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President Kennedy and the Neutralization of Laos

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Kenneth L. Hill
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Extract

SoonAfter John F. Kennedy became President, difficult foreign policy decisions had to be made. Even before he assumed the burdens of office, he knew an early judgment would be required concerning United States policies vis-à-vis Laos. Throughout 1960, Communist forces in Laos and their allies won numerous military victories and the Laotian Royal Army was unable to check their advances. The United States and other SEATO members were understandably disturbed. They now had to contemplate a total Communist victory with all its potentially painful and embarrassing consequences. These consequences worried President-elect Kennedy and prior to his inauguration, he and his advisors began systematically examining all their policy alternatives; they found that none were really attractive.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 31 , Issue 3 , July 1969 , pp. 353 - 369
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1969

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References

1 Three members of President Kennedy's Administration have written books that include chapters dealing with Laos. See Hilsman, Roger, To Move a Nation (New York, 1967)Google Scholar, Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr, A Thousand Days (Boston, 1965)Google Scholar, and Sorensen, Theodore, Kennedy (New York, 1965)Google Scholar.

2 The New York Times (February 28, 1955), p. 6.

3 Sorensen, , op. cit., p. 548Google Scholar.

4 See Harriman, W. A., “What We Are Doing in Southeast Asia”, The New York Times Magazine, 05 27, 1962Google Scholar.

5 See Haynes Miller, “A Bulwark Built on Sand”, The Reporter (11 13, 1958), pp. 11–16Google Scholar.

6 Rothwell H. Brown has written a detailed analysis arguing that for logistical and geographical reasons Laos should be defended. See “Laos: Key to the Maintenance of U.S. Interests in Southeast Asia”, quoted in U.S. Congressional Records, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. (July 13, 1962), pp. 12611–12619.

7 See Hilsman, , op. cit., pp. 130–132Google Scholar.

8 For a detailed description of Laos' problems see Trager, Frank N., “Laos and the Defense of Southeast Asia”, Orbis, VIII (Fall, 1963), 550–582Google Scholar.

9 For an analysis of the Vientiane agreement see my “Laos: The Vientiane Agreement”, Journal of Southeast Asian History, VIII No. 2 (09, 1967), 257–267Google Scholar.

10 Unless otherwise noted, the term “1962 agreement” refers to all aspects of the agreements.

11 For background information on the 1961–62 Geneva conference see Modelski, George, International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question (Canberra, 1962), pp. 1–33Google Scholar.

12 For text of the agreement see ibid., pp. 144–153.

13 See “Laos: Agreement for a Coalition Government”, Current Notes on International Affairs, 33 (06, 1962), 50–51Google Scholar.

14 Ibid., p. 50.

15 The most important evaluations of President Kennedy's policies have been made by individuals who have served in his administration. It is only natural that their opinions should be somewhat biased but the problem of objectivity is complicated by the fact that some of these people have developed deep resentments towards President Johnson and some of his advisors. Where an individual has served in both administrations, his “reentry” into the academic and/or liberal community is apparently assisted by publicly denouncing some aspects of President Johnson's policies. For an analysis of this problem see the devastating critique of Roger Hilsman's book, To Move a Nation, by Grenfield, Meg, “The Kiss and Tell Memoirs”, The Reporter, 37 (11 30, 1967), 14–19Google Scholar.

16 During the preliminary talks in Paris, , Harriman accused North Vietnam of violating the 1962 agreement on Laos. During one session, “he invited Colonel Lau … to go to Laos with him to see firsthand the ‘damning evidence’ of North Vietnamese ‘aggression’ in Laos”. The New York Times (08 1, 1968), p. 5Google Scholar. See also Britsch, Jacques, “Après un an de neutralité au Laos”, L'Afrique et L'Asie, 63 (3 Trimestre, 1963), 17–26Google Scholar.

17 For a Lao, Pathet interpretation see Twelve Years of U.S. Imperialist Intervention, and Aggression in Laos (N.P., Neo Lao Haksat Publications, 1966)Google Scholar, Ch. 2. For the Royal Government's version see White Book on the Violations of the Geneva Accords of 1962 by the Government of North Vietnam (Vientiane: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1968), pp. 5–45Google Scholar.

18 See Phouma, Souvanna, “Laos: le fond du problème”, France-Asie, XVII (03–04, 1961), 1823–1826Google Scholar and “Le Laos, avant-garde du monde libre”, ibid., XVII (novembre–decembre, 1960), 1428–1434.

19 See The New York Times (February 24, 1966), p. 17.

20 See excerpts from the ICC report quoted in “North Vietnam and the Geneva Agreements on Vietnam and Laos”, Current Notes on International Affairs (07, 1965), pp. 376–378Google Scholar. The above report was submitted by Canada and India. Poland, the third ICC member, refused to sign it.

21 New York Times (June 18, 1962), p. 24.

22 See Chen, King, “Peking's Strategy in Indochina”, Yale Review (06, 1965), p. 559Google Scholar.

23 See Nuechterlein, Donald E., Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia (New York, 1965), pp. 228–236Google Scholar.

24 See Ono, Kiyoshi, “Breathing Space in Laos”, Far Eastern Economic Review, XLVIII (06 10, 1965), 517Google Scholar.

25 See the comments of Canada's Foreign Secretary quoted in External Affairs (Ottawa, 08, 1961), p. 293Google Scholar.

26 See President Kennedy's press conference statement on March 23, 1961, quoted in The Department of State Bulletin, XLIV, 1138 (04 17, 1961), 544Google Scholar.

27 Modelski, George, SEATO: Six Studies (Canberra, 1962), p. 193Google Scholar.

28 For a brief but useful discussion of these two issues see the exchange of letters between W. Averell Harriman and the then Representative Laird, Melvin R. printed in U.S., Congressional Record, 87th Gong., 2d Sess. (08 13, 1962), pp. 15244–15266Google Scholar and ibid. (August 27, 1962), p. 16647.

29 Twelve Years of U.S. Imperialist Intervention and Aggression in Laos, p. 47.

30 President Kennedy's statement is quoted in The Department of State Bulletin, XLV (08 28, 1961), 372Google Scholar.

31 See Souphanouvong's, statement quoted in the Daily News Release (Peking: Hsinhua News Agency, 02 25, 1955), pp. 227–228Google Scholar.

32 See the Lao, Pathet demands quoted in New China News Agency (Peking: 05 5, 1955), pp. 45–47Google Scholar.

33 For an analysis of Thailand's attitudes towards Laos' difficulties see Wilson, David A., “Bangkok's Dim View to the East”, Asian Survey (06, 1961), 13–16Google Scholar.

34 Halpern, Abraham, Policies Towards China: A View from Six Continents (New York, 1965), p. 342Google Scholar.

35 Sullivan's, William H. statement is quoted in Warner's, Denis, The Last Confucian (Baltimore, 1964), p. 294Google Scholar.

36 See Hoffmann, Stanley, The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics (New York, 1965), p. 171Google Scholar.