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Transnational REDD+Rule Making: The Regulatory Landscape for REDD+ Implementation in Latin America

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 July 2018

María Eugenia Recio*
Centre for Climate, Energy and Environmental Law (CCEEL), Law School, University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu (Finland). Email:


REDD+ – an incentive mechanism to reduce deforestation and associated greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries – was developed under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and subsequently included in the Paris Agreement. Its early implementation activities have highlighted the role of certain intergovernmental actors: REDD+financing initiatives, including the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and Forest Investment Programme, and UN-REDD, a collaborative programme involving three agencies of the United Nations. By setting conditions for the provision of support for REDD+, these initiatives have actively and influentially engaged in REDD+rule making. This article focuses on the regulatory landscape for REDD+and examines rules developed under the UNFCCC and elaborated by the REDD+financing initiatives, using examples from the Latin American region. The analysis shows that informal lawmaking plays a more relevant role in REDD+rule making than international formal law, and has demonstrated legal and practical effects. However, informality can also tilt power relations between donor and recipient countries, which could jeopardize the legitimacy of transnational rule making.

© Cambridge University Press 2018 

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The author thanks Kati Kulovesi, Harro van Asselt, Analissa Savaresi and the CCEEL team for their useful comments on earlier drafts, and also expresses her gratitude to the anonymous TEL reviewers for their time and valuable remarks.


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14 Linked to the direct control of financial flows or ‘fund-based authority’: van Asselt & McDermott, n. 11 above, p. 78.

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18 Equivalent to USD 819 million: Watson, C., Patel, S. & Schalatek, L., Climate Finance Thematic Briefing: REDD+Finance (Overseas Development Institute, 2016), p. 3 Google Scholar.

19 UN-REDD Programme website, available at:

20 FCPF website, available at:

21 Brazil, Mexico and Peru; Ecuador, Guatemala, and Honduras joined in 2015: see Climate Investment Funds (CIF) website, available at:; and FIP, ‘FIP Fact Sheet’, 2016, available at:

22 Alvarez, J., International Organizations as Law-makers (Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 129 Google Scholar (an entity that ‘is not a subject of international law … is arguably not able to be a party to treaties, present claims against other international persons, possess other international rights and duties, or otherwise exist with relative autonomy in the legal sphere’); see also Klabbers, J., ‘The Concept of Legal Personality’ (2005) 11 Ius Gentium, pp. 3566 Google Scholar. On the relationship between subjecthood and international legal personality, see Klabbers, J., An Introduction to International Institutional Law (Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 3952 Google Scholar.

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24 This has also been referred to as the voluntarism principle: Roberts, A. & Sivakumaran, S., ‘Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging Armed Groups in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law’ (2012) 37(1) Yale Journal of International Law, pp. 107152 Google Scholar, at 112.

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27 d’Aspremont, J., ‘Introduction – Non-State Actors in International Law: Oscillating between Concepts and Dynamics’, in J. d’Aspremont (ed.), Participants in the International Legal System: Multiple Perspectives on Non-State Actors in International Law (Routledge, 2011), pp. 121 Google Scholar, at 4.

28 Roberts & Sivakumaran, n. 24 above, p. 116.

29 Hollis, D., ‘Why State Consent Still Matters: Non-State Actors, Treaties, and the Changing Sources of International Law’ (2005) 23(1) Berkeley Journal of International Law, pp. 137174 Google Scholar, at 172.

30 The Conference of the Parties (COP), such as the UNFCCC COP, can be seen as a treaty body: see, e.g., Brunnée, J., ‘COPing with Consent: Lawmaking under Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ (2002) 15(1) Leiden Journal of International Law, pp. 152 Google Scholar, at 16–8; or as ‘autonomous institutional arrangements’ similar to traditional international organizations with a will of their own: Churchill, R.R. & Ulfstein, G., ‘Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law’ (2000) 94(4) American Journal of International Law, pp. 623659 Google Scholar, at 658–9.

31 Roberts & Sivakumaran, n. 24 above, p. 116. For Hollis, they are ‘extra-national actors’: Hollis, n. 29 above, p. 161.

32 Cf. International Court of Justice (ICJ), Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 66, at 79, para. 25. On attributed powers of institutions, see Klabbers (2009), n. 22 above, pp. 55–73.

