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Les implications macroéconomiques extérieures d’une monnaie unique en Europe

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Gérard Kébabdjian
Gérard Kébabdjian*
Affiliation:
Université de Paris 8
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Résumé

L’article analyse la coopération monétaire en Europe comme une coalition (au sens de la théorie des jeux) au sein de l’économie mondiale. Le modèle de Canzoneri et Henderson sert de point de départ; il est enrichi, notamment par la prise en compte d’une fonction de création de la monnaie internationale, pour répondre à trois questions: La coordination des politiques monétaires européennes contribuera-t-elle à améliorer l’équilibre mondial, spécialement du point de vue de l’emploi? Quelles implications associer au refus d’accorder à l’objectif d’emploi une place explicite dans la formulation de la politique monétaire européenne conformément au traité de Maastricht? Quelles implications associer à la promotion de l’euro comme une monnaie internationale concurrente du dollar?

Summary

Summary

This article analyses European monetary co-operation as a coalition—in its game theory meaning—in the context of the world economy. Starting with the Canzoneri and Henderson model, we add equations, particulary an international liquidity creation function, so as to adress the following questions. Can European monetary policy cooperation improve world equilibrium, particulary as far as employment is concerned? What will be the consequences of the absence of employment targets in European policy, as formulated in Maastricht treaty? What will be the implications of the promotion of an international currency in competition with the dollar?

Keywords

F42F33F42F33
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 62 , Issue 2 , 1996 , pp. 155 - 189
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 1996 

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Footnotes

(*)

Je dois remercier les deux rapporteurs anonymes, et plus particulièrement l’un des deux, pour la lecture attentive de la première version et les remarques qui m’ont permis d’améliorer grandement le contenu de cet article. Je reste bien sûr seul responsable des erreurs et imperfections qui peuvent encore demeurer.

References

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