¹ Lasswell, Harold D. and Kaplan, Abraham, Power and Society (New Haven: Yale University Press 1950).Google Scholar In an early and influential article, Herbert A. Simon described his discussion as “a series of footnotes on the analysis of influence and power by Lass well and Kaplan.” “Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power,” Journal of Politics, XV (November 1953), 501. See also Nagel, Jack H., “Some Questions About the Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science, XIII (March 1968), 129.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² Simon, (fn. 1), and Models of Man (New York: Wiley 1957)Google Scholar; March, James G., “An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Influence,” American Political Science Review, XLIX (June 1955), 431–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dahl, Robert A., “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science, 11 (July 1957), 201–15Google Scholar, and “Power,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, XII (New York: Free Press 1968), 405–15; Nagel, Jack H., The Descriptive Analysis of Power (New Haven: Yale University Press 1975)Google Scholar; and Oppenheim, Felix E., “Power and Causation,” in Barry, Brian, ed., Power and Political Theory: Some European Perspectives (London: John Wiley 1976), 103–16.Google Scholar

Excellent reviews of the literature on power, reflecting both consensus and healthy intellectual dispute, are the following: Cartwright, Dorwin, “Influence, Leadership, Control,” in March, James, ed., Handbook of Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally 1965), 1–47Google Scholar; Dahl, “Power”; Tedeschi, James T. and Bonoma, Thomas V., “Power and Influence: An Introduction,” in Tedeschi, , ed., The Social Influence Processes (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton 1972), 1–49Google Scholar; and Nagel, The Descriptive Analysis of Power.

³ Nagel (fn. 2), 9–10.

⁴ Dahl, “Power” (fn. 2), 414.

⁵ Dahl, Robert A., Modern Political Analysis (3rd ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1976), 26.Google Scholar

⁶ Two important recent works in international relations use Hans Morgenthau's textbook published in 1948 as their basic reference on power: Kindleberger, Charles P., Power and Money (New York: Basic Books 1970)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Gilpin, Robert, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York: Basic Books 1975).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷ For a review of a different set of international relations works with regard to a different set of topics, see Baldwin, , “Inter-Nation Influence Revisited,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, XV (December 1971), 471–86.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For a suggestion that current “academic practitioners of international relations analysis and theory” have neglected the study of power, see Gray, Colin S., The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era (New York: Crane, Russak 1977), 1–5.Google Scholar Gray's contention that power analysis is the only approach that “enables students to appreciate the essence of the field” of international relations, however, goes considerably beyond the argument I am presenting here.

⁸ Cartwright (fn. 2), 4; and Dahl, Robert A., Modern Political Analysis (2d ed., Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1970), 16.Google Scholar

⁹ For useful arguments in favor of the validity and desirability of distinguishing power from influence, see Bell, David V. J., Power, Influence, and Authority (New York: Oxford University Press 1975)Google Scholar; and Knorr, Klaus, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations (New York: Basic Books 1975).Google Scholar

¹⁰ On the importance of this point, see Lasswell and Kaplan (fn. 1), 76; Dahl, “Power” (fn. 2), 408; Dahl (fn. 5), 33; and Nagel (fn. 2), 14, 115. Among students of international politics, the strongest proponents of this view have been Harold and Margaret Sprout. See their Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of In ternational Politics Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Research Monograph (Princeton 1956), 39–49; “Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, I (December 1957), 309–28; The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs: With Special Reference to International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1965), 83–98, 214–16; and Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth (New York: Van Nostrand 1971), 163–78.

¹¹ “I still believe he [President Johnson] found it viscerally inconceivable that what Walt Rostow kept telling him was ‘the greatest power in the world’ could not dispose of a collection of night-riders in blackpa jamas.” Schlesinger, Arthur Jr, “The Quagmire Papers,” New York Review of Books (December 16, 1971), 41.Google Scholar

¹² For examples of this type of explanation, see Knorr (fn. 9), 9–14; 17–18; Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown 1977), 11, 18–19Google Scholar, 53, 225; Dahl (fn. 5), 37; and Cline, Ray S., World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press 1975).Google Scholar The inclusion of Dahl in this list is somewhat anomalous since Dahl stresses variations in the scope and domain of power.

