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The Intellectual Animal
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2024
Abstract
Properly interpreted, Aquinas supports a transformative rather than an additive understanding of how the human intellect relates to the capacities human beings share with other animals, an understanding founded in a metaphysics. The soul (‘life-form’) is the substantial form that maintains an organism as a single being throughout life, and Aquinas holds that the human soul is the only substantial form in the human being. He respects the variety of appetitive and apprehensive capacities displayed by different animals, and has a high view of the perceptive (even inductive) powers of the higher animals: they ‘share somewhat in reason’. It is no surprise that we cannot easily identify a rigid boundary between our intellectual powers and the cognitive and conative powers we share with other animals; rather, the powers not only interact, they qualify each other. As Stephen Brock put it, ‘Rationality is a mode of intellect … intrinsically connected to the life of the senses, and therefore to the sense-organs … and to matter itself.’
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References
1 In what follows, I will make reference to various of Aquinas's works: DV: Disputed Questions on Truth (Quaestiones disputatae De veritate) (c. 1256-1259); SCG: Summa Contra Gentiles (Tractatus de fide catholica, contra Gentiles [contra errores infidelium]) (1261-1263); SLA: Commentary on Aristotle's On the Soul (Sententia Libri De anima) (1267-1268); SP: Commentary on Aristotle's Physics (Sententia super Physicam) (c. 1268-1269); ST: Summa Theologiae (1265-1273); SLE: Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (Sententia libri Ethicorum) (1271-1272); CM: Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics (In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum expositio) (1271-1272); Super I Cor: Commentary on First Corinthians (Super Epistolas S. Pauli Lectura) (possibly 1269-1273); CT: Compendium of Theology (Compendium theologiae ad fratrem Reginaldum socium suum carissimum) (c. 1273).
2 I am grateful to the John Templeton Foundation grant, Virtue, Happiness and the Meaning of Life, for support of my work on Aquinas. I am grateful to Hank Vogler, Irad Kimhi, and Jay Schleusener for discussion of some of the material in this essay. Partial drafts of an earlier foray into this topic were read at the 2015 annual conference of the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues in Oxford, to the Departments of Philosophy at the University of St Paul and Wheaton College, and at the Metaphysics of Morals Conference at the New York University Catholic Center in 2015, as well as inspiring parts of an essay read at the Thomistic Circles, Dominican House of Studies in Washington, D.C. and at the Symposium Thomisticum in Paris in 2016.
3 ST, III, q.2, a.2 ad 2: Dignius autem est alicui quod existat in aliquo se digniori, quam quod existat per se. Et ideo ex hoc ipso humana natura dignior est in Christo quam in nobis, quia in nobis quasi per se existens propriam personalitatem habet, in Christo autem existit in persona Verbi. Sicut etiam esse completivum speciei pertinet ad dignitatum formae; tamen sensitivum nobilius est in homine propter coniunctionem ad nobiliorem formam completivam, quam sit in bruto animali, in quo est forma completiva.
4 Boyle, Matthew, ‘Additive Theories of Rationality: A Critique,’ European Journal of Philosophy (2016), Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 527-555CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
5 Matthew Boyle, ‘Additive Theories of Rationality: A Critique’, fn. 9, p. 552.
6 Matthew Boyle, ‘Additive Theories of Rationality: A Critique’, p. 550.
7 I gather from scholarly work that Aquinas may have taken some of his understanding of Plato from Nemesius’ treatise on human nature, a work that Aquinas mistakenly attributed to Gregory of Nyssa.
8 Pegis, Anton C., At the Origins of the Thomistic Notion of Man, The Saint Augustine Lecture 1962, (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1963), p. 18Google Scholar.
9 Stephen Brock emphasizes that the formality in question is such that what counts as matter is always relative to the form at issue, as the letters ‘b’ and ‘a’ are matter with respect to the syllable ba, which could in turn be matter with respect to a word. Both form and matter are highly abstract terms. See Stephen L. Brock, The Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas: A Sketch, (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2015), p. 41. See also SP 1.13 (118). Lawrence Dewan gives attention to the place of matter in Aquinas's understanding of substances in various essays. See, for example, Dewan, Lawrence, St. Thomas Aquinas and Form as Something Divine in Things (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2007), pp. 25-29Google Scholar.
10 For concise, clear treatment of the topic, see Stephen L. Brock, The Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas: A Sketch, pp. 40-44.
11 Thompson, Michael, Life and Action: Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical Thought, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 57CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
12 Thompson develops his argument over the course of the whole of the first part of Life and Action [pp. 25-84]. See also, Thompson, Michael, ‘The Representation of Life’, in Virtues and Reasons, Hursthouse, Rosalind, Lawrence, Gavin, and Quinn, Warren, editors, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 247-297Google Scholar; and ‘Apprehending Human Form’, in O'Hear, Anthony, editor, Modern Moral Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 47-74CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
13 See, for example, SLA II.I.2; CM Lib. VIII, lect. 5 (1767)
14 ST, I, q. 58, a. 3: . . . inferiores intellectus, scilicet hominum, per quondam motum et discursum intellectualis operationis perfectionem in cognitione veritatis adipiscuntur; dum scilicet ex uno cognito in aluid cognitum procedunt. Si autem statim in ipsa cognitione principii noti, inspicerent quasi notas omnes conclusiones consequentes, in eis discursus locum non haberet. Et hoc est in angelis, quia statim in illis quae primo naturaliter cognoscunt, inspiciunt omnia quaecumque in eis cognosci possunt.