33 In general, non-state actors ‘are not the state, and not governmental’: Peters, A., Koechlin, L. & Fenner Zinkernagel, G., ‘Non-State Actors as Standard Setters: Framing the Issue in an Interdisciplinary Fashion’, in A. Peters et al. (eds), Non-State Actors as Standard Setters (Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 132 Google Scholar, at 14; Alston, P., ‘The “Not-a-Cat” Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?’, in P. Alston (ed.), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 336 Google Scholar.

34 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 11 Apr. 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, p. 174, para. 174.

35 Ibid., para. 179.

36 Similar to international organizations: Alvarez, n. 22 above, p. 129.

37 Hollis, n. 29 above, p. 173.

38 Klabbers (2009), n. 22 above, pp. 5, 9.

39 Amerasinghe, C., Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organisations (Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 4448 Google Scholar; Churchill & Ulfstein, n. 30 above, p. 632.

40 Klabbers (2009), n. 22 above, pp. 5, 9.

41 Berman & Wessel, n. 26 above, p. 36.

42 Pauwelyn, J., Wessel, R.A & Wouters, J., ‘When Structures Become Shackles: Stagnation and Dynamics in International Lawmaking’ (2014) 25(3) European Journal of International Law, pp. 733763 Google Scholar, at 743.

43 Wiersema, A., ‘Climate Change, Forests, and International Law: REDD’s Descent into Irrelevance’ (2014) 47(1) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, pp. 166 Google Scholar.

44 Decisions 9/CP.19, 10/CP.19, 11/CP.19, 12/CP.19, 13/CP.19, 14/CP.19 and 15/CP.19, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1, 31 Jan. 2014.

45 See the Warsaw Framework website at: Recio, M.E., ‘The Warsaw Framework and the Future of REDD’ (2014) 24(1) Yearbook of International Environmental Law, pp. 3769 Google Scholar.

46 Savaresi, ‘The Legal Status and Role of REDD-Plus Safeguards’, n. 12 above, p. 135; van Asselt & McDermott, n. 11 above.

47 Paris (France), 12 Dec. 2015, in force 4 Nov. 2016, available at:

48 Art. 5(1) Paris Agreement. This provision confers less of a sense of obligation (‘should’) than the UNFCCC in Art. 4.1(d) (‘shall’).

49 Art. 5(2) Paris Agreement.

50 Ibid.

51 Cf. Ellis, J., ‘Shades of Grey: Soft Law and the Validity of Public International Law’ (2012) 25(2) Leiden Journal of International Law, pp. 313334 Google Scholar, at 318.

52 See, e.g., Brunnée, n. 30 above; Churchill & Ulfstein, n. 30 above; L.K. Camenzuli, ‘The Development of International Environmental Law at the Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ Conference of the Parties and Its Validity’, 2007, available at:; A. Savaresi, ‘The Paris Agreement: Reflections on an International Law Odyssey’, European Society of International Law 2016 Annual Conference, Riga (Latvia), 31 Jan. 2017, available at:, p. 5; van Asselt, H., Sindico, F. & Mehling, M., ‘Global Climate Change and the Fragmentation of International Law’ (2008) 30(4) Law & Policy, pp. 423429 Google Scholar, at 430.

53 Churchill & Ulfstein, n. 30 above, p. 641; Wiersema, A., ‘The New International Law-Makers? Conferences of the Parties to Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ (2009) 31(1) Michigan Journal of International Law, pp. 231287 Google Scholar, at 276–8. This view has been criticized: Staal, T., ‘Exercising or Evading International Public Authority?’ (2016) 7(1) Goettingen Journal of International Law, pp. 948, at 33–4Google Scholar.

54 Brunnée, n. 30 above, pp. 16–18.

55 Ibid., p. 18.

56 The UNFCCC’s mandate for lawmaking on REDD+is not strong; the UNFCCC does require members to enhance the conservation of forests, but developing countries have no obligations of mitigation results: see Arts 3.3 and 4.1(d), UNFCCC.

57 Sands, P., Principles of International Environmental Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 144 Google Scholar.

58 Vihma, A., ‘Analyzing Soft Law and Hard Law in Climate Change’, in K. Kulovesi, M. Mehling & E. Hollo (eds), Climate Change and the Law (Edwar Elgar, 2013), pp. 143164 Google Scholar, at 145; van Asselt, Mehling & Siebert, n. 13 above.

59 J. Pauwelyn, ‘Informal International Lawmaking: Framing the Concept and Research Questions’, in Pauwelyn, Wessel & Wouters, n. 26 above, pp. 13–34, at 15.

60 Similarly, the technical details of the Kyoto Protocol (Kyoto (Japan), 11 Dec. 1997, in force 16 Feb. 2005, available at: were greatly developed through COP decisions: Brunnée, n. 30 above; Boyle, A. & Chinkin, C., The Making of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 216220 Google Scholar; Savaresi, n. 52 above.

61 For an overview see Wiersema, n. 43 above.

62 See Brunnée, n. 30 above; Boyle & Chinkin, n. 60 above, pp. 216–20; Savaresi, n. 52 above, p. 5.

63 Klabbers, J., ‘The Undesirability of Soft Law’ (1998) 67(4) Nordic Journal of International Law, pp. 381391 Google Scholar; Klabbers, J., ‘The Redundancy of Soft Law’ (1996) 65(2) Nordic Journal of International Law, pp. 167182 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

64 Klabbers (2009), n. 22 above, p. 183.

65 The rules are, at the same time, more precise than, e.g., other provisions in the Paris Agreement. Cf. Abbott, K.W. et al., ‘The Concept of Legalization’ (2000) 54(3) International Organization, pp. 401419 Google Scholar, at 412–3; but see Finnemore, M. & Toope, S.J., ‘Alternatives to “Legalization”: Richer Views of Law and Politics’ (2001) 55(3) International Organization, pp. 743758 Google Scholar.

66 UNFCCC Secretariat, Decision 1/CP.16, ‘The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention’, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 15 Mar. 2011, paras 71–2.

67 It should address land tenure, gender, forest governance: ibid.

68 Ibid., Appendix II.

69 Cf. Decision 12/CP.19, n. 44 above.

70 Decision 1/CP.16, n. 66 above, Appendix II.

71 Recio, n. 45 above, pp. 60–1, Savaresi, ‘The Legal Status and Role of REDD-Plus Safeguards’, n. 12 above.

72 Cf. Decision 9/CP.19, n. 44 above, para. 4. See Bodin, B., Väänänen, E. & van Asselt, H., ‘Putting REDD+Environmental Safeguards into Practice: Recommendations for Effective and Country-specific Implementation’ (2015) 9(2) Carbon & Climate Law Review, pp. 168182 Google Scholar, at 171. However, see Savaresi, ‘The Legal Status and Role of REDD-Plus Safeguards’, n. 12 above, p. 135 (‘[t]he fact … that information on the implementation of safeguards is a requirement … seems to indicate that compliance with safeguards is mandatory … for Parties seeking REDD+results-based payments’).

73 Savaresi, ‘The Legal Status and Role of REDD-Plus Safeguards’, n. 12 above, pp. 134–5; Bodin, Väänänen & van Asselt, ibid., p. 168.

74 Decision 1/CP.16, n. 66 above, para. 71; Abbott et al., n. 65 above, p. 415.

75 Pauwelyn, Wessel & Wouters, n. 42 above, p. 756.

76 UNFCCC Secretariat, Decision 2/CP.13, ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries: Approaches to Stimulate Action’, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1, 14 Mar. 2008, paras 2, 3.

77 Decision 1/CP.16, n. 66 above, para. 73.

78 But voluntary commitments can be set in countries’ nationally determined contributions: see Art. 4 Paris Agreement.

79 Recio, n. 45 above, p. 47.

80 Savaresi, ‘The Legal Status and Role of REDD-Plus Safeguards’, n. 12 above, pp. 136–7.

81 Angelsen, A. et al. (eds), Analysing REDD+: Challenges and Choices (Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), 2012), p. 381 Google Scholar.

82 Countries in the region that have passed REDD+laws include Ecuador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru: Recio, n. 17 above. See also S. Aguilar & M.E. Recio, ‘Climate Change Law in Latin America’, in Kulovesi, Mehling & Hollo, n. 58 above, pp. 653–78.