¹³ Sprout and Sprout (fn. 10). Actually the Sprouts’ concept of a “policy-contingenc framework” goes beyond specification of scope and domain to include the time, place, and means of an influence attempt. For purposes of this article, however, the Sprouts’ insistence that “policy-contingency frameworks” be specified will be treated as roughly equivalent to Dahl's insistence that scope and domain be specified.

¹⁴ Dahl (fn. 5), 37.

¹⁵ “It seems that what we call a ‘resource’ is such, not on its own account, but solely because of the uses to which it can be put, and its quantitative aspect, how much resource there is, is still more evidently determinable only in terms of the use.” Knight, Frank H., Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (New York: Harper & Row 1921), 65–66.Google Scholar

¹⁶ For a comparison of political power and purchasing power which emphasizes the absence of a political counterpart to money, see Baldwin, , “Money and Power,” Journal of Politics, XXXIII (August 1971), 578–614CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁷ See Nye, Joseph S. Jr, and Keohane, Robert O., “Transnational Relations and World Politics,” International Organization, XXV (Summer 1971), 736Google Scholar; Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S., “World Politics and the International Economic System,” in Fred Bergsten, C., ed., The Future of the International Economic Order: An Agenda for Research (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books 1973), 121Google Scholar; Keohane and Nye (fn. 12), 146. For an extended critique of the analogy between power and money, see Baldwin, “Money and Power” (fn. 16).

¹⁸ See Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1960), 205–54.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Lasswell and Kaplan (fn. 1), 85, 92, 94.

²⁰ Sprout and Sprout, Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth (fn. 10), 178. Dahl makes a similar point regarding the possibility of comparing policy-contingency frame-works: “Power comparability will have to be interpreted in the light of the specific requirements of research and theory, in the same way that the decision as to whether to regard any two objects—animals, plants, atoms, or whatnot—as comparable depends upon general considerations of classification and theoretical import. To this extent, and to this extent only, the decision is ‘arbitrary’; but it is not more ‘arbitrary’ than other decisions that establish the criteria for a class of objects.” “The Concept of Power” (fn. 2), 209. Nagel also notes that “domain and scope need not be particularistic or unique. Depending on one's purpose and the limits imposed by reality, the outcome class may contain a few similar members or many diverse elements.” (Fn. 2), 14.

²¹ Two excellent yet quite different examples of power theorizing based on explicit recognition that power configurations vary from one policy-contingency framework to another are Keohane and Nye (fn. 12), and Alker, Hayward, “On Political Capabilities in a Schedule Sense: Measuring Power, Integration, and Development,” in Alker, Hay-ward, Deutsch, Karl W., and Stoetzel, Antoine, eds., Mathematical Approaches to Politics (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 1973), 307–73.Google Scholar The former work illustrates the value of “middle-level” empirical theorizing about power; the latter work demonstrates that abstract model-building is not precluded by the assumption that power is multidimensional.

²² Schelling (fn. 18).

²³ Keohane and Nye (fn. 12), 146–47.

²⁴ Dahl, , “Power” (fn. 2), 408Google Scholar; Sprout and Sprout, “Environmental Factors …” (fn. 10), 325.

²⁵ Keohane, and Nye, , “World Politics and the International System” (fn. 17), 163.Google Scholar

²⁶ The idea that power resources or “power bases” could be identified without reference to the value system of the person or group to be influenced is not found in Lasswell and Kaplan. They make it clear that power relations presuppose B's value system. (Fn. 1), 76–77, 83–84.

²⁷ Generally speaking, I consider this to be the perspective of all those who emphasize the importance of scope specification, policy-contingency frameworks, and/or contextual analysis, including Lasswell and Kaplan (fn. 1), the Sprouts (fn. 10), and Dahl (fn. 2).

²⁸ Knorr (fn. 9), 9.

²⁹ Cf. Nagel (fn. 2), 172–73.

³⁰ Knorr (fn. 9), 313.

³¹ Ibid., 9.

³² Ibid., 18.

³³ Cline (fn. 12), 11. Cline's book is especially interesting as an indication of how power analysis is performed by high-level government officials. He has served as Deputy Director for Intelligence in the CIA and as Director of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State.

³⁴ Ibid., 130.

³⁵ Cline describes power as “a subjective factor” (ibid., 8) and uses the term “perceived power” in his formula. In a puzzling footnote, however, he indicates that “real power” is something different from “perceived power” (p. 12n). The distinction is not developed, thus leaving one wondering about the significance of the formula.

