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Shirer's History of Nazi Germany

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Klaus Epstein
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Extract

William shirer'sRise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New York, 1960) has been widely hailed as a great work of history. Harry Schermann, chairman of the board of directors of the Book of the Month Club, says that it “will almost certainly come to be considered the definitive history of one of the most frightful chapters in the story of mankind.” The book has already sold more widely than any work on European history published in recent years. It is probable that tens of thousands of American readers will take theirviews on recent German affairs from Shirer's pages for years to come. For that reason, it is important to point out the serious shortcomings of this work.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 23 , Issue 2 , April 1961 , pp. 230 - 245
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1961

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References

1 Shirer's neglect of recent German scholarship is revealed by the facts that he never refers to any article published in the Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, though this is the leading scholarly journal devoted to the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich, and almost every issue includes important articles. He notes the existence of this journal (p. 1182) only to state that it has published a valuable bibliography in a special number, a bibliography which he has not used to any good purpose, as will be shown below. All the references in my footnotes — with two exceptions specifically noted — are to works not used by Shirer.

2 It may be noted in passing that the University of Berlin, as any student of the Prussian Reform period knows, was founded only in 1810.

3 See, for example, Bracher, Karl Dietrich, Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik (Stuttgart, 1957)Google Scholar; Conze, Werner, “Die Krise des Parteienstaates in Deutschland 1929–30,” Historische Zeitschrift, CLXXVIII (1954), 47–83Google Scholar, and Besson, W., Württemberg und die deutsche Staatskrise (Stuttgart, 1959)Google Scholar. To these must now be added the superb volume edited by Matthias, Erich and Morsey, Rudolf, Das Ende der Parteien 1933 (Düsseldorf, 1960), which appeared at the same time as Shirer's bookGoogle Scholar.

4 See Landauer, Carl, “The Bavarian Problem in the Weimar Republic 1918–23,” Journal of Modern History, XVI (06–09 1944), 93–115, 205–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Schwend, Karl, Bayern zwischen Monarchie und Diktatur (Munich, 1954)Google Scholar, two important studies not utilized by Shirer.

5 See his ridicule of those Germans who denounced the Treaty as intolerable (p. 58). But the Treaty did have, in fact, many intolerable features, and it constituted besides a clear breach of the “pre-armistice contract.” The most judicious summary of the problem is, in this reviewer's opinion, Eyck's, ErichGeschichte der Weimarer Republik, I (Zurich, 1954), Ch. IV. It is most unlikely that Eyck, a staunch German liberal, was a victim of nationalist propagandaGoogle Scholar.

6 Shirer's account of Munich utilizes, so far as secondary accounts are concerned, Wheeler-Bennett's, J.Munich: Prologue to Tragedy (New York, 1948)Google Scholar, an excellent book at the time when it was published. He ignores the more recent Laffan, R.G.D., The Crisis over Czechoslovakia Jan.–Sept. 1938 (London, 1951)Google Scholar and Celovsky, Boris, Das Münchener Abkommen von 1938 (Stuttgart, 1958), which partially supersedes Wheeler-BennettGoogle Scholar.

7 There is no evidence that he used either of the standard works: Ikté, Frank, German-Japanese Relations 1936–40 (New York, 1956)Google Scholar or Presseisen, Ernst, Germany and Japan, A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy 1933–34 (The Hague, 1958)Google Scholar.

8 Like that attempted by Buchheit, Gert, Hitler, der Feldherr. Die Zerstörung einer Legende (Rastatt, 1958)Google Scholar, and more narrowly for naval problems by Hinsley, Francis, Hitler's Strategy: The Naval Evidence (Cambridge, 1951)Google Scholar.

9 Where Shirer fails to utilize the standard German treatment, Foertsch, Hermann, Schuld und Verhängniss. Die Fritschkrise im Frühjahr 1938 als Wendepunkt in der Geschichte der national sozialistischen Zeit (Stuttgart, 1951)Google Scholar.

10 The notorious fact that latter-day Nazis foolishly point to the Autobahnen to prove that all was not bad in Hitler's Reich is irrelevant in this connection.

11 The best brief account is, perhaps, still to be found in the final chapters of Stolper's, GustavGerman Economy (1870–1940)(New York, 1940)Google Scholar, though Neumann's, FranzBehemoth (New York, 1942)Google Scholar Part II, used by Shirer, is also valuable despite its Marxist preconceptions. Guillebaud, C. W., The Economic Recovery of Germany (London, 1939) is a contemporary account of considerable valueGoogle Scholar.

12 The author could have used Willi Frischauer, , Himmler (London, 1953)Google Scholar and Crankshaw, Edward, Gestapo: Instrument of Tyranny (London, 1956), over and above the Reitlinger volume included in his bibliographyGoogle Scholar.

13 See Fischer, George, Soviet Opposition to Stalin, a case study in World War II (Cambridge, 1952)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The entire Vlasov movement is ignored by Shirer except for allusive mention in extraneous contexts.

14 See the monograph by Koehl, Robert L., RKFDV. German Resettlement and Population Policy 1939–1945 (Cambridge, 1957)Google Scholar.

15 On these administrative problems, and indeed most aspects of the nonmilitary history of the Third Reich, see the excellent account by Clifton Child, “The Political Structure of Hitler's Europe,” in Toynbee, A., Hitler's Europe 1939–45 (Oxford, 1954)Google Scholar, a book mentioned in Shirer's bibliography but evidently not used to good advantage.

16 Though Shirer occasionally lapses into the widespread error of describing Hitler as a “politician of the Right” (p. 24) or a “conservative nationalist”(p. 161).

17 Some recent studies seeking to explain modern totalitarianism in historical perspective are Arendt, Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism. (New York, 1951)Google Scholar; Fromm, Erich, Escape from Freedom (New York, 1941)Google Scholar; and Tolman, J. L., The Rise of Totalitarian Democracy (Boston, 1952)Google Scholar.

18 The infant science of the comparative study of totalitarianism has found a promising beginning in Friedrich, C. J. and Brzezinski, Z. K., Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge, Mass., 1956)Google Scholar.

19 No attempt can be made here to list the gaps in Shirer's treatment of the resistance. He omits completely any discussion of the successful opposition of both Christian Churches to the euthanasia program of 1939–41, which the Nazis were forced to discontinue. The narrative of the Kirchenkampf could have benefitted from Buchheim, Hans, Glaubenskrise im Dritten Reich: drei Kapitel nationalsozialistischer Religionspolitik (Stuttgart, 1953)Google Scholar.

20 They indicate to this reviewer the tragic conclusion that on balance it was preferable for Germany's future political development that the conspiracy should fail, though this meant nine additional months of war and the butchery of Germany's anti-Nazi elite by Hitler's henchmen. It was essential, nonetheless, that the conspiracy be tried—for the reason indicated by Tresckow one of the finest of the conspirators, that the Lord would have spared Sodom and Gomorrah if these cities had included but a jew just people. But these considerations go far beyond the scope of this review article.