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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2011
For over a quarter-entury, two separate states have existed in Germany. By fighting over “unity” and “unification,” the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic have in fact stabilized and legitimized their separate sociopolitical orders. This impact on the domestic politics of both states has been the main function of inter-German relations. Only recently has positive identification replaced negative orientation to the counter-state. The “German question” provides an example of “nation building” as a historical process of both the disintegration of old and the building up of new identities.
1 Preamble to the Basic Treaty (Grundvertrag). The English text may be found in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1972, 25621–22, and in Hess, Frederick W., ed., German Unity (Kansas City, Mo.: Park College Bureau of Governmental Research 1974), 28–33Google Scholar.
2 Bericht zur Lage der Nation (Report on the State of the Nation), in the Bundes. tag, January 30, 1975Google Scholar; see Archiv der Gegenwart, 1975, 19222Google Scholar.
3 Preamble and Art. 8, sec. 2 of the constitutional amendments of October 7, 1974, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1974, 26835–36Google Scholar.
4 Preamble to the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of the F.R.G.; Art. 1 of the G.D.R.'s constitutionof 1949.
5 Schwarz, , Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik [From Reich to Federal Republic] (Berlin-Neuwied: Luchterhand 1966)Google Scholar. See the review article by Epstein, Klaus“The German Problem: 1945–1950,” World Politics, XX (January 1968), 279–300CrossRefGoogle Scholar, which presents abrilliant summary of Schwarz's findings.
6 In this respect, the material of Krisch's study contradicts his generalