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Towards a History of the Renaissance Idea of Wisdom

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2019

Antonio V. Romuáldez*
Affiliation:
Ateneo de Manila University
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Extract

The history of Tudor and early Stuart England', Professor Mark Curtis writes at the beginning of his book Oxford and Cambridge in Transition 1558-1642, ‘defies all attempts to characterize it briefly. In the life of the period the old and new were almost inextricably intertwined. They can now be separated only at the risk of sacrificing truth to misleading over-simplification.'1 Indeed, of the Renaissance in general the same can be said, and must be said as a primary assumption by one undertaking the study of the development of the period's ideas. For, as again Curtis observes, ‘Though the revisionists who have attempted to make the Renaissance a part of the Middle Ages may have failed to prove their case, they have demonstrated first that some phenomena, once thought uniquely characteristic of Renaissance culture, were present by more than coincidence in medieval civilization and second that important features of medieval thought and attitudes persisted as fundamental, constituent parts of the Renaissance mind'.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Renaissance Society of America 1964

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References

1 Curtis, Mark H., Oxford and Cambridge in Transition 1558-1642(Oxford, 1959), p . I.Google Scholar

2 Ibid., pp. 12-13.

3 See, for example, Rice, Eugene F. Jr., The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), pp. 2-3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 Ibid., p. 3.

5 Quoted by Rice, op. cit., p. ix.

6 Joseph Hall says in Heaven upon Earth that ‘not Athens must teach this lesson [concerning the true heaven], but Ierusalem'. In the editon of Heaven upon Earth and Characters of Vertues and Vices by Rudolf Kirk (New Brunswick, 1948), the quotation is on p . 86.

7 The Christian orientation of their assumptions and conceptions can be readily seen, for instance, in their notions about the state. It has often been said that one of the peculiar characteristics of the Renaissance is its emphasis on the active life, the crowning glory of which is service to the state. Hans Baron, in a review-article referred to elsewhere in this paper (see note 62), has said, and properly so, that one of the principal reasons for the Renaissance interest in civic humanism was the wider acceptance then of the concept of man as a ‘political animal'. We cannot but observe, it seems, that if the Renaissance thinkers justified their political activism by reference to man's social and political nature, it was because they felt confident that what was according to nature was at the same time according to the law of God. The moral basis of the politics of medieval and Renaissance man was, in other words, one dependent on the Christian notion of God, the Creator of heaven and earth. Ultimately civil service was, in their estimation, one of several ways to God. This is especially true after the scholastic synthesis of Aristotelianism and Christian philosophy.

8 Gilson, Étienne, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages(New York, 1954), p. 6. Google Scholar

9 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, I, 3, 2: ‘Est autem in his quae de Deo confitemur duplex veritatis modus. Quaedam namque vera sunt de Deo quae omnem facultatem humanae rationis excedunt, ut Deum esse trinum et unum. Quaedam vero sunt ad quae etiam ratio naturalis pertingere potest, sicut est Deum esse, Deum esse unum, et , alia huiusmodi; quae etiam philosophi demonstrative de Deo probaverunt, ducti naturalis lumine rationis.'

10 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, i, I, 6: ‘Sacra autem doctrina propriissime determinat de Deo secundum quod est altissima causa: quia non solum quantum ad illud quod est per creaturas cognoscibile (quod philosophi cognoverunt, ut dicitur Rom. I, 19: quod notum est Dei, manifestum est Mis); sed etiam quantum ad id quod notum est sibi soli de seipso, et aliis per revelationem communicatum.'

11 Ibid., IIa-IIao, 45, 4: ‘Respondeo dicendum quod sapientia quae est donum Spiritus Sancti, sicut dictum est (a. 2. 3), facit rectitudinem iudicii circa res divinas, vel per regulas divinas de aliis, ex quadam connaturalitate sive unione ad divina.'

