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Coalition Maintenance in the Soviet Union

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Dennis Ross
Dennis Ross
Affiliation:
University of California, Los Angeles
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Abstract

Few students of the Soviet political scene have used coalition theory to explain Soviet behavior. However, the fact that coalitions are assumed to exist suggests that the different elements of coalition theory—coalition formation and coalition maintenance—may be useful for the study of Soviet decision making. Because the Soviet political system has evolved to the point where the elements that are vital to preserving coalitions are also an integral part of the Soviet system (e.g., fear of the alternative to the coalition, unanimity rule in decision making, the existence of a power broker, and the exclusion of contentious issues), the operation of coalition maintenance may describe the decision-making process. If that is so, the key institutional actors in the Soviet hierarchy must be minimally satisfied before major decisions can be reached. Although elite harmony and coalition stability are ensured thereby, lowest-common-denominator policies will serve to rule out fundamental changes or reform attempts that are necessary for coping with emerging problems. As emerging economic problems make it difficult to satisfy the incremental demands from elite actors and the society at large, it is quite possible that the current decision-making process, or the distribution of power it ensures, will not endure.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 32 , Issue 2 , January 1980 , pp. 258 - 280
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1980

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References

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