83 Including Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru: REDD+Web Platform, available at:

84 Including Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador: REDD+Web Platform, ibid.

85 E.g., Brazil and Ecuador submitted their REDD+strategy to the REDD+Web Platform, ibid. Peru and Chile have also developed strategies: Government of Peru, Estrategia Nacional Sobre Bosques y Cambio Climático, Supreme Decree No. 007-2016-MINAM (2016); Government of Chile, Estrategia Nacional de Cambio Climático y Recursos Vegetacionales 2017–2025 (2016).

86 Brazil and Ecuador: REDD+Web Platform, n. 83 above.

87 Decision 9/CP.19, n. 44 above, para. 5.

88 See van Asselt and McDermott, n. 11 above, p. 82 (arguing that regulatory gaps in the REDD+rules allow other governance arrangements to play a role in rule making); Savaresi, ‘The Legal Status and Role of REDD-Plus Safeguards’, n. 12 above, p. 135.

89 FCPF, ‘FCPF Information Memorandum’, 13 June 2008, p. 13, available at:

90 CIF, ‘Linkages between REDD+Readiness and the Forest Investment Program’, Nov. 2014, pp. 5–6, available at:

91 Without prejudice to differences among them: see M. Young, ‘REDD+and Interacting Legal Regimes’, in Voigt, n. 11 above, pp. 89–125, at 121.

92 The FCPF was established by the World Bank: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, ‘Charter Establishing the FCPF’, 23 Dec. 2014, Art. 2 and Preamble, paras (B) and (C), available at: The FIP is a targeted programme under the Special Climate Fund established by the World Bank: CIF, ‘Governance Framework for the Strategic Climate Fund’, Nov. 2008, para. 4, available at: The UN-REDD Programme was convened by the FAO, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Environment Programme: UN-REDD Programme, ‘Terms of Reference: UN-REDD Programme Multi-Partner Trust Fund’, 25 Nov. 2015, para. 3.

93 Similar to international agencies: cf. Berman & Wessel, n. 26 above, p. 43.

94 FCPF, n. 89 above, p. 11. On the FIP process, see C. Lang, ‘The World Bank’s FIP: The Story so Far’, REDD Monitor, 20 July 2009, available at:

95 ‘Dedicated Grant Mechanism for Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities’, available at:

96 Trust funds are often placed in organizations experienced in the field: Gold, J., ‘Trust Funds in International Law: The Contribution of the International Monetary Fund to a Code of Principles’ (1978) 72(4) American Journal of International Law, pp. 856866 Google Scholar, at 860. The FIP’s donors are the United Kingdom (UK), the US, Norway, Japan, Australia, Sweden, Spain and Denmark, see the FIP website, available at: UN-REDD’s main donor is Norway, followed by the European Union (EU), Denmark, Spain, Japan, Luxemburg and Switzerland. FCPF donors are the same as those of UN-REDD, as well as the EU, Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the US: FCPF website, available at:

97 The World Bank is the trustee for the FIP and the FCPF. The UN-REDD Programme is administered by the UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office.

98 Unlike other funding initiatives, FIP funds can be implemented by different multilateral development banks whose rules apply. Cf. CIF, ‘Design Document for the Forest Investment Program: A Targeted Program under the Special Climate Fund Trust Fund’, 22 June 2009, paras 35–6, available at:

99 UN-REDD, n. 92 above, Section III, para. 1.

100 UNDP, ‘UNDP’s Social and Environmental Standards’, 1 Jan. 2015.

101 Or the implementation organization, or the trustee.

102 The FIP is under the governing structure of the Special Climate Fund.

103 See FCPF, n. 92 above.

104 FCPF, n. 92 above, Art. 10.1(b); UN-REDD, n. 92 above, paras 31–5; CIF, n. 92 above, para. 31.

105 Exceptionally, by eligible recipient countries: see CIF, n. 98 above, para. 18; CIF, n. 92 above, para. 17.

106 The FCPF’s Participants Committee has 14 representatives of donors and recipients; and the FIP Sub-Committee includes six representatives from each constituency: FCPF, n. 92 above, Art. 11, paras 11.1.(a)–(d); CIF, n. 98 above, para. 25(e).

