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Francisco De Vitoria on the Nature and Source of Civil Authority

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 October 2022

Thomas M. Osborne Jr.
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Abstract

Readers have found at least two distinct and perhaps contradictory accounts of civil authority in the works of Francisco de Vitoria, and some hold that Vitoria himself holds contradictory positions. This article argues that Vitoria holds one consistent position, namely, that civil power is based on a necessity that is rooted in human nature, and in particular on the final cause of human life, and not on a necessity that is a result of any historical decision or process on its own. Rulers receive from the community their authority, which is a power to act on behalf of that community. Scholars have failed to consider how Vitoria's understanding of civil power is Aristotelian and Thomistic to the extent that it is based on the thesis that the political community is natural in a way similar to how families and individuals are natural.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 85 , Issue 1 , Winter 2023 , pp. 1 - 22
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of University of Notre Dame

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Footnotes

Thanks to those who provided comments on and questions about material from this paper which I presented at the Institute of State and Law (Prague, Czech Republic) and the Catholic University of America (Washington, DC), and to the anonymous referees of this journal for their suggestions.

References

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2 Tierney, Brian, The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law and Church Law, 1140–1625 (Atlanta, GA: Scholars, 1997), 256–65Google Scholar.

3 Tierney, Idea of Natural Rights, 291–95.

4 André Alves, “Vitoria, the Common Good and the Limits of Political Power,” in At the Origins of Modernity: Francisco de Vitoria and the Discovery of International Law, ed. José María Beneyto and Justo Corti Varela (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017), 67. See also André Alves and José Moreira, The Salamanca School (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 45–51.

5 Alves and Moreira, Salamanca School, 47.

6 Aquinas, Thomas, Sententia libri Ethicorum, lib. 1, lect. 1, in Opera Omnia (Rome: Leonine Commission, 1884–), vol. 47.1, 4–5Google Scholar. See also Francisco de Vitoria, In I-II, q. 90, art. 3, in Comentario al Tratado de la Ley, ed. Vicente Beltrán de Heredia (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientifica, 1952), 13–14; translation in Francisco de Vitoria, Political Writings, ed. and trans. Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 158. Unless otherwise indicated, I cite the edition of Pagden and Lawrance.

7 Aristotle, Politics 1.2 1252a24–1253a39; Thomas Aquinas, Sententia libri Politicorum, loc. cit., in Opera, vol. 48, A 73–A 80; ST I-II, q. 90, art. 2, resp. For Vitoria's understanding of the perfect community, see Aemilius Naszalyi, Doctrina Francisci de Vitoria de Statu (Rome: Scuola Salesiana, 1937), 107–24. It seems to me that Cavallar, Georg, The Rights of Strangers: Theories of International Hospitality, the Global Community, and Political Justice since Vitoria (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), 104–7Google Scholar, minimizes the ways in which according to Vitoria commonwealths are independent and sovereign.

8 Francisco de Vitoria, On the Law of War, q. 1, art. 2, in Relectio de iure belli; o, Paz dínamica, Corpus Hispanorum de Pace 5, ed. Luciano Pereña et al. (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1981), 118 (Pagden/Lawrance, 301).

9 Vitoria, In I-II, q. 105, art. 1 (Heredia, Tratado, 80; Pagden/Lawrance, 197). See also Thomas, ST I-II, q. 105, art. 1, resp.; Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.10; Politics 3.7.

10 Pagden/Lawrance, 19n43.

11 Vitoria, In I-II, q. 90, art. 2, q. 92, art. 1 (Heredia, Tratado, 13, 20–22; Pagden/Lawrance, 157–58, 164–67). For Vitoria and Thomas on the perfect community and the common good, see my “MacIntyre, Thomism and the Contemporary Common Good,” Analyse & Kritik 30 (2008): 382–97.

12 Thomas, ST II-II, q. 58, art. 5.

13 Vitoria, In I-II, q. 96, art. 3 (Heredia, Tratado, 30–35; Pagden/Lawrance, 173–79).

14 ST II-II, q. 58, art. 7, ad 2.

15 ST II-II, q. 47, art. 10, ad 2.

16 For the meaning of “consent” in Scholastic political thought, see Tierney, Brian, Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought, 1150–1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 39–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dunbabin, Jean, “Government,” in The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, c. 350 – c. 1450, ed. Burns, J. H. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 513–19Google Scholar.