12 Rice, op. tit., p. 107.

13 Ibid., p. 122.

14 On the non-philosophical character of Renaissance humanism, read P. O. Kristcller, 'Philosophical Movements of the Renaissance’ and ‘Humanism and Scholasticism in the Italian Renaissance', Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters (Roma, 1956), pp. 17-31 and 553-583.

15 On the debate concerning Pico della Mirandola's concept of man, read Dulles, Avery, Princeps Concordiae, Pico della Mirandola and the Scholastic Tradition(Cambridge, Mass., 1941), pp. 105128.Google Scholar

16 My use of the term ‘Christian philosophy’ is in the sense explained by E. Gilson in his History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages.

17 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theohgiae, 1, 80, 1c and 84, 2 ad 2.

18 My references to the Liber de sapiente are from the edition by Raymond Klibansky which has been included among the appendices of Cassirer, Ernst, Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance(Berlin, 1927).CrossRefGoogle Scholar I have also used a microfilm copy of the 1511 edition now at the Harvard University Library.

19 Liber de sapiente, p. 303: ‘Homini omni insunt a natura Substantia, Vita, Sensus ct Ratio. Est etenim, vivit, sentit et intelligit omnis homo. Ast alii hominum duntaxat ut simplicis Substantie, alii ut Substantie et Vite, alii ut Substantie, Vite et Sensus, alii denique Substantie, Vite, Sensus et Rationis actu atque operatione funguntur.

'Unde fit, ut cuncti homines natura et substantia sint similes et speciei equalitate tantum unus Homo: vivendi autem modo, functione et arte varii ac dissimillimi. Alii siquidem mineralibus aut simplicibus elementis comparantur, vegetantibus alii, alii brutis animantibus; supremi soli merito Hominum similes, Rationis et habitu et functione rationales, veri perfectique Homines dictitentur.'

20 Ibid., p. 308: ‘Sunt igitur naturalium capita rerum in triplici differentia: viventium equidem deorsum et abditum in terra; animalium in medio et ad latus; Hominum sursum et in summo, ad sui ipsorum corporis mundique fastigium.’ Also p. 305: ‘Gula sive corporee alimonie irrepressa aviditas hunc a primo propriove loco dejicit in tertium plantisque persimilem emcit…’ Also p. 304: ‘Ex carnis vero corporisve illecebris fit item Homo triniter Homine inferior ab humanoque fastigio prolapsus in trinam abyssum mergitur infelix …'

21 Ibid., pp. 303-304: ‘Etenim cum gemine sint passiones animi, quibus in varia hinc inde intranquilla mens divellitur, honoris scilicet appetitio et carnis delectatio: utraque huiusmodi passio trinas sagittas lethali arcu in Animam excutit, trinis veneno madentibus spiculis improvide sauciatam interimit. Nempe ex honoris appetitione Homo, cum supra seipsum extolli, cum medio et sui equalitate fieri superior cupit, in tres immanes scopulos infaustis ventis propulsatur: in Superbiam, Iram, Invidiam, quas spiritales animi labes vocant. Ex carnis vero corporisve illecebris fit item Homo triniter Homine inferior ab humanoque fastigio prolapsus in trinam abyssum mergitur infelix: in Luxuriam, Gulam, Acediam, quas Hominis corporeas esse maculas dicunt.’ Also p. 305: ‘Emcit quippe Luxuries et immoderatus fede libidinis amor Hominem haud bestiis absimilem illumque ab humana sede in brutorum animantium gradum infeliciter exturbat, quandoquidem nil prestantius brutis animantibus adsit quam seminis profusio sueque speciei propagatio. Gula sive corporee alimonie irrepressa aviditas hunc a primo propriove loco dejicit in tertium plantisque persimilem emcit, que licet totius sensationis et voluptatis probentur expertes, officia tamen alimentationis exercent. Porro extrema Acedia Hominem in imum ultimumque gradum extrudit facitque mineralibus persimilem.

