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Separation of Powers and the Politics of Administrative Rule Review

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2021

Neal D. Woods
Neal D. Woods*
Affiliation:
University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC, USA
*
Neal D. Woods, Department of Political Science, University of South Carolina, 1600 Hampton Street, Columbia, SC 29208, USA. Email: neal.woods@sc.edu
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Abstract

In many states, agency rules are subject to review and possible veto by elected political officials in the legislative and/or executive branches. The consequences of this rule review authority are little understood. Using time-series cross-section data on state environmental compliance costs, this study investigates the impact that several types of administrative rule review procedures have on the stringency of state environmental regulation. The findings suggest that (1) both gubernatorial and legislative rule review powers are systematically associated with reduced environmental compliance costs, (2) legislatures controlled by the Democratic Party use rule review powers to reduce these costs less than Republican ones, and (3) the latter effect is observable only when legislatures have the power to amend or veto rules without the approval of the governor. These results indicate that rule review plays an important, but complex, role in shaping regulatory outcomes.

Keywords

legislative/executive interactionlegislative politicsbureaucracy, executive politicsenvironmental policypublic policyregulatory policypolicy implementation
Type
Research Article
Information
State Politics & Policy Quarterly , Volume 15 , Issue 3: Special Issue Title: Regulation in the States , September 2015 , pp. 345 - 365
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2015

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