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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 February 2009
The central issue in most wars is how to win. The central issue in the Crimean War was whether there should be a war. Throughout most of the war, the question of peace or war remained an open one, dependent on military prospects, diplomatic vicissitudes, and the shuttlecock of parliamentary faction. That British public opinion was hotly for war was interpreted by players of the parliamentary game only as meaning that it might become pacific with equal volatility. The supposed political invincibility of Palmerston in 1855–6 had some reality outside Parliament, but little inside Parliament where it mattered. If events in Parliament varied in line with the war, it was also true that parliamentary prospects could affect the war.
2 Sir George Lewis, Palmerston's Chancellor of the Exchequer, thought not long before the fall of Sebastopol that the public ‘before long will begin to tire of the war’ (21 Aug. 1855) (The Greville Memoirs, ed. Strachey, G. Lytton and Fulford, R., 8 vols., London, 1938, VIII, p. 153)Google Scholar.
3 Even his two outdoor speeches at Melbourne and Romsey, made to celebrate the fall of Sebastopol, were very minor affairs. At Romsey he did not even alight from his cab.
4 National Register of Archives, Broadlands MSS. D/16 (diary for 1855). No diary for 1856 survives in this collection. The entries for the period of the ministerial crisis of 23 Jan. 7 Feb. 1855 have been printed in W. E. Gladstone. Ill: Autobiographical Memoranda 1845–1866, ed. Brooke, J. and Sorensen, Mary (H.M.C., The Prime Ministers’ Papers Series, London, 1978), pp. 274–7Google Scholar.
5 Palmerston to Carlisle, 29 May 1855 (B.L., Palmerston Letter Books). Palmerston argued that senile Irish judges must be made to retire, things being ‘too scandalous to be allowed to continue’. ‘… If I mistake not, there are at least four wholly incapable.’
6 Palmerston to Molesworth, 8July 1855 (B.L., Palmerston Letter Books); Palmerston to Sir Benjamin Hall, 25 Sept. 1855 (loc. cit.), on redesigning paths in the interests of pedestrians.
7 Palmerston to Molesworth, 30 Aug. 1855 (loc. cit.); Palmerston to Labouchere, 19 Dec. 1855 (loc. cit.).
8 For Pelissier, see Gooch, B. D., The New Bonapartist Generals in the Crimean War. Distrust and Decision-making in the Anglo-French Alliance (The Hague, 1959)Google Scholar.
9 Palmerston to Clarendon, 5 June 1855 (Bodleian Library, Clarendon MSS.).
10 Palmerston to Sir William Temple, 24 Dec. 1855 (Broadlands MSS.).
11 Same to same, 7 Nov. 1855 (loc. cit.).
12 Same to same, 24 Dec. 1855 (loc. cit.).
13 Gladstone told Palmerston that if he formed a ministry, ‘he would certainly start it amidst immense clapping of hands, yet he could not have any reasonable prospect of stable parliamentary support… He argued only rather faintly the other way, and seemed rather to come round to my way of thinking’ (Bell, H. C. F., Lord Palmerston, 2 vols., London, 1936, II, p. 111)Google Scholar.
14 See Sir George Lewis to Palmerston, 18 Sept. 1855 (Broadlands MSS.), arguing that ‘by dissolving now, we deprive ourselves of a great card which may be played next session, if the House proves intractable’. On 12 Nov. 1855 Sir George Grey wrote to Palmerston, ‘Ellice too writes strongly for dissolution, but I think our decision upon that was right’ (loc. cit.).
15 Parl. Deb., 3, cxxxviii, cols. 466–83 (14 May 1855).
16 Ellenborough had written a memorandum, dated 8 Aug. 1854, opposing the invasion of the Crimea on strategic grounds. This document was given to Granville at the close of the 1854 session by Ellenborough, with a request that it should be circulated to the cabinet. This was not done, though Newcastle sent it to some military men. Argyll retrieved it from Newcastle some time in 1855, with a view to using it to discredit Ellenborough (Broadlands MSS.).
17 Monypenny, W. F. and Buckle, G. E., The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield (6 vols., London, 1910–1920), IV, p. 3Google Scholar; Disraeli to Mrs. Brydges Willyams, 13 Apr. 1855 (New Court MSS.).
18 On 19 June 1855, the day after the failure of the first assault on Sebastopol, Palmerston wrote to his brother, Sir William Temple: ‘I hope to hear before long that we have driven the Russians out of the Crimea’ (Broadlands MSS.).
19 Lewis to Sir Edmund Head, 10 June 1855 (Letters of the Right Hon. Sir George Cornewall Lewis, Bart., to Various Friends, ed. SirLewis, Gilbert Frankland, London, 1870, p. 296)Google Scholar.
20 In debate ministers tended to evade the question of peace or war by pushing forward the merits of aristocratic government as a safe diversionary issue.
21 Part. Deb., 3, cxxxviii, cols. 1036–75 (24 May 1855).
22 Sir Charles Wood to the third Earl Grey, 16 July 1855 (Grey MSS., Department of Palaeography, University of Durham).
23 Loc. cit.
24 Shaftesbury's diary, 5 July 1855 (Broadlands MSS.).
25 The Greville Memoirs, VII, pp. 155–6, 160–3.
26 Palmerston to Clarendon, 20 July 1855: ‘… if you wanted for Vienna or Constantinople a man of ability and not belonging to the present diplomatic Body, there is Disraeli ready to your Hand; and barring any little objection to the wife, I take it you could not have a better agent’ (Clarendon MSS.). See also the same to same, 3 Sept.
27 Parl. Deb., 3, cxxxix, cols. 1930–8 (7 Aug. 1855).
28 Sir George Lewis to Sir Edmund Head, 17 Aug. 1855 (Lewis, , Letters, pp. 297–8)Google Scholar.
29 Monypenny, and Buckle, , Disraeli, IV, p. 11Google Scholar, citing Derby to Disraeli, 11 (? 12) July 1855.
30 owe this argument to Hawkins, A. B., ‘British Parliamentary Politics, 1855 to 1859’ (University of London Ph.D., 1980)–an important studyGoogle Scholar.
31 Monypenny, and Buckle, , Disraeli, IV, p. 16Google Scholar, referring to July 1855.
32 Disraeli to Lord Henry Lennox, 21 Aug. 1855 (ibid., IV, p. 17).
33 Disraeli to Mrs. Brydges Willyams, 2 Sept. 1855: ‘There is a great pause in public events, and I see little prospect of anything happening’ (New Court MSS.).
34 Palmerston to Clarendon, 15 Sept. 1855 (Clarendon MSS.). See also Palmerston to Sir George Lewis, 16 Sept. 1855: ‘I am told that Dizzy and Gladstone have concluded a compact upon the Peace Principle, and that this has produced a schism among the Conservatives, many of whom don't chuse to follow the devious footsteps of Dizzy, and it is said that neither Derby nor Stanley are with him’ (B.L., Palmerston Letter Books).
35 Palmerston to Clarendon, 16Sept. 1855 (Clarendon MSS.). This was the first time since becoming premier that Palmerston had discussed Poland with Clarendon or other senior ministers.
36 Derby to Disraeli, 25 Oct. 1855 (Monypenny, and Buckle, , Disraeli, IV, pp. 21–2)Google Scholar.
37 Ibid., IV, pp. 34–41.
38 The Times, 3 Dec. 1855.
39 Ibid., 14 Nov. 1855.
