¹ Cf. Ressourcement Thomism: Sacred Doctrine, the Sacraments, and the Moral Life, ed. Hütter, Reinhard and Levering, Matthew (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2010)Google Scholar.

² See, for example, Oakes, Edward T. S.J., “The Paradox of Nature and Grace: On John Milbank's The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate Concerning the Supernatural,” Nova et Vetera 4 (2006): 667–95Google Scholar, especially 676–95; Hütter, Reinhard, “Desiderium Naturale Visionis Dei—Est autem duplex hominis beatitudo sive felicitas: Some Observations about Lawrence Feingold's and John Milbank's Recent Interventions in the Debate over the Natural Desire to See God,” Nova et Vetera 5 (2007): 81–131Google Scholar, especially 89–96; Healy, Nicholas J. III, “Henri de Lubac on Nature and Grace: A Note on Some Recent Contributions to the Debate,” Communio 35 (2008): 535–64, at 551–52Google Scholar. See also Waddell, Michael M., “Faith and Reason in the Wake of Milbank and Pickstock,” International Philosophical Quarterly 48 (2008): 381–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The current debate about nature and grace is much more extensive, of course, than is debate about Milbank's view in particular.

³ Cf. Milbank, John, “The New Divide: Romantic versus Classical Orthodoxy,” Modern Theology 26 (2010): 26–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ See Milbank, John, The Suspended Middle: Henri de Lubac and the Debate concerning the Supernatural (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005), 96, 97, 108Google Scholar. For highly problematic late-medieval and Baroque understandings of God and the creature as concurring partial causes, see Schmutz, Jacob, “La doctrine médiévale des causes et la théologie de la nature pure (XIIIe-XVIIe siècles),” Revue Thomiste 101 (2001): 217–64Google Scholar; Muralt, André de, “La causalité aristotélicienne et la structure de pensée scotiste,” Dialectica 47 (1993): 121–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar, especially 135–36 on Scotus and Ockham and 137–39 on Calvin's reaction. As Milbank points out, Schmutz identifies Bonaventure's position as already problematic. Schmutz's essay appears in a symposium that has been published in English as Surnaturel: A Controversy at the Heart of Twentieth-Century Thomistic Thought, ed. Bonino, Serge-Thomas O.P., trans. Williams, Robert (Ave Maria, FL: Sapientia Press, 2009)Google Scholar.

⁵ Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 95; he cites Laruelle, François, Principes de la Non-philosophie (Paris: PUF, 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Laruelle's, “Qu'est ce que la non-philosophie?” in Initiation à le Pensée de François Laruelle, ed. Blanco, Juan Diego (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1997), 13–69Google Scholar.

⁶ Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 94.

⁷ Ibid., 96; cf. Grummett, David, “Eucharist, Matter and the Supernatural: Why de Lubac Needs Teilhard,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 10 (2008): 165–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Johnson, Elizabeth A. C.S.J., “Does God Play Dice? Divine Providence and Chance,” Theological Studies 57 (1996): 3–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For further discussion of Bruaire, see López, Antonio F.S.C.B., Spirit's Gift: The Metaphysical Insight of Claude Bruaire (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2006)Google Scholar.

⁸ Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 99.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., 100.

¹¹ Ibid., 101. Milbank cites Summa contra Gentiles III, ch. 147 and In Rom., ch. 11, lect. 3.

¹² Ibid., 100.

¹³ Ibid., 102.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ I, q. 105, a. 3.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid. Aquinas explains that he does not thereby give the created intellect a merely passive role: “The intellectual operation is performed by the intellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds from God as from its first cause” (ad 1). Likewise he notes, “The intellectual light together with the likeness of the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but it is a secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle” (ad 2).

¹⁸ I, q. 105, a. 3, ad 3.

¹⁹ I, q. 12, a. 2.

²⁰ I, q. 12, a. 2, ad 3.

²¹ II-II, q. 1, a. 4, ad 3.

²² II-II, q. 2, a. 3; cf. I, q. 1, a. 1.

²³ II-II, q. 2, a. 3.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ II-II, q. 23, a. 1. Cf. Bonino, Serge-Thomas O.P., “‘Nature and Grace’ in the Encyclical Deus Caritas Est,” trans. Gaffney, Shannon, Nova et Vetera 5 (2007): 231–48Google Scholar.

²⁶ II-II, q. 24, a. 2.

²⁷ I, q. 105, a. 5.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ I-II, q. 110, a. 2, ad 2.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ I-II, q. 110, a. 2.

³² See I, q. 108, a. 4; cf. q. 108, a. 7.

³³ I, q. 108, aa. 6 and 8. See Dempsey, “Providence, Distributive Justice, and Divine Government in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas,” 381–82.

³⁴ I, q. 108, a. 8. See also, regarding the fallen angels, I, q. 109, aa. 3 and 4. For an overview of Aquinas's theology of angels in light of biblical and patristic teaching, see Bonino, Serge-Thomas O.P., Les anges et les démons (Paris: Parole et Silence, 2007), 15–71Google Scholar.

³⁵ II-II, q. 24, a. 3, sed contra. Aquinas explains that “the quantity of charity depends neither on the condition of nature nor on the capacity of natural virtue, but only on the will of the Holy Spirit” (II-II, q. 24, a. 3).

³⁶ Cf. I, q. 95, a. 1; II-II, q. 5, a. 1.

³⁷ Milbank, The Suspended Middle, 96, 98, 101.

³⁸ Ibid., 102.

³⁹ I, q. 95, a. 1. Romanus Cessario, O.P. makes this point in his “Cardinal Cajetan and His Critics,” Nova et Vetera 3 (2005): 109–18, at 117Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ I, q. 95, a. 1