17 Aristotle, Physics 2.3.

18 See especially Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.7.

19 Francisco Vitoria, On Civil Power, q. 1, art. 1, nn. 1–2, in Obras de Francisco de Vitoria: Relecciones Teológicas, ed. Teófilo Urdánoz (Madrid: Editorial Católica, 1960), 151–54 (Pagden/Lawrance, 4–6). The Pagden/Lawrance translation departs from the printed texts because it is based on manuscripts and not on a critical edition. It seems to me that Vitoria has in mind Aristotle, Physics 2.9; On the Parts of Animals 1.1.

20 Vitoria, On Civil Power, q. 2, art. 2, nn. 3–4 (Urdánoz, 154–57; Pagden/Lawrance, 6–9).

21 Höpfl, Harro, Jesuit Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 188CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22 Valenzuela-Vermehren, Luis, “The Origin and Nature of the State in Francisco de Vitoria's Moral Philosophy,” Ideas y Valores 62 (2013): 84–93Google Scholar. For the final cause of the state, see Naszalyi, Doctrina de Statu, 153–95.

23 Thomas Aquinas, De regno 1.1 (Leonine, vol. 42, 449–51).

24 Aristotle, Politics 1.2 1253a7–18.

25 Vitoria, On Civil Power, q. 2, art. 2, n. 5 (Urdánoz, 157; Pagden/Lawrance, 9).

26 Ibid. (Urdánoz, 157; Pagden/Lawrance, 9–10).

27 John Doyle, “Vitoria on Choosing to Replace a King,” in Hispanic Philosophy in the Age of Discovery, ed. Kevin White (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 47.

28 Weithman, Paul, “Augustine and Aquinas on Original Sin and the Function of Political Authority,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (1992): 353–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29 Vitoria, On Civil Power, q. 1, art. 11a (Urdánoz, 172; Pagden/Lawrance, 125).

30 Ibid., q. 2, art. 2, n. 2 (Urdánoz, 152–54; Pagden/Lawrance, 4–6). See especially Aristotle, Physics 2.3 195a21–26, and Thomas, In Physicorum, lib. 2, lect. 5 (Leonine, vol. 2, 71).

31 Brett, Liberty, Right, and Nature, 136–37. For a similar interpretation, see Daniel Deckers, Gerechtigkeit und Recht: Eine historisch-kritische Untersuchung der Gerechtigkeitslehre des Francisco de Vitoria (1483–1546) (Freiburg/Vienna: Universitäts Verlag/Heider, 1991), 281–86.

32 Tierney, Idea of Natural Rights, 290, 295.

33 Vitoria, In I-II, q. 92, art. 1 (Heredia, Tratado, 20–22; Pagden/Lawrance, 164–67).

34 Francisco de Vitoria, In I-II, q. 57, art. 1, in Comentarios a la secunda secundae de Santo Tomás, vol. 3, De iustitiae (qq. 57–66), ed. V. Beltrán de Heredia (Salamanca: Publicaciones de la Asociación Francisco de Vitoria, 1934), 4.

35 There are many interpretations of objective and subjective rights in the scholarly literature. For some of the issues, see John Lamont, “In Defence of Villey on Objective Right,” in Truth and Faith in Ethics, ed. Hayden Ramsay (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2011), 177–98. For the existence of what some might call “subjective right” in Thomas Aquinas, see Pappin, Gladden J., “Rights, Moral Theology and Politics in Jean Gerson,” History of Political Thought 36 (2015): 234–61Google Scholar. For an argument that Vitoria's dominium is a subjective right, see Deckers, Gerechtigkeit und Recht, 166–88.

