Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-5nwft Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-07T06:11:11.145Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

In Defence of the Humanities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2024

Extract

While I was preparing this article, I read some remarks on the same subject by a U.S. politician with whom I found myself in substantial agreement. I then discovered, to my consternation, that the politician’s opinions had been compared with those of Adolf Hitler. So the reader must be warned that she can expect something pretty shocking in what follows.

We desperately need a philosophy of the humanities, both in the popular and in the narrower professional sense of the term ‘philosophy’. That is to say, we need to be able to spell out clearly and distinctly what the place of the humanities is in the good life, why they are important, and why (to put the matter in the most basic terms) they are worth paying for. I read that in parts of the U.S. the obvious obscurity and apparent triviality of the work of many representatives of the humanities has led to a cutting of funds and a precipitous fall in the number of students. I also note with some regret that, for the construction of a philosophy of the humanities in the sense that I have just given, recent trends in philosophy have been of very little help. In general I find a gaping hole in most prevailing modes of contemporary philosophy where the means for defending civilization— sustained reflection on the true and the good, and the best means of achieving them—should be.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 Provincial Council of the English Province of the Order of Preachers

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 See Roger Kimball, Tenured Radicals (New York: HarperCollins 1990), 4-5.

2 Kimball, op. cit.

3 Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979) typifies this tendency, maintaining as it does that philosophy must give up its traditional pretentions to provide foundations for knowledge and culture.

4 B. J. F. Lonergan, Method in Theology (London: Darton, Longman and Todd 1971), chapter 1.

5 See R. G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art (Oxford: Ctarendon Press, 1963), p. 220.

6 In the journal Polemic; cited in the London Observer, 29 September 1968.

7 J. A. C. Brown, Freud and the Post-Freudians (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1961) p. 2.

8 E.g., P. K. Feyerabend and J. Derrida.

9 See Kimball, op. cit., passim. Kimball's book provides a remarkable anthology of the doctrines and assumptions to which I have taken exception in this article.