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Thomas Aquinas and the Modern and Contemporary Debate on Evil

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2024

Agustín Echavarría
Agustín Echavarría*
Affiliation:
Universidad de Navarra
*
aechavarria@unav.es
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Abstract

This article aims to demonstrate that Thomas Aquinas's metaphysics of being, in which evil is considered a privation or lack of perfection introduced only by the creature against God's intention, is a remarkable starting point for solving the main problems involved in the modern and contemporary debate on the problem of evil. It also seeks to prove that Aquinas's position is neither reducible to an ‘optimistic theodicy’ –such as Leibniz's theodicy– nor to a ‘free will defence’.

Keywords

Thomas AquinasEvilPrivationOptimismTheodicyFree Will Defence
Type
Original Article
Information
New Blackfriars , Volume 94 , Issue 1054 , November 2013 , pp. 733 - 754
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 The Dominican Council.

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Footnotes

1

I am grateful to William E. Carroll, Ignacio Silva, Andrew Pinsent and Orlando Poblete for their comments on earlier versions of this paper, and to Enrique Alarcón for his suggestions on a Thomistic approach to the compatibilism vs. libertarianism debate.

References

2 In fact, as sustained by R. Rovira, it is not properly speaking a ‘tetra-lemma’, since a contradiction of the concept of God seems to follow from the first three hypotheses, but not from the fourth. R. Rovira, ‘Si quidem Deus est, unde mala? Examen de la adecuación del argumento del libre albedrío como solución de la aporía capital de la teodicea’, Anuario Filosófico XLIII/1 (2010), pp. 121–159.

3 Lactantius, Liber de ira Dei, c. XIII (PL 7, 120B-121A). Reference is taken from R. Rovira, ‘Si quidem Deus est, unde mala?’, p. 123.

4 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3, obj. 1.

5 Boethius, Philosophiae consolatio, I, 4, 30; Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina, XCIV, p. 9. Translations of all Latin texts are mine.

6 McGrath, S. J., “Boehme, Hegel, Schelling, and the Hermetic Theology of Evil”, Philosophy and Theology 18 (2006), pp. 257–285CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 Schelling, F. W. J., Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2011)Google Scholar.

8 Pareyson, L., Ontologia della libertà: el male e la sofferenza (Torino: Enaudi, 2000)Google Scholar.

9 See Hartshorne, Ch., Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984)Google Scholar.

10 See Polkinghorne, J., “Kenotic Creation and Divine Action”, in Polkinghorne, J. J., (ed.), The Work of Love: Creation as Kenosis (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001)Google Scholar.

11 See for example, Jonas, H., Il concetto di Dio dopo Auschwitz (Genova: Melangolo, 1991)Google Scholar; Moltmann, J., The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ As the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology (London: SCM Press, 1973)Google Scholar.

12 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, a. 3, ad 1.

13 Leibniz, G. W., Textes inédits d'après les manuscrits de la Bibliothèque provinciale de Hanovre, ed. Grua, G. (Presses Universitaires de France, 1948), p. 370Google Scholar.

14 G. W. Leibniz, Essais de Théodicée [1710], Die Philosophische Schriften, ed. Gerhardt, C. J., Berlin, 1875–1890Google Scholar, reimp. Olms, Hildesheim, 1965, VI, p. 258.

15 Ibidem, p. 258.

16 Ibidem, p. 255.

17 Ibidem, p. 115.

18 Ibidem, pp. 203–204.

19 Ibidem, p. 117.

20 Ibidem, p. 242. On Leibniz's concept of ‘permission’ and its metaphysical grounding, see: Echavarría, Agustín, Metafísica leibniziana de la permisión del mal (Pamplona: Eunsa, 2011)Google Scholar and Echavarría, , ‘Leibniz's Conception of God's Permissive Will’, in Rateau, P., ed., Lectures et interprétations des Essais de Théodicée de G. W. Leibniz, Studia Leibnitiana, Sonderheft 40, pp. 191–209Google Scholar.

21 Plantinga, Alvin, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1974), pp. 27–28Google Scholar; Inwagen, Peter Van, The Problem of Evil. The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of St Andrews in 2003 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 7CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22 Even though the term ‘consecuencialism’ is used with a different meaning in moral philosophy, I use it here following Nadler's characterisation of Leibniz's theodicy: Nadler, S., ‘Choosing a Theodicy: The Leibniz-Malebranche-Arnauld connection’, Journal of the History of Ideas 55 (1994), p. 581CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

23 Roark, E., ‘Aquinas's Unsuccessful Theodicy’, Philosophy and Theology 18/2 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Estrada, J. A., La imposible teodicea (Madrid: Trotta, 1997)Google Scholar.

24 G. W. Leibniz, Essais de Théodicée [1710], p. 246.

25 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I. q. 49, a. 2.

26 Ibidem, I, q. 48, a. 2, ad 3.

27 Ibidem, I, q. 48, a. 2; also Summa Contra Gentiles III, c. 71.

28 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles III, c. 71. On the participation of the ‘form of being’ as the ultimate reason for the permission of evil, seeDewan, L., ‘Thomas Aquinas and Being as a Nature’, Acta Philosophica 12 (2003), pp. 123–135Google Scholar.