³⁶ Sprout and Sprout, Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth (fn. 10), 177.

³⁷ Cline (fn. 12), 134–35.

³⁸ Kindleberger (fn. 6), 56. He defines power in terms of ability to use strength “efficiently” at one point (p. 56) and in terms of ability to use strength “effectively” at another point (p. 65). In the context of power analysis the difference is not trivial.

³⁹ See Young, Orao R., “Interdependencies in World Politics,” International Jourlal, XXIV (Autumn 1969), 726–50Google Scholar; Rosecrance, Richard and Stein, Arthur, “Interdelendence: Myth or Reality?” World Politics, XXVI (October 1973), 1–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Waltz, Kenneth, “The Myth of Interdependence,” in Kindleberger, Charles, ed., The International Corporation (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press 1970), 205–23Google Scholar; Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Oseph S., “International Interdependence and Integration,” in Polsby, Nelson W. and Greenstein, Fred I., eds., Handbook of Political Science, VIII, International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley 1975), 363–414.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Inkeles, Alex, “The Emerging Social Structure of the World,” World Politics, XVII (July 1975), 467–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. 477–86.

⁴¹ This definition seems to be the basic concept of interdependence espoused by Keohane and Nye (fn. 12), 8–9. There is some ambiguity about this point, however, ince their concept of “vulnerability interdependence” corresponds more closely with he idea of interdependence as transactions that are mutually costly to forego.

⁴² The pioneering work by Hirschman, Albert O., National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California 1945Google Scholar) is still the best statement of the relationship between trade and dependency. “The influence which country A acquires in country B by foreign trade depends in the first place upon the total gain which B derives from that trade; the total gain from trade for any country is indeed nothing but another expression for the total impoverishment which would be inflicted upon it by a stoppage of trade. In this sense, the classical concept, gain from trade, and the power concept, dependence on trade, now being studied are seen to be merely two aspects of the same phenomenon” (p. 18). See also Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, The First and Second Discourses, trans. Masters, Roger D. and Masters, Judith R. (New York: St. Martin's Press 1964), 36nGoogle Scholar, and On the Social Contract, trans. Judith R. Masters; ed. Roger D. Masters (New York: St. Martin's Press 1978), 74n.

⁴³ See Waltz (fn. 39); also Inkeles (fn. 40), 483–88; Krasner, Stephen D., “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics, XXVIII (April 1976), 317–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 320. Note that the concept of interdependence as entailing relations that would be mutually costly to break need not imply that such relations are “positive” or “beneficial” for the participants. It merely implies that those involved have a choice, and that in choosing to maintain the relationship they forego some other alternative.

⁴⁴ Thibaut, John W. and Kelley, Harold H., The Social Psychology of Groups (New York: Wiley 1959), 100–125Google Scholar; Emerson, Richard M., “Power-Dependence Relations,” American Sociological Review, XXIII (February 1962), 31–41CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Blau, Peter M., Exchange and Power in Social Life (New York: Wiley 1964), 118–25Google Scholar, 133, 197. If a graduate student were to ask me where to begin the study of international interdependence, I should direct attention to these writers and to Hirschman (fn. 42) rather than to more recent treatments of this topic in the international relations literature.

⁴⁵ The extensive bibliography on interdependence compiled by Keohane and Nye for the Handbook of Political Science (fn. 39) contains no entry for any of the authors cited in the preceding footnote—including Hirschman.

⁴⁶ Cf. Harsanyi, John C., “Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games,” Behavioral Science, VII (January 1962), 67–80Google Scholar; and Nagel (fn. 1).

⁴⁷ Young (fn. 39), 746–47.

⁴⁸ Knorr (fn. 9), 207–10.

⁴⁹ Keohane and Nye (fn. 12), 11–12.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid., 15.

⁵² The distinction between “sensitivity” interdependence and “vulnerability” interdependence bears some resemblance to that between limited war and “total” (or not-so-limited) war. The policy constraints are obviously fewer in one situation than in the other. For a demonstration that ability to fight a “total” war may be of little help in fighting a limited war, see Wolf, Charles Jr, “The Logic of Failure: A Vietnam ‘Lesson,’” Journal of Conflict Resolution, XVI (September 1972), 397–401.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵³ Hart, Jeffrey, “Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations,” International Organization, XXX (Spring 1976), 297, 303.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Ibid., 291. A similar line of reasoning, drawing on Hart's article, is found in Keohane and Nye (fn. 12), 11.