'Sicut enim mineralia, que in extremo sedent gradu, haud aliud aliquid habent quam ipsum Esse nullaque naturali operatione exerceri aut per seipsa dimoveri illis indultum est: ita et quoscunque portentosum Acedie monstrum obsederit, assiduo ferme somno consopescunt, ab actu omni et operatione remittuntur, immoti ut lapides perstant, tanquam si simplex Esse sine ulla preclara vi atque laudabilium operationum facultate Natura mater illis esset elargita.’ Also p. 319: ‘Sapiens finitus Homo est, id est fine compositus atque perfectus. Insipiens vero infinitus est, inconsummatus, imperfectus. Nempe hie principium sine fine, potentiam sine obiecto, vim sine operatione se esse palam ostendit; ille autem principium fini coniunctum, potentiam minime ab obiecto separatam et vim in actu, usu et opere se continentem esse demonstrat. Hie rursum est ut oculus in tenebris aut a re visibili dimotus; ille vero oculorum aciei lumine perfuse ipsique soli, visibilium rerum fonti, iugiter exposite comparatur.'

22 See, for instance, St. Augustine, City of God, v, 2; St. Thomas Aquinas, Sumtna theologiae, 1, 91, 1; 96, 2; Ia-IIae, 17, 8 ad 2.

23 Pico della Mirandola, Heptaplus, Pr. ad led., p. 8, quoted in Avery Dulles, Princeps Concordiae, p. 113.

24 See Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae, IV, 2 and 3; Roger Bacon, Moralis philosophia, ed. Eugenio Massa (Zurich, 1953), pp. 55-57; St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, IIa-IIae, 64, 2 ad 3; that sin renders man comparable to minerals, vegetables, and beasts is the basis of much symbolism in the “Inferno” of the Divine Comedy.

25 See note 19 above. Also Liber de sapiente, pp. 310-311: ‘Manifestum ex his, que diximus, est hominem trifariam tribusve de causis Hominem posse dici. Aut enim homo simpliciter est Homo, hoc est ex humano corpore et rationali Anima conflatus; quopacto homo omnis est Homo, tarn Insipiens quam Sapiens, tarn infantulus quam qui virile robur est consequutus. Hie enim Hominis modus est a natura, quo inter sensibiles substantias humana species quartum efficere gradum comprobatur. Aut Hominem quidem vocamus eum, qui perfecta sui corporis accepit incrementa quique vir actu evasit; quopacto infans et puer Homines rninime dicuntur. Aut denique Homo est, qui animo maturus est virtuteque perfectus; quomodo neque infans neque insipiens vir Homines sunt, sed studiosi soli atque sapientes. Est enim studiosus Homo omnifariam sive triniter Homo: Homo inquam natura, Homo etate et Homo virtute. Qui autem studiosus non est: hie tantum bifariam Homo esse potest; nam et etate et natura Homo. Qui autem etate non Homo est, ut infans: hie unice duntaxat, hoc est a natura, Homo esse declaratur, etate autem et virtute non Homo.’ Italics added.

26 See notes 21 and 25.

27 See note 19 above.

28 See note 21 above.

29 See note 20 above.

30 Liber de sapiente, p. 318: ‘Sapienti in promptu adest suiipsius numerus; partes omnes suas apprehendit: corpus, Animam. Congruum in seipso Nature ordinem servat, ut hec pars dominetur, ilia huic famuletur. Cunctas animi vires naturalesve potentias atque facilitates iuxta seipsas metitur; illam cunctis prefert ac super omnes excolit, qua ad immortalitatem et beatitudinem via illi reseratur. Vivit denique in terris ut Deus alter …'

31 Ibid.: ‘Vivit denique in terris ut Deus alter: eterni, primi naturalisque Dei—a quo et Substantiam et Virtutem mutuavit—vera, precipua et substantialis imago.'