107 UN-REDD, n. 92 above, para. 36.

108 FCPF, n. 92 above, Art. 11; CIF, n. 98 above, paras 17–21; UN-REDD, n. 92 above, para. 36. In the past, the UN-REDD Programme’s Policy Board allowed representatives of civil society and indigenous peoples as full members: UN-REDD Programme, ‘Policy Board Terms of Reference’, Mar. 2009; UN‐REDD Programme, ‘Rules of Procedure and Operational Guidance’, 10 Mar. 2009, pp. 5–6.

109 FCPF, n. 92 above; UN-REDD, n. 92 above; UN-REDD Programme, ‘Strategic Framework 2016–2020’, May 2015; CIF, n. 98 above; CIF, n. 92 above.

110 UN-REDD, n. 92 above, para. 4.2; FCPF, n. 92 above, para. 11.1; CIF, n. 98 above, para. 25.

111 Such as the attribution of emissions reductions with a view to provide REDD+payments: FCPF, n. 92 above, Art. 11.1(g) and (h).

112 FCPF, n. 92 above, Art. 11.1(i).

113 The number of REDD+host countries is greater than the number of donors, but in the governing bodies both tend to have an equal number of seats and voting power. An exemption is the FCPF Assembly, composed of a broad membership, which can overturn some decisions taken by the FCPF’s governing body: FCPF, n. 92 above, Art. 10.2(a)(ii).

114 See, e.g., UN-REDD, n. 92 above, p. 33.

115 J. Winters & D. Sridhar, ‘Earmarking for Global Health: Benefits and Perils of the World Bank’s Trust Fund Model’ (2017) BMJ online articles, 358:j3394, available at:

116 As did the UN-REDD Programme: UN-REDD Programme, ‘Guidelines on Free, Prior and Informed Consent’, Jan. 2013, p. 4.

117 Similar to the World Bank’s Social and Environmental Safeguards: see J.E. Alvarez, ‘International Organizations and the Rule of Law: Challenges Ahead’, 10 June 2016, p. 23, available at:

118 UN-REDD Programme, ‘Report of the Eighth Policy Board Meeting’, Apr. 2012, p. 21.

119 Ibid.

120 Ibid.; FCPF, ‘Incorporating Environmental and Social Considerations into the Process of Getting Ready for REDD’, Note FMT 2009–6, 15 Oct. 2009, available as a draft at:; but others have followed different procedures: see UN-REDD, n. 116 above.

121 See the description of the Social and Environmental Principles and Criteria (SEPC): UN-REDD, n. 118 above, pp. 20–2. Savaresi argues that these rules are no longer internal, but part of the obligations that will be undertaken by one of the parties: Savaresi, ‘The Legal Status and Role of REDD-Plus Safeguards’, n. 12 above, p. 135.

122 Larson, A. & Ribot, J., ‘The Poverty of Forestry Policy: Double Standards on an Uneven Playing Field’ (2007) 2(2) Sustainability Science, pp. 189204 Google Scholar, at 189.

123 Sikor, T. et al., ‘REDD-Plus, Forest Peoples’ Rights and Nested Climate Governance’ (2010) 20(3) Global Environmental Change, pp. 423425 Google Scholar.

124 Seymour, F., Forest, Climate Change, and Human Rights: Managing Risks and Trade Offs (CIFOR, 2008), pp. 13, 18Google Scholar.

125 Griffiths, T. & Martone, F., Seeing ‘REDD’? Forests, Climate Change Mitigation and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (Forest Peoples Programme, 2009), p. 6 Google Scholar.

126 Decision 1/CP.16, n. 66 above, para. 72. Other safeguards contribute indirectly to enhance stakeholder participation, such as the consideration of international agreements.