15 This aspect of form is the topic of Lawrence Dewan's St. Thomas Aquinas and Form as Something Divine in Things.
16 DV, q. 25, a. 2: Sciendum est autem, quod tam ex parte apprehensivarum virium quam ex parte appetitivarum sensitivae partis, aliquid est quod competit sensibili animae secundum propriam naturam; aliquid vero, secundum quod habet aliquam participationem modicam rationis, attingens ad ultimum eius in sui supremo.. Sicut vis imaginativa competit animae sensibili secundum propriam rationem, quia in ea reservantur formae per sensum acceptae; sed vis aestimativa, per quam animal apprehendit intentiones non acceptas per sensum, ut amicitiam vel inimicitiam, inest animae sensitivae secundum quod participat aliquid rationis: unde ratione huius aestimationis dicuntur animalia quamdam prudentiam habere. . . . Et similiter ex parte sensitivae. Nam quod animal appetat id quod est delectabile secundum sensum, quod ad concupiscibilem pertinet, hoc est secundum propriam rationem sensibilis animae; sed quod relicto delectabili appetit victoriam, quam consequitur cum dolore, quod ad irascibilem pertinet, competit ei secundum quod attingit aliqualiter appetitum superiorem.
17 Price, H. H., Thinking and Experience, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 42CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
18 CM, I.1.10: Animalibus vero immobilibus sufficit ad proprias operationes, praesentis sensibilis acceptio, cum ad distans non moveantur; et ideo sola imaginatione confusa habent aliquem motum indeterminatum.
19 CM, Lib. I, lect. 1 (11): Ex hoc autem, quod quaedam animalia memoriam habent, et quaedam non habent, sequitur quod quaedam sunt prudentia et quaedam non. Cum enim prudentia ex praeteritorum memoria de futuris provideat.
20 CM, Lib. I, lect. 1 (12): Inter ea vero, quae memoriam habent, quaedam habent auditum et quaedam non. Quaecumque autem auditum non habent, ut apes, vel si quod aliud huiusmodi animal est, licet prudentiam habere possint, non tamen sunt disciplinabilia, ut scilicet per alterius instructionem possint assuescere ad aliquid faciendum vel vitandum: huiusmodi enim instructio praecipue recipitur per auditum: unde dicitur in libro de sensu et sensato, quod auditus est sensus disciplinae. Quod autem dicitur apes auditum non habere, non repugnat ei, quod videntur ex quibusdam sonis exterreri. Nam sicut sonus vehemens occidit animal, et scindit lignum, ut in tonitruo patet, non propter sonum, sed propter commotionem aeris vehementem in quo est sonus: ita animalia, quae auditu carent, iudicium de sonis non habendo possunt per sonos aereos exterreri. Illa vero animalia, quae memoriam et auditum habent, et disciplinabilia et prudentia esse possunt.
21 One might wonder here about the vegetative aspects of sentient life—nutrition, growth, and reproduction. I take it as fairly obvious that all of these aspects are shaped by the substantial form of the animal in question. These vital operations, and what is needed to sustain an animal, and allow for the ongoing reproduction of its species, are manifestly geared to the kind of animal in question. Bovine digestion is very different from feline digestion, both of which are unlike the nutritive and reproductive activities of birds and fishes and frogs.
22 For a detailed account of the twists and turns in Aquinas's story about how sentience works, see, e.g., White, A. Leo, ‘Instinct and Custom’, The Thomist, vol. 66 (2002): 577-605CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
23 Deely, John N., ‘Animal Intelligence and Concept-Formation’, The Thomist, vol. 35 (1971), pp. 63-64CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
24 On the destitution of the disembodied human soul, see, for example, Super I Cor., ch. 15, 1ect. 2 (Super Epistolas S. Pauli Lectura, 8th ed. rev., 2 vols., ed. Raphaelis Cai, O.P. [Turin: Marietti, 1953], 1: 411b, n. 924): ‘The soul since it is a part of the body of man, is not the whole man, and my soul is not I. So, although the soul obtains salvation in another life, however, not I or any man.’ ( anima autem cum sit pars corporis hominis, non est totus homo, et anima mea non est ego; unde licet anima consequatur salutem in alia vita, non tamen ego vel quilibet homo.
25 CT, ch. 154: Neque etiam praedicta identitas secundum numerum impeditur ex hoc quod corporeitas non redeat eadem numero, cum corrupto corpore corrumpatur. Nam si per corporeitatem intelligatur forma substantialis, per quam aliquid in genere substantiae corporeae ordinatur, cum non sit unius nisi una forma substantialis, talis corporeitas non est aliud quam anima. Nam hoc animal per hanc animam non solum est animal, sed animatum corpus, et corpus, et etiam hoc aliquid in genere substantiae existens: alioquin anima adveniret corpori existenti in actu, et sic esset forma accidentalis. Subiectum enim substantialis formae non est actu hoc aliquid, sed potentia tantum: unde cum accipit formam substantialem, non dicitur tantum generari secundum quid hoc aut illud, sicut dicitur in formis accidentalibus, sed dicitur simpliciter generari, quasi simpliciter esse accipiens, et sic corporeitas accepta eadem numero manet, rationali anima eadem existente.
26 Ibid.: Unde cum unio sit quaedam relatio, ac per hoc sit accidens, eius diversitas secundum numerum non tollit identitatem subiecti. Similiter nec diversitas potentiarum secundum numerum animae sensitivae et vegetativae, si tamen corrumpi ponantur: sunt enim in genere accidentis potentiae naturales coniuncti existentes, nec a sensu sumitur sensibile secundum quod est differentia constitutiva animalis, sed ab ipsa substantia animae sensitivae, quae in homine est eadem secundum substantiam cum rationali.
27 Stephen Brock, The Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, p. 79.