32 Ibid., p . 358: ‘In huius autem summe ac supersubstantialis omnium cause, beatissime trinitatis cognitione et sacratissima fide merito pre ceteris gloriari possunt Christicole, quod archana ilia, suprema et eminentissima Veritas, que a condito mundo omnem latuit heresim sive gentilium sive Hebreorum, quam nulli mundi sapientes, philosophi et magi per mundanam sapientiam naturali intelligentie lumine rimari potuerunt, que nullis vel paucissimis prophetarum sub nubis et caliginis tempus innotuit, sibi solis adaperta ac dilucidata sit. Solus inclytus Christianorum dux, novo et insolito sydere e virginis utero ortus in mundum, tante scientie (hoc est divine trinitatis) lumen e sydereis sedibus in orbem terrarum advexit, solus divine substantie numerum et fecunditatem palam edocuit atque publicavit.'

33 Ibid., p. 374: ‘Humana vero Sapientia ultima est Sapientia ac tryas; est enim trium entium cognitio: Anime, Angeli, Dei.'

34 See note 32 above.

35 Ibid., p. 410: ‘Humana etenim doctrina nos ut prurimum ieiunos relinquit atque sitibundos. Divina autem Sapientia esca eiusmodi est, “que”, ut Bigus ait, “satiat vivo pectora nostra cibo.” ‘

36 Ibid., p. 411: ‘ “Age igitur, o Homo”, ut sacer Dionysius suadet, “cognoscentia et provida corda gerens sursum erigere. Agnosce patrem luminum, a quo lux omnis procedit suique motus initium sumit.” Ac ne pro iis, que non sunt, ipsum ens verum unquam permutes: cuius sapida et suaveolens agnitio vera est, perfecta et consummata Sapientia.'

37 Rice, op. cit., p. 166.

38 Ibid., p. 169.

39 Ibid., p. 177.

40 The four ideas of wisdom which Cardanus recognizes are: divine wisdom, natural wisdom, human wisdom, and demonic wisdom. He divides the De sapientia according to these four kinds of wisdom. My references to the De sapientia are from a microfilm copy of an edition of Cardanus’ works now at the Harvard University Library, Hieronymi Cardani medici Mediolanensis De sapientia libri quinque. Eiusdem de consolatione libri tres, alias aediti, sed nunc ab eodem authore recogniti. Eiusdem, de libris propriis, liber unus (1544).

41 De sapientia, sig. eIr : ‘Ergo nimirum est o Sfondrate optime veram Aristotelis illam fuisse sententiam: Maximam partem eorum que scimus, minimam esse illorum quae ignoramus: Si de cunctis rebus, atque manifestissimis, adeo pauca etiam imperfecta cognoscimus. Atque ideo si vel arte aliqua, vel studio, divina sapientia nobis adveniret: superflua certe omnis alterius sapientiae tractatio foret: Verum cum adeo pusilla, atque exigua, ut ne vestigium quidem humano generi concessum esse videatur: illaque quantulacunque sit, nulla industria nullave solicitudine nobis pateat: cogimur non solum de aliis abunde, verum de ipsa parte admodum scribere. Est enim prorsus audacis imo temerarii consilii, velle alios docere que nescias, et ea scribere quae ignores. Quamobrem ob hanc causam non solum, verum etiam quia quae scriberem cum dimcillimum esset intelligere, longe tamen difficilius esset scribere quae sentirem, divinae sapientiae historia brevissima evasit.'

42 Ibid., sig. C3r: ‘Ergo nulli dubium esse debet, sapientiam divinam summam hominis foelicitatem comprehendere.“

43 Ibid., sigs. eIr-eIv: ‘Nanque quod ad subiectam rem pertinet, cum omnia quae ab aliis tribus continentur late ipsa amplexa sit: si vel eius portio aliqua digna nobis nota foret: vel tarn exiguae partis adipiscendae ratio aliqua pateret: sane multo maiorem diligentiam in ilia, multoque minorem in reliquis explicandis laborem impendissemus. Verum cum vel ob nostram inertiam, aut pravitatem, vel naturae humilitatem neutrum horum concessum nobis sit, cogimur quanquam rem arduam ac multis modis implexam, totis viribus summaque industria pertractare. Atque ut altius parum repetam, cum omnium eorum quibus nulla medicina adhiberi potest malorum, una sit ratio sapientiae consolatio: de qua alias in tribus libris disseruimus, reliquum est ut hie vel de malis quae tolli aliqua arte possunt, vel de bonis parandis aut retinendis sermo ipse instituatur.'