29 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 48, a. 2; Summa Contra Gentiles III, c. 71.

30 Ibidem, I, q. 48, a. 2, ad 3; also I, q. 48, a. 2; and also I. q. 49, a. 2.

31 Ibidem, I, q. 48, a. 2, ad 3.

32 This is what J. Maritain has called the first instance of ‘indifferent permission’ of evil: Dieu et la permission du mal (Paris: Desclée De Brouwer, 1963), p. 64Google Scholar.

33 Some might object that for Leibniz evil does not contribute per se any perfection to the universe. It must be said that, in his early writings, Leibniz describes evil as a ‘dissonance’ within the universal harmony that, by its own nature, contributes to the perfection of the universe (see Agustín Echavarría, Metafísica leibniziana de la permisión del mal, pp. 53–80); in his mature writings, by means of adopting the classic definition of evil as ‘privation’, Leibniz devaluates the ontological input of evil; nevertheless, in this perspective, evil is still a ‘necessary possibility’ and, therefore, an essential element for the constitution of the best possible world (ibid. pp. 143–148 y 207–213).

34 Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 46, q. 1, a. 3.

35 Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 46, q. 1, a. 3.

36 Ibidem, dist. 46, q. 1, a. 3.

37 Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., d. 46, a. 3, ad 6.

38 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I q. 49 a. 2.

39 Ibidem, I, q. 48, a. 6; I, q. 49 a. 2.

40 Ibidem, I, q. 48, a. 6.

41 Ibidem.

42 Ibidem, d. 46, q. 1, a. 3, ad 6; on this issue, Thomas Aquinas clearly follows Augustine, De civitate Dei, XI, XXIII, 22–31, Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina XLVIII, p. 342.

43 That is why Aquinas states that even if the first man's sin made the Incarnation of the Son of God possible, nevertheless such sin was not a necessary condition for obtaining that good: Summa Theologiae, III q. 1 a. 3.

44 Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 46, q. 1, a. 3.

45 Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 46, q. 1, a. 3.

46 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 79, a. 1.

47 Ibidem, I-II, q. 112, a. 3, ad 2.

48 Thomas Aquinas, De malo, q. 3 a. 2.

49 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I q. 25 a. 6 ad 1.

50 Ibidem, I q. 25 a. 6.

51 Thomas Aquinas, De potentia, q. 3 a. 1 ad 17.

52 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 48, a. 2, ad 3.

53 The argument based on the injustifiable character of certain amount of evil or of certain ‘horrendous evils’ present in the universe gave rise in the recent years to the so-called ‘evidential problem of evil’, as opposed to the mere ‘logical problem of evil’. SeeHoward-Snyder, D., The Evidential Argument from Evil, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996Google Scholar.

54 Van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil, cit. 106.

55 The expression ‘free will defence’ was used for the first time by Anthony Flew in Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom, in Flew, A. and MacIntyre, A., eds., New Essays on Philosophical Theology (London: SCM Press, 1955), pp. 149–160Google Scholar. Reference taken from R. Rovira, ‘Si quidem Deus est, unde mala?’, p. 128.

56 Plantinga, , God, Freedom and Evil (Michigan, William Erdmans Publishing Company, 1989)Google Scholar.

57 Swinburne, Richard, Providence and the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

58 The current debate within the analytic tradition is more focused on the ‘evidential problem of evil’. In this context, many new and interesting theist solutions have appeared, such as ‘Sceptical Theism’ (see Bergmann, M., “Sceptical Theism and Rowe's New Evidential Argument from Evil”, Nous 35 (2001), pp. 278–296CrossRefGoogle Scholar). For a complete summary of the current debate, see Dougherty, T., “Recent Work on the Problem of Evil”, Analysis Reviews 71 (2011), pp. 560–573CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

59 This assertion is not common to all free will defenders, since it goes beyond a simple ‘defence’, and gives a positive reason for the permission of evil, which is what is meant today by the term ‘theodicy’. Swinburne clearly supports it (Providence and the Problem of Evil, pp. 82-ss), while Plantinga (God, Freedom, and Evil, 28–29) and Van Inwagen (The Problem of Evil, p. 70) remain within the limits of a mere ‘defence’.

60 Plantinga, , ‘Which Worlds Could God Created’, Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973) 551CrossRefGoogle Scholar; also Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, pp. 88–89.

61 See V. Brümmer, Moral Sensitivity and the Free Will Defence, ‘Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie’ 29 (1987), pp. 86–100. Reference taken from R. Rovira, ‘Si quidem Deus est, unde mala?’, p. 130.

62 This statement is common to all free will defenders. See Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, pp. 84–85.

63 Plantinga, ‘Which Worlds Could God Created’, p. 544.

64 Ibidem, p. 543; also God, Freedom and Evil, p. 43.

65 ‘Which Worlds Could God Created’, p. 542; also, The Nature of Necessity, Clarendon, Oxford, 1974, pp. 170–171Google Scholar.