36 “jus est potestas vel facultas conveniens alicui secundum leges.” Vitoria, In I-II, q. 62, art. 1 (Heredia, De iustitiae, 64). For the broader discussion, see 63–65; Mäkinen, Virpi, “Dominion Rights: Their Development and Meaning in the History of Human Rights,” in A Companion to Early Modern Spanish Imperial Political and Social Thought, ed. Tellkamp, Jörg Alejandro (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 153–58Google Scholar. For Gerson's understanding of rights and the error of unequivocally attributing to him Tierney's notion of “subjective right,” see Pappin, “Rights, Moral Theology and Politics,” 241–54. For Gerson and Summenhart on right and dominion, see Varkemaa, Jussi, Conrad Summenhart's Theory of Individual Rights (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 80–83CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

37 Valenzuela-Vermehren, “Origin and Nature of the State,” 84–89.

38 Prats, Jaime Brufau, “La noción analógia del ‘dominium’ en Santo Tomás, Francisco de Vitoria y Domingo de Soto,” Salmanticensis 4 (1957): 96–126CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

39 Thomas, ST I, q. 13, art. 7, ad 1. For the application to other contexts, see II-II, q. 66, art. 1; q. 103, art. 3.

40 ST I, q. 96, art. 1–2.

41 ST II-II, q. 78, art. 1.

42 ST I, q. 96, art. 4.

43 ST I, q. 96, q. 1, art. 2, resp.

44 Tierney, Idea of Natural Rights, 265. For a similar reading, see Cavallar, Rights of Strangers, 80–84.

45 Vitoria, In II-II, q. 62, art. 1 (Heredia, De iustitiae, 66–67). Brufau Prats, “Noción analógia del ‘dominium,’” 126–29. On Gerson and Summenhart on right and dominion, see Varkemaa, Conrad Summenhart's Theory, 80–83.

46 Valenzuela-Vermehren, “Origin and Nature of the State,” 93–95.

47 Vitoria, On Civil Power, q. 1, art. 3, n. 6 (Urdánoz, 158–59; Pagden/Lawrance, 10).

48 Brett, Liberty, Right, and Nature, 136.

49 Tierney, Idea of Natural Rights, 291–93, 295–96.

50 Ibid., 333–34.

51 Vitoria does not make and does not attribute to Aristotle a clear distinction between “social” and “political.” See his On Civil Power, q. 1, art. 2, nn. 4–5 (Urdánoz, 154–56; Pagden/Lawrance, 1–10).

52 Vitoria, On Civil Power, q. 1, art. 3, n. 6 (Urdánoz, 159; Pagden/Lawrance, 11).

53 Ibid., q. 1, art. 4, n. 7 (Urdánoz, 159–61; Pagden/Lawrance, 11–12).

54 For the persistence of these arguments in Jesuit Scholasticism, see Höpfl, Jesuit Political Thought, 204–8.

55 Thomas, ST I-II, q. 96, art. 6, resp.; II-II, q. 60, art. 1, resp.; q. 64, art. 3, resp.

56 ST I-II, q. 92, art. 2, ad 3.

57 ST II-II, q. 108, art. 1.

58 ST II-II, q. 64, art. 3.

59 For the way in which this power is concentrated, and for the difference from later social contract theories, see Naszalyi, De Doctrina de Statu, 200–211.

60 Tierney, Idea of Natural Rights, 293–96.

61 Vitoria, On Civil Power, q. 1, art. 5, n. 8 (Urdánoz, 164; Pagden/Lawrance, 16–17).

62 Vitoria, I On the Power of the Church, q. 6, art. 3, n. 3 (Urdánoz, 320; Pagden/Lawrance, 103–4).

63 Brett, Liberty, Right, and Nature, 135–36; Tierney, Idea of Natural Rights, 292. For Almain, see Brett, Libery, Right, and Nature, 116–22. Vitoria's basic argument can be found not only in Almain but also in Thomas, ST II-II, q. 40, art. 1; q. 64, art. 2–3.

64 Brett, Liberty, Right, and Nature, 135. She cites Vitoria, On Civil Power, q. 1, art. 4, n. 7 (Urdánoz, 159; Pagden/Lawrance, 11).

65 Francisco de Vitoria, On the Law of War, q. 1, art. 2, in Relectio de iure belli, 110–20 (Pagden/Lawrance, 299–302).

66 Vitoria, On Civil Power, q. 1, art. 5, n. 7 (Urdánoz, 160–61; Pagden/Lawrance, 12–14). See also art. 8, n. 11 (Urdánoz, 19–20; Pagden/Lawrance, 19–21). Urdánoz's text is considerably more condensed than that used by Pagden/Lawrance.