⁵⁵ Nagel (fn. 2), 9–10, 14, 29, 114–22, 175–76.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 14.

⁵⁷ Hart (fn. 53), 303.

⁵⁸ Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (fn. 5), 50. See also Nagel (fn. 2), 142–43; Baldwin (fn. 16), 606.

⁵⁹ Lasswell and Kaplan (fn. 1), IX, 76, 85, 94, 92.

⁶⁰ Cline (fn. 12), 8.

⁶¹ Gilpin (fn. 6), 24; emphasis added.

⁶² See Keohane and Nye (fn. 12), 8, 11–18, 27–29, 228. Although the authors use the term “dominates,” the context indicates that they are referring to the relative “effectiveness” of force. Credence is lent to this interpretation by their use of the term “effectiveness” instead of “dominance” in an earlier similar discussion. Cf. Keohane and Nye, “World Politics and the International Economic System” (fn. 17), 125–26.

⁶³ Keohane and Nye (fn. 12), 27; emphasis in original.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 16.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 27.

⁶⁶ For a review of some of these threats, see Sprout, Harold and Sprout, Margaret, Multiple Vulnerabilities: The Context of Environmental Repair and Protection, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Research Monograph No. 40 (Princeton 1974).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Keohane and Nye (fn. 12), 28.

⁶⁸ I do not want to push this argument too far. Jacob Viner was fond of quoting William Stanley Jevons as follows: “It is always to be remembered that the failure of an argument in favor of a proposition does not, generally speaking, add much, if any probability, to the contradictory proposition.” For a discussion of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe that identifies several drawbacks to the Soviet use of force, see Jones, Christopher D., “Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe: The Dynamics of Political Autonomy and Military Intervention,” World Politics, XXIX (January 1977), 216–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶⁹ On this point, see Knorr (fn. 9), 46.

⁷⁰ Schelling (fn. 18), 207–54.

⁷¹ Knorr (fn. 9), IX, 310–11. See also Baldwin, , “The Power of Positive Sanctions,” World Politics, XXIV (October 1971), 19–38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷² See Baldwin, , “Economic Power,” in Tedeschi, James T., ed., Perspectives on Social Power (Chicago: Aldine 1974), 395–413.Google Scholar

⁷³ On this point, see Baldwin, “Power and Social Exchange,” American Political Science Review (forthcoming). In the literature on international relations, Hirschman's National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (fn. 42) is of fundamental importance. His treatment demonstrates that power potentially inheres in all international trade relations.

⁷⁴ Knorr (fn. 9), 7–8, 310–19.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 311.

⁷⁶ See Blau (fn. 44); Gouldner, Alvin W., “The Norm of Reciprocity,” American Sociological Review, XXV (April 1960), 161–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷⁷ “Social exchange differs in important ways from strictly economic exchange. The basic and most crucial distinction is that social exchange entails unspecified obligaions.” Blau (fn. 44), 93; emphasis in original.

⁷⁸ See Baldwin, , Economic Development and American Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1966).Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Fisher, Roger, International Conflict for Beginners (New York: Harper and Row 1969)Google Scholar; Knorr (fn. 9); Galtung, Johan, “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia,” World Politics, XIX (April 1967), 378–416CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rosecrance, Richard, ed., The Future of the International Strategic System (San Francisco: Chandler 1972)Google Scholar; George, Alexander and Smoke, Richard, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press 1974).Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Eckstein, Harry, “Authority Patterns: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 67 (December 1973), 1157–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸¹ Hoffmann, , “Notes on the Elusiveness of Modern Power,” International Journal, XXX (Spring 1975), 191.Google Scholar

⁸² It is interesting to note that one could neither predict nor advocate Sadat's dramatic visit to Israel on the basis of zero-sum game assumptions. The players in a zero-sum game have no common interests—by definition. Therefore, they never have a reason to negotiate (unless they think their opponent is stupid and can be outwitted).

⁸³ Gilpin (fn. 6), 22–25, 34; emphasis in original.

