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Prejudicial Speech: What's a Liberal to Do?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 May 2024

Mari Mikkola
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Abstract

This paper discusses potential responses to harmful prejudicial speech. More specifically, it considers how different types of prejudicial speech merit different responses. The paper distinguishes hate speech, discriminatory speech, and toxic speech as different types of speech that are prejudicial or oppressive – they are not of the same kind diverging only in their severity and explicitness. As these sorts of problematic speech are categorially distinct, the paper holds, they also demand differential remedies. The task of this paper is to consider such remedies, their potential effectiveness, and compatibility with the liberal value of free speech.

Type
Paper
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 95: Words and Worlds: New Directions in the Philosophy of Language , May 2024 , pp. 87 - 106
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2024

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