44 Ibid., sigs. l2r-l2v: ‘Ergo naturalis sapeintiae institutum, quod ad beatam pertinet vitam, animi virtutes, bonam valetudinem, integritatem sensuum, conscientiam rectae vitae, honestatem et amorem, quern amicitiam nuncupamus amplectitur.'

45 Ibid., sig. l2v: ‘Quinque enim scopi esse videntur illius qui naturali sapientia praeditus est, animum eruditione et virtute excolere, corporis vires servare, vitae commoda praestare, personae decorem tueri, honestatem sic in cunctis operationibus praeferre, ut nihil iure reprehendi queat.'

46 Ibid., sig. d6v: ‘Ergo summa hominis foelicitas, summa quies summa securitas est divina sapientia. At divina sapientia erit Deum cognoscere, diligereque.'

47 Ibid.: ‘… aut quomodo Deum cognoscemus sine divina sapientia?'

48 Ibid.: ‘Fructus est diuturna, secura, ac summa foelicitas, quae homini in hac vita possit contingere.'

49 Rice, op. tit., p. 205.

50 Ibid., pp. 204-205.

51 Ibid., p. 205.

52 My references to the De la sagesse are from a microfilm copy of the 1604 edition now at the Harvard University Library: De la sagesse trots livres (Paris, 1604). The warning to the readers is on pp. 21-22. ‘Bien veux-ie aduertir le lecteur qui entreprendra de iuger de cet ceuvre, qu'il se garde de tomber en aucun de ces sept mescontes, comme ont faict aucuns en la premiere edition, qui sont de rapporter au droit & devoir ce qui est du faict: Au faire ce qui est du juger: A resolution & determination ce qui n'est que propose, secoue, & dispute problematiquement & academiquement: a moy & a mes propres opinions, ce qui est d'autruy, & par rapport: A l'estat, profession, & condition externe, ce qui est de l'esprit & suffisance interne: A la religion & creance diuine, ce qui est de l'opinion humaine: A la grace & operation surnaturelle, ce qui est de la vertu, & action naturelle & morale: Toute passion & preoccupation ostee, il trouuera en ces sept points bien entendus, dequoy se resouldre en ses doubtes, dequoy respondre a toutes les obiections que luy-mesme & d'autres luy pourroint faire, & s'esclarcir de mon intention en c'et oeuure.“

53 Rice, op. cit., p. 205.

54 See note 52 above.

56 De la sagesse, p. 2.

56 Ibid., p. 3.

57 Ibid., pp. 3-4.

58 Ibid., p. 5.

59 Ibid., p. 8.

60 Ibid., p. 7: ‘Si i'eusse entreprins d'instruire pour le cloistre, & la vie consiliaire, c'est à dire profession des conseils Euangeliques, il m'eust falu suyure, adamussim, les aduis des Theologiens, mais nostre liure instruit à la vie ciuile, & forme vn homme pour le monde, c'est à dire à la sagesse humaine & non diuine.'

61 Ibid., p. 378: ‘Les preparatifs faits, & les deux fondemens jettés, il est temps de bastir & dresser les reigles de sagesse; dont la premiere & plus noble regarde la religion, & seruice de Dieu. La piete tient le premier lieu au rang de nos deuoirs, & est chose de tresgrand poids; en laquelle il est dangereux & tres-facile de se mecompter & faillir.'

62 Hans Baron, ‘Secularization of Wisdom and Political Humanism in the Renaissance', JHI xxi (1960), 149-150.

63 Baron, op. cit., p. 150.

64 De la sagesse, p. 381: ‘Mais Ton n'est point en doute ny en peine de scauoir quelle est la vraye, ayant la Chrestienne tant d'auantages & de priuileges si hauts & si authentiques par dessus les autres, & priuatiuement d'icelles. C'est le sujet de ma seconde verite, ou est montre combien toutes les autres demeurent au dessous d'elle.'