127 Decision 1/CP.16, n. 66 above, Appendix I, 2(c). UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), UNGA Resolution 61/295, 13 Sept. 2007, available at:

128 UNDRIP, ibid., Arts 19, 32.

129 FCPF & UN-REDD Programme, ‘Guidelines on Stakeholder Engagement in REDD+Readiness’, 20 Apr. 2012.

130 Including the FCPF’s Readiness Preparation Proposal template, available at:

131 FCPF & UN-REDD, n. 129 above, para. 9(g).

132 Ibid.

133 For the UN-REDD Programme: ibid., Annex 1.

134 Ibid., para. 9(i).

135 Ibid., para. 10.

136 UN-REDD, n. 116 above, p. 9.

137 World Bank, Environmental and Social Framework (World Bank, 2016)Google Scholar, para. 55.

138 E.g., UN-REDD, n. 118 above, p. 20.

139 FCPF, n. 92 above, Art. 3 (FCPF will ‘seek to ensure consistency with the UNFCCC Guidance on REDD’); UN-REDD, n. 109 above, para. 14 (focusing on coherence in REDD+support by ‘aligning country and global level support around the UNFCCC guidance’); e.g., CIF, n. 98 above, para. 9 (stating that ‘the FIP should draw upon the IPCC … while recognizing the evolving vocabulary within the UNFCCC process’).

140 Savaresi, ‘The Legal Status and Role of REDD-Plus Safeguards’, n. 12 above, p. 148.

141 UN-REDD Programme, ‘Comparative Analysis of the UNFCCC REDD+Related Decisions and Other Multilateral and Bilateral Requirements to Access Results-Based Payments/Results-Based Finance for REDD+Results-Based Actions’, Technical Resource Series 5, Jan. 2017, p. 145 (arguing that [some of these additional prescriptions may be necessary] ‘in line with the operational modalities of the various financing entities’).

142 Geneva (Switzerland), 27 Jun. 1989, in force 5 Sept. 1991, available at: normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C169.

143 Government of Peru, Law N° 2978: Ley del Derecho a la Consulta Previa a los Pueblos Indígenas u Originarios, reconocidos en el Convenio 169 de la OIT (2011), Art. 15.

144 Dann, n. 10 above, p. 372.

145 Countries must complete a National Programme Document (NPD) for UN-REDD, a Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP) for the FCPF, and an Investment Plan for the FIP.

146 Le Groupe-conseil baastel Itée, Nordic Agency for Development and Ecology & FCPF, ‘Final Evaluation Report’, June 2011, p. vii.

147 Pacheco, P. et al., ‘The Recognition of Forest Rights in Latin America: Progress and Shortcomings of Forest Tenure Reforms’ (2012) 25(6) Society & Natural Resources, pp. 556571 Google Scholar, at 563; see also FAO, ‘Leyes Forestales de América del Sur’ [‘Forestry Laws in South America], Apr. 2010, p. 54 (in Spanish).

148 Sanhueza, J.E. & Antonissen, M., REDD+en América Latina: Estado Actual de las Estrategias de Reducción de Emisiones por Deforestación y Degradación Forestal (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, 2014), p. 27 Google Scholar.

149 The grant approval procedure for FCPF funds took longer than the two-year average time required for the Global Environment Facility projects in some Latin American countries.

150 The World Bank’s safeguards applicable to the FIP and the FCPF are described as mandatory, while the UN-REDD guidelines may seem less obligatory. However, both inform decision making and are ‘considered in the formulation, review … and monitoring of implementation’: UN-REDD, n. 118 above, pp. 20–1.

151 E.g., the UN-REDD programme establishes a national team together with the recipient country, which includes civil society and indigenous peoples’ representatives: UN-REDD, n. 109 above, p. 18.

152 Dann, n. 10 above, p. 360.

153 Under the FCPF, e.g., countries that fail to fulfil agreed obligations lose all rights and privileges, including eligibility to become a member of the governing body: FCPF, n. 92 above, para. 6.5.

154 K. Hite, ‘Adjudicating Disputes Across Scales: Global Administrative Law Considerations for REDD+’, in Voigt, n. 11 above, pp. 408–47, at 426.

155 B. de Chazournes, ‘Policy Guidance and Compliance: The World Bank Operational Standards’, in Armstrong, n. 25 above, pp. 289–90. See also Dann, n. 10 above, p. 376; Savaresi, ‘The Legal Status and Role of REDD-Plus Safeguards’, n. 12 above, p. 135.

156 Berman & Wessel, n. 26 above, p. 37.

157 Walker, N., Intimations of Global Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 41 Google Scholar.

158 Alvarez, n. 22 above, p. 246.

159 Collaborative Partnership on Forests, ‘SFM and Primary Forests’, 2012, available at:

160 Sieder, R., ‘Pueblos Indígenas y Derecho(s) en América Latina’, in C. Rodríguez Garavito (coord.), El Derecho en América Latina (Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 2011), pp. 303321 Google Scholar, at 303 (in Spanish).