67 Ibid., q. 1, art. 5, n. 8 (Urdánoz, 164; Pagden/Lawrance, 17).

68 Ibid., q. 3, art. 1, nn. 15–17 (Urdánoz, 183–86; Pagden/Lawrance, 34–36). See also In I-II, q. 96, art. 4 (Heredia, Tratado, 32; Pagden/Lawrance, 174).

69 Vitoria, On Civil Power, q. 3, art. 1, n. 17 (Urdánoz, 185; Pagden/Lawrance, 35).

70 Ibid., q. 3, art. 2, nn. 18–19 (Urdánoz, 186–90; Pagden/Lawrance, 36–39); In I-II, q. 96, art. 4 (Heredia, Tratado, 32–35; Pagden/Lawrance, 175–79).

71 Vitoria, On Civil Power, q. 3, art. 2, n. 19 (Urdánoz, 188; Pagden/Lawrance, 37).

72 Ibid., q. 3, art. 5, n. 22 (Urdánoz, 192; Pagden/Lawrance, 41–42).

73 “facultas, auctoritas, sive ius gubernandi rempublicam civilem.” Ibid., q. 1, art. 7, n. 10 (Urdánoz, 193; Pagden/Lawrance, 18). Pagden/Lawrance reads “the authority or right of government over the civil commonwealth.” My translation slightly modified for accuracy, and to include “facultas.”

74 Doyle, “Vitoria on Choosing to Replace a King,” 50–57. See also Scott, James Brown, The Catholic Conception of International Law (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1934), 67–71Google Scholar; Hamilton, Bernice, Political Thought in Sixteenth-Century Spain (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963), 36–37Google Scholar. The “majority” seems to mean the “stronger” or “greater” part.

75 Vitoria, In I-II, q. 105, art. 2 (Heredia, Tratado, 81–82; Pagden/Lawrance, 200).

76 Francisco de Vitoria, On the American Indians, q. 2, art. 6 (I.2.23), in Relectio de Indis, Corpus Hispanorum de Pace 5, ed. Luciano Pereña and José M. Pérez (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1967), 74 (Pagden/Lawrance, 275–76).

77 Vitoria, On the American Indians, q. 2, art. 6 (I.2.23) (CHDP 5, 73; Pagden/Lawrance, 276).

78 For the possible attribution of such a view to Francisco Suarez, see Höpfl, Jesuit Political Thought, 253.

79 McCoy, Charles N. R., “Note on the Problem of the Origin of Political Authority,” Thomist 16, no. 1 (1953): 71–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

80 Murphy, Mark C., “Consent, Custom, and the Common Good in Aquinas's Account of Political Authority,” Review of Politics 59 (1997): 323–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For the various notions of consent in Suarez's account of the law of nations, see Höpfl, 304–6.

81 Vitoria, On Civil Power, q. 1, art. 8, n. 8 (Urdánoz, 161–64; Pagden/Lawrance, 19–21). But Vitoria also emphasizes that the community's consent in the form of rule makes it responsible for a ruler's bad actions. Therefore, a ruler's citizens can be punished because of the ruler's own wickedness. Ibid., q. 1, art. 9, n. 12 (Urdánoz, 168; Pagden/Lawrance, 21).

82 Tierney, Idea of Natural Rights, 292; Vitoria, On Civil Power, q. 2, art. 1, n. 14 (Urdánoz, 179–80; Pagden/Lawrance, 30–31).

83 Vitoria, On Civil Power, q. 2, art. un., n. 14 (Urdánoz, 178–81; Pagden/Lawrance, 30–32).

84 Pagden, Anthony, Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination: Studies in European and Spanish-American Social and Political Theory, 1513–1830 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 6–7Google Scholar, 37–63.

85 Vitoria, On Civil Power, q. 2, art. un., n. 14 (Urdánoz, 181; Pagden/Lawrance, 32). For the alternate reading of Venice and Florence for Rome, see Pagden/Lawrance, 32n60.