¹ Speech by Menon, V. K. Krishna, U. N. General Assembly Official Records, 15th Session Plenary,10 17, 1960, p. 751.Google Scholar

² See Sayegh, F. A., The Dynamics of Neutralism in the Arab World: A Symposium (San Francisco, 1964), p. 170 and passim.Google Scholar

³ Brecher, Michael, The New States of Asia, A Political Analysis (New York, 1966), p. 112.Google Scholar

⁴ See Hovet, Thomas, Bloc Politics in the United Nations (Cambridge, 1960);CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Africa in the United Nations (Evanston, 1963).Google Scholar

⁵ See Wilcox, F. O., UN and the Nonaligned Nations (Headline Series,Foreign Policy Association, 1962.)Google Scholar

⁶ For an excellent statistical survey see Alker, H. R. and Russet, B. M., World Politics in the General Assembly (New Haven, 1965).Google Scholar

⁷ Crabb, C. V., Jr., The Elephants and the Grass (New York, 1965), pp. ix, xi.Google Scholar

⁸ See the article by Liska, G., in Martin, L. W. (ed.), Neutralism and Nonalignment: The New States in World Affairs (New York, 1962), p. 80.Google Scholar

⁹ No votes were taken during the Nineteenth Session and there were no critical cold war issues, as defined below, voted on during the Twentieth Session. Thus a survey covering six years of voting behavior produces usable data from only the first four years. The altered position of France since 1965 has contributed to the lack of clear-cut cold war votes, as established by the criteria cited above.

¹⁰ No nonaligned state necessarily follows the lead of a great power, nor do great powers necessarily follow the lead of important nonaligned states, especially on critical cold war issues. When identical votes occur and when they establish a pattern, then there is evidence of a significant correlation of interests over a wide range of critical issues.

¹¹ These three states are among the negative nonaligned. The above classification is based on Chi-square analysis of their positive votes. When they chose to participate actively in a critical cold war issue, they voted in a statistically significant Western-oriented manner.

¹² The states which did not cast sufficient votes with either great power bloc to be considered oriented in either direction will be dealt with in the next section under the heading Equidistant Nonaligned. One state, Sierra Leone, cast fifty percent of its positive votes with the West and fifty percent with the Soviet bloc.

¹³ Cuba is considered nonaligned because it is not a member of the Warsaw Pact, and was a participating member of both the Belgrade and Cairo Conferences of nonaligned states.

¹⁴ These three states are among the negative nonaligned. A Chi-square analysis of their positive votes places them in the Soviet-oriented classification.

¹⁵ These states are among the negative nonaligned. A Chi-square analysis of their positive votes places them in the equidistant classification.

¹⁶ The recent changes of government in Indonesia and in Ghana may be expected to produce a marked alteration in the foreign policy orientation of these two states.

¹⁷ Some of the Moslem Arab League states, especially Saudi Arabia, Libya, and the Sudan may be casting a number of their Soviet-oriented votes in order to preserve Arab unity and show their united front against Israel. It would be impossible to explain the motivation of each government or each of the votes cast. In the aggregate, the statistical pattern of the votes cast places these states in the Soviet-oriented category.

¹⁸ See Lyon, Peter, Neutralism (Leicester, 1963);Google Scholar and Jansen, G. H., Nonalignment and the Afro-Asian States (New York, 1966) for two of the most detailed surveys in the field.Google Scholar

¹⁹ See “Afro-Asian Summit Is Postponed Indefinitely,” Mideast Mirror, 11 6, 1965.Google Scholar

²⁰ Hindu, 10 18, 1966.Google Scholar

²¹ Daily Telegraph, 10 25, 1966.Google Scholar

²² New York Times, 10 30, 1966.Google Scholar