66 Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, p. 184; God, Freedom and Evil, pp. 45–49.

67 Mackie, , ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, Mind 64 (1955) 200–212CrossRefGoogle Scholar; 208–210; also the Miracle of Theism (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982), pp. 160–162Google Scholar.

68 Plantinga, ‘Which Worlds Could God Created’, pp. 551–552; P. Van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil, pp. 75–77.

69 Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, p. 167.

70 Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil, p. 58.

71 Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, pp. 176–192.

72 Van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil, pp. 84–90.

73 Rovira, ‘Si quidem Deus est, unde mala?’, p. 132.

74 Thomas Aquinas, In I Sent., dist. 46, q. 1, a. 3.

75 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 113, a. 9, ad 2.

76 Maritain, Jacques, Saint Thomas d'Aquin et le problème du mal, in De Bergson à Thomas d'Aquin (New York: Éditions de la Maison Française, 1944), p. 229Google Scholar.

77 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 63, a. 2.

78 Maritain, Saint Thomas d'Aquin et le problème du mal, p. 227.

79 Pieper, Joseph, Über den Begriff der Sünde, en Werke (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1997Google Scholar) Band 5, pp. 266–267.

80 Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 22, a. 6.

81 Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 24, a. 3, ad 2; In II Sent., d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1.

82 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, c. 109 n. 6.

83 Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 22, a. 6.

84 See Gaine, Simon, Will there be Free Will in Heaven?: Freedom, Impeccability and Beatitude (Continuum, 2003), p. 121Google Scholar; Alarcón, Enrique, ‘Libertad y necesidad’, Anuario Filosófico 43/1 (2010), pp. 25–46Google Scholar.

85 Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 22, a. 6 ad 3.

86 Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 24, a. 7.

87 Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 24, a. 3.

88 Thomas Aquinas, De spiritualibus creaturis, a. 11.

89 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, c. 88.

90 Thomas Aquinas, De potentia, q. 3, a. 7.

91 Thomas Aquinas, De potentia, q. 3, a. 1.

92 Thomas Aquinas, De potentia, q. 3, a. 7; Summa Contra Gentiles, III, c. 88.

93 This consideration underlies the more recent ‘libertarian’ approaches, which make the creature's free will and God's causality compatible: Grant, W. Mathews, ‘Can a Libertarian Hold that Our Free Acts are Caused by God?’, Faith and Philosophy 27/1 (2010), pp. 22–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

94 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I. q. 19, a. 8.

95 Maritain, , Court Traité de l'Existence et de l'Existant (Paul Hartmann, Paris, 1947), p. 161Google Scholar.

96 Ibidem, pp. 154–156. On Maritain's notion of ‘breakable motion’ and his debate with defenders of ‘physical pre-motion’, see Echavarría, Agustín, ‘Jacques Maritain contra el tomismo bañeciano: la polémica de los decretos permisivos’, Studium: Filosofía y Teología 24 (2009), pp. 319–358Google Scholar.

97 Thomas Aquinas, De malo, q. 1, a. 4.

98 McDonald, P. A. Jr., ‘Original Justice, Original Sin and the Free-Will Defense’, The Thomist 74 (2010) pp. 105–141CrossRefGoogle Scholar; pp. 108–109.

99 Thomas Aquinas, De malo, q. 1, a. 3.

100 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I. q. 49, a. 2.

101 Newlands, Sam, Evils, Privations and the Early Moderns, in MacDonald, S. and Chingell, A., eds., Evil, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming)Google Scholar, pro manuscripto, p. 36 (cited with author's permission).

102 Ibidem.

103 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 48, a. 1; Summa Theologiae, I, q. 38, a. 5, ad 1; De malo, q. 1, a. 1.

104 Crosby, J., ‘Doubts About the Privation Theory That Will Never Go Away: Response To Patrick Lee’, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2007), pp. 489–505CrossRefGoogle Scholar; 500. For the complete debate see Crosby, J., ‘Is All Evil Really Only Privation’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association 75 (2001), pp. 197–210Google Scholar and Lee, P., ‘Evil as Such is a Privation: A Reply to John Crosby’, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2007), pp. 469–488CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

105 Swinburne, Providence and the Problem of Evil, p. 32.

106 Ibidem, pp. 31–32.

107 Ibidem, I, q. 48, a. 3, c.

108 Thomas Aquinas, De malo, q. 1, a. 1.

109 Maritain, Dieu et la permission du mal, p. 16.

110 Thomas Aquinas, De malo, q. I, a. 2.

111 Thomas Aquinas, De spiritualibus creaturis, c. XI.

112 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 2, a. 3; also Super Evangelium S. Ioannis Lectura, Prologus; and De potentia, q. 3, a. 5.

113 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, c. 71.

114 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 79, a. 1.

115 Thomas Aquinas, De malo, q. 1, a. 3.

116 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 112, a. 3, ad 2.

117 Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 23, a. 2; Summa Theologiae, I, q. 48, a. 6.

118 A very good introduction to this doctrine can be found in Brian Davies's new book, Aquinas on Good and Evil, Oxford: OUP, 2011Google Scholar.