161 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), ‘Acceso a la Información, Participación y Justicia en Temas Ambientales en América Latina y el Caribe: Situación Actual, Perspectivas y Ejemplos de Buenas Prácticas’, Serie Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo No. 151, 2013, p. 52 (in Spanish).

162 E.g., Government of Ecuador, Ministerial Agreement 128 (2013) (setting procedures for consultation and negotiation with traditional communities for REDD+implementation).

163 A.M. Larson et al., ‘Rights to Forests and Carbon under REDD+Initiatives in Latin America’, CIFOR Infobrief No. 33, Nov. 2010, p. 6, available at:

164 The Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Rainforest (AIDESEP), unlike the Confederation of Amazonian Nationalities of Peru (CONAP), rejected REDD+implementation if it was not adapted to the priorities of indigenous peoples. AIDESEP required budget allocation to enhance land rights of indigenous peoples by, e.g., demarcating lands and recognizing indigenous practices: Zelli, F. et al., REDD in Peru: A Challenge to Social Inclusion and Multi-Level Governance (Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, 2014), p. 46 Google Scholar.

165 Ibid.

166 Espinoza Llanos, R. & Feather, C., La Realidad de REDD+en Perú, entre el Dicho y el Hecho (Forest Peoples Programme, 2011), p. 21 (in Spanish)Google Scholar.

167 Ibid.

168 Ibid., p. 53. AIDESEP, ‘Se conformó la Mesa Nacional de REDD Indígena de Perú’, AIDESEP blog, 31 Jul. 2013, available at: (in Spanish).

169 See, e.g., Regional Government Madre de Dios, Regulation N° 018-2013-RMDD/CR (2013), available at:

170 Zelli et al., n. 164 above, p. 47.

171 Similarly in Indonesia: D. Lee & T. Pistorius, ‘The Impacts of International REDD+Finance’, Climate and Land Use Alliance, Sept. 2015, p. 35, available at:

172 Recio, M.E., ‘Honduras Resource Tenure and Sustainable Landscapes Assessment: Tenure and Global Climate Change (TGCC)’, US Agency for International Development (USAID), Mar. 2015, pp. 1–26, available at: Google Scholar.

173 En el marco del proceso REDD Gobierno y CONPAH firman acta sobre derechos indígenas y afrohondureños sobre su territorio, UNDP, 21 Jan. 2013, available at: (in Spanish).

174 Agreement signed between SERNA, ICF, SEDINAFROH, INA and CONPAH, 9 Jan. 2013: see Recio, n. 172 above, pp. 3, 70.

175 Recio, M.E., ‘Panama Resource Tenure and Sustainable Landscapes Assessment: Tenure and Global Climate Change (TGCC)’, USAID, Sept. 2014, pp. 1–22, available at: Google Scholar.

176 Coordinadora Nacional de Pueblos Indigenas De Panamá (COONAPIP), ‘Informe Final Elaboración de un Marco de Referencia sobre la Participación de los Pueblos Indígenas de la República de Panamá dentro del Contexto de la Propuesta de UN-REDD Panamá’, 12 Oct. 2009, Annex III, available at:

177 Recio, n. 175 above, pp. 3, 13.

178 Ibid.

179 Ibid.

180 Ibid.

181 Ibid.

182 Similarly, see van Asselt & McDermott, n. 11 above, p. 63 (arguing that institutional complexity in REDD+can lead to a ‘benevolent jigsaw’ or ‘conflicting fragmentation’).

183 Savaresi, ‘The Legal Status and Role of REDD-Plus Safeguards’, n. 12 above.

184 Ibid., p. 135.

185 Recio, n. 45 above; Savaresi, ‘A Glimpse into the Future of the Climate Regime’, n. 12 above, pp. 191–4.

186 Wheatley, S., ‘A Democratic Rule of International Law’ (2011) 22(2) European Journal of International Law, pp. 525548 Google Scholar, at 527.

187 Cf. Pauwelyn, Wessel & Wouters, n. 42 above, pp. 743, 748.