⁸⁴ For further discussion of this point, see Baldwin (fn. 16), 605–6.

⁸⁵ At times such references become rather confusing. Keohane and Nye, for example, usually use the terms “positive” and “negative” power to refer to the compellencek deterrence distinction (“World Politics and the International Economic System” [fn. 17], 119, 134; Power and Interdependence [fn. 12], 44). But elsewhere they refer to the ability to resist influence attempts as “the negative dimension of power.” (“World Politics and the International Economic System” [fn. 17], 134.) It seems desirable to maintain a clear distinction between deterring influence attempts and resisting them. The difference between deterring a nuclear attack and resisting one is a difference that matters.

⁸⁶ Parts of the argument that follows are drawn from Baldwin, , “Bargaining with Airline Hijackers,” in William Zartman, I., ed., The 50% Solution (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1976), 416–21.Google Scholar One example of the extent to which students of international relations have accepted the compellencekdeterrence arguments of Schelling is provided by the following passage: “Enough has already been said to indicate the disparities between American and Soviet strategic doctrines in the nuclear age. These differences may be most pithily summarized by stating that whereas we view nuclear weapons as a deterrent, the Russians see them as a ‘compellant’ [sic]—with all the consequences that follow.” Pipes, Richard, “Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War,” Commentary, Vol. 64 (July 1977), 34.Google Scholar It will be argued here that the consequences that follow are by no means obvious.

⁸⁷ Schelling (fn. 18), 195–99; and Schelling, , Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press 1966), 69–91.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Ibid., 100; emphasis in original.

⁸⁹ The autonomous probability of the outcome X is defined as the probability that X would have occurred in the absence of any attempt by A to make it occur. Thus, the autonomous probability of X in a situation in which A is trying to influence B to do X is the probability that B would have done X anyway. See Deutsch, Karl W., The Analysis of International Relations (2d ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1978), 29–31Google Scholar, 159. Strictly speaking, the autonomous probability of B's performance of X is not the same as the probability of success of A's attempt to get B to do X. A high autonomous probability need not indicate a high probability of success for A, and a low au tonomous probability does not necessarily mean that it will be hard for A to get B to do X. B's strong dislike of A may make him reluctant to do X if he knows A wants him to; likewise, B's respect for A may make him eager to do X after he learns of A's desire. Other things being equal, however, it is generally harder to make unlikely events occur than it is to make likely events occur. For purposes of this article, there fore, it will be arbitrarily assumed that influence attempts aimed at bringing about outcomes of low autonomous probability have a low probability of success; while in fluence attempts aimed at bringing about outcomes of high autonomous probability have a high probability of success.

⁹⁰ Schelling (fn. 87), 72.

⁹¹ Ibid., 82.

⁹² “Breathe or I'll shoot” is actually just a variation of “act normally or I'll shoot”—a compellent threat often found in TV dramas depicting the criminal hiding in the closet while the prisoner answers the doorbell.

⁹³ Schelling (fn. 87), 72–73.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 74.

⁹⁵ The closest Schelling comes to a precise definition of compellence is in Arms and Influence (fn. 87), 70–71. I suspect that psychologists may have some persuasive arguments as to why it is useful to distinguish between deterrence and compellence. Schelling does not present such arguments, however.

⁹⁶ Frey, Frederick W., “Comment: On Issues and Nonissues in the Study of Power,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 65 (December 1971), 1086.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Wolfinger, Raymond E., “Nondecisions and the Study of Local Politics,” and “Rejoinder to Frey's ‘Comment,’” both in American Political Science Review, Vol. 65 (December 1971), 1063–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar and 1102–04, respectively.

⁹⁷ Keohane and Nye (fn. 12), 43–54, 222–25.

⁹⁸ Dahl (fn. 5), 33: “Any statement about influence that does not clearly indicate the domain and scope it refers to verges on being meaningless.” For a similar comment, see Sprout and Sprout, “Environmental Factors …” (fn. 10), 325.

⁹⁹ For an impressive demonstration of generalizaton at a high level of abstraction based on explicit acknowledgment of the importance of scope and domain and the resulting multidimensional nature of power, see Alker (fn. 21).

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Dahl (fn. 5), 32–36; Baldwin (fn. 16).

¹⁰¹ Alker (fn. 21), 370–71.