, arg. 1.
40 Ibid., II-II, q. 10, a. 10, co.; II-II, q. 19, a. 4, co.; II-II, q. 108, a. 3, co.; II-II, q. 122, a. 4, ad. 3.
41 Ibid., III, q. 48, a. 4, co.
42 Ibid., II-II, q. 64, a. 2, ad. 30.
43 Ibid., II-II, q. 15, a. 3, co.
44 Ibid., II-II, q. 104, a. 6, ad. 1; III, q. 47, a. 4, arg. 1; III, q. 49, a. 1.
45 Ibid., II-II, q. 126, a. 1, co.
46 Ibid., III, q. 49, a. 2.
47 Ibid., III, q. 48, a. 6, ad. 3; III, q. 49, a. 3; III, q. 49, a. 5, co.
48 Ibid., III, q. 50, a. 1, co.
49 Ibid., III, q. 53, a. 8, sc.
50 Ibid., II-II, q. 69, a. 1, arg. 2.
51 Ibid., II-II, q. 65, a. 3, ad. 1.
52 Ibid., II-II, q. 10, a. 8, co.
53 Ibid., II-II, q. 69, a. 3, co.
54 Ibid., II-II, q. 81, a. 2, arg. 2.
55 Ibid., II-II, q. 104, a. 1, ad. 1.
56 Ibid., II-II, q. 104, a. 1, ad. 3.
57 Ibid., I-II, q. 79, a. 1, co.: “every sin is a departure from the order which is to God as the end: whereas God inclines and turns all things to Himself as to their last end” (Omne peccatum est per recessum ab ordine qui est in ipsum sicut in finem. Deus autem omnia inclinat et convertit in seipsum sicut in ultimum finem).
58 “He says that it is a ‘voluntary justification,’ because by his own free will man observes what is just according to his judgment and not according to the written law” (Et ideo dicit de ea quod est voluntaria iustificatio, quia scilicet ex proprio arbitrio id quod iustum est homo secundum eam servat, non secundum legem scriptam).
59 Only Christ and the saints are free from sin rather than freed from sin. “There are some, viz. mortal, sins from which they are free who are members of Christ by the actual union of charity,” ibid., III, q. 8, a. 3, ad. 2; the saints are free from unreasonable anger, III, q. 39, a. 6, ad. 4; “not free from sin,” II-II, q. 83, a. 13, arg. 3; interference of demons, II-II, q. 95, a. 8, co.
60 Christ had immunity from sin, ibid., III, q. 13, a. 3, ad. 2.
61 From whirling passions, ibid., II-II, q. 44, a. 1, co.
62 From hunger, nakedness, poverty, debt of love, ibid., II-II, q. 107, a. 1, ad. 3.
63 Freely offered, ibid., II-II, q. 86, a. 2, ad. 2; II-II, q. 100, a. 3, ad. 1.
64 To be free for the Word of God, ibid., II-II, q. 97, a. 1, ad. 3.
65 Give things freely, ibid., II-II, q. 100, a. 1, co.; II-II, q. 100, a. 3, co.; II-II, q. 100, a. 3, ad. 2; II-II, q. 100, a. 3, ad. 4; II-II, q. 100, a. 6, co.
66 Freed from an obligation, ibid., II-II, q. 100, a. 6, arg. 5; do not wish to be free from debt of love, II-II, q. 107, a. 1, ad. 3.
67 Ibid., II-II, q. 123, a. 3, co.; II-II, q. 129, a. 7, arg. 1.
68 Perfect freedom, ibid., II-II, q. 129, a. 7, co.
69 There is something to this in relation to the soul and organ transplantation. The rational soul no longer exists in an organ removed from a body. Does the rational soul of the new body exist in it once it is transplanted into that body?
It also has interesting applications to the Eucharist. Just as the whole soul is in each part of the body, so the whole Christ is in each Eucharistic host.
70 Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation, ed. McDermott, Timothy (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1989), p. 124Google Scholar.
71 While synderesis (q. 79, a. 12) is a habit with the same definition, the concupiscible is a power, an ability. Synderesis makes us inclined or well disposed toward the good (definition of “habit,” q. 83, a. 2), the concupiscible power makes us able to do the good and avoid the evil.
72 “The goodness of the divine will—which is the ultimate end,” I, q. 21, a. 4, co; “beatitude is the last end of the rational nature,” I, q. 26, a. 3, arg. 2; God is the last end of human beings, I-II, q. 79, a. 1, co.; II-II, q. 82, a. 1, ad. 1; II-II, a. 112, a. 2, ad. 3; God is the last end of the will of human beings, II-II, q. 122, a. 2, co.
73 Aquinas, A Concise Translation, p. 128.
74 Ibid., p. 128.
75 Ibid., p. 129.
76 Pinckaers, Sources of Christian Ethics, p. 327. All the page numbers in parentheses in this section are from Sources of Christian Ethics.
77 One example can be seen in some advice given on dieting. If you try to avoid some food, like ice cream or chocolate, completely, then if you break down and have some, you will probably splurge and overindulge. But if you resist small urges and feed large urges with a small treat (say, a quarter of a chocolate bar) then you can control your urges better. To be in control does not mean to resist completely and totally, but to manage the body effectively.
78 See chart in Pinckaers, Sources of Christian Ethics, p. 375.
79 Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II, prologue, original emphasis.
80 This sounds very Catholic: it is not either/or but both/and, the “two poles.”
81 Pinckaers, Sources of Christian Ethics, p. 384: bonum est faciendum, malum est vitandum.
82 See note 6 above. Indifferent, II-II, q. 14, a. 3, arg. 3; III, q. 18, a. 4, arg. 3; flexible, II-II, q. 19, a. 11, co.; changeable, II-II, q. 137, a. 4, co.
83 This does not include true insanity or delirium as mentioned above.