65 The true religion is closest in its essence to the notion of divine wisdom since in a sense, a very real sense, Christianity is a participation in God's knowledge of Himself. This truth is contained in the mystery of the doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ.

66 See note 50 above.

67 My references to the De laudibus philosophiae are from a microfilm copy of the 1543 edition now in the University of Toronto Library: Jacobi Sadoleti de laudibus philosophiae libri duo (1543).

68 Rice, op. cit., p. 92.

69 De laudibus philosophiae, p. 3: ‘Omnis, Mari Volaterrane, quae ad bene beateque vivendum pertinet doctrinae institutio, ducta primum mihi quidem a Philosophiae praeceptis videtur esse: atque ab eius facultate disciplinae, quae in contemplatione rerum naturalium, & moribus ad virtutem fingendis, constituendisque cernitur. Post autem his Uteris, quae quemadmodum sunt, sic etiam vocantur sacrae: in quibus vera Dei percipitur cognitio cum aucta & corroborata, turn ad extremum ex variis fluctibus iactationibusque vite, quas nostra imbecillitas fert, ad stabilem certamque spem immortalitatis conversa, atque translata.'

70 Ibid., p. 189: ‘Qui si praeter has communes Philosophiae rationes, quae similitudinem & imitationem praepotentis Dei insinuant nobis atque proponunt, ilia quoque praeterea maxima atque amplissima eiusdem Dei beneficia in genus humanum cognoverit: quae uni tantum generi, nominique nostro, qui Christum filium unigenum Dei colimus, & profitemur, proprie ac singulariter data sunt: quod in hac una religione & salus hominibus est, et vera beatae vitae in terris ratio, in coelo immortalitatis adeptio: nedum per Philosophiam, a pura & Integra religione non deflexerit, quemadmodum tu Phaedre, dudum calumniabare: sed magis in ea etiam statuetur, & confirmabitur.'

71 Ibid., p. 4: ‘Ac nos, qui (ut tu ipse optimus testis es) harum artium utranque adamavimus semper, & nunc quidem iam in alteram hanc, quae nostrae & personae propria est, & religionis, tanquaminportum vela deflectere, & pleno cursu contendere cogitamus….'

72 I have used the translation by E. T. Campagnac and K. Forbes of Sadoleto's De pucris recte instituendis (Sadoleto on Education, London, 1916). The quotation is from p. 84.

73 My references to Sadoleto's Commentary on Paul's Epistle to the Romans are from the “^eighteenth-century Verona edition: Jacobi Sadoleti Cardinalis et Episcopi Carpentoractensis viri disertissimi, Opera quae extant omnia (Verona, 1737-1738). The passage mentioned is Opera, iv, 3, col. 1. Cf. also 2, col. 2. ‘Nostra vero haec, quae sola veram in se continet sapientiae facultatem, sacrarum rerum, litterarumque cognitio, tametsi ea summis, atque altissimis divinorum consiliorum mysteriis referta est, nullis tamen ingeniis, nisi credulis, atque simplicibus percipiendam se praebet, genereque novo instituendi, et docendi prius persuasos vult esse sectatores sui, quam aliquid illis ipsa persuadeat, prius ut credant, quam doceantur: prius ut anient, quam noverint plane, quid illud sit, quod ante omnia illis est amandum.'

74 To appreciate fully Sadoleto's realization of the limitations of human knowledge without grace, read his discussion on how man can know things divine in the De laudibus philosophiae, pp. 165 ff. Here he stresses that man can know only as much of things divine as his reason can reach. To explain his point of view, Sadoleto compares the relationship between human reason and things divine to the relationship between our power of sight and the sun. Human knowledge of the divine is at best indirect just as human eyes can see the sun only indirectly.

75 Spenser, Edmund, ‘An Hymne of Heavenly Beautie’ (The Poetical Works of Edmund Spenser,ed. Smith, J. C. and de Selincourt, E., London, 1957), 11. 253255.Google Scholar