Skip to main content
×
Home
    • Aa
    • Aa

The Representational vs. the Relational View of Visual Experience

  • Brian P. McLaughlin (a1)
Abstract
Abstract

In Reference and Consciousness,1 John Campbell attempts to a make a case that what he calls ‘the Relational View’ of visual experience, a view that he champions, is superior to what he calls ‘the Representational View’.2 I argue that his attempt fails. In section 1, I spell out the two views. In section 2, I outline Campbell's case that the Relational View is superior to the Representational View and offer a diagnosis of where Campbell goes wrong. In section 3, I examine the case in detail and argue that it fails. Finally, in section 4, I mention two very well-known problems for the Relational View that are unresolved in the book.

Copyright
References
Hide All
G. Harman , ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’ in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives (Northridge, Calif.: Ridgeview, 1990)

M. Johnston , ‘The Obscure Object of Hallucination’, Philosophical Studies 120:1–3 (2004), 113–83

S.D. Kelly , ‘Reference and Attention: A Difficult Connection’, Philosophical Studies 120 (2004), 277–86

M. Matthen , ‘Biological Functions and Perceptual Content’, Journal of Philosophy 85:1 (1988), 527

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements
  • ISSN: 1358-2461
  • EISSN: 1755-3555
  • URL: /core/journals/royal-institute-of-philosophy-supplements
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 13
Total number of PDF views: 42 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 274 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 17th October 2017. This data will be updated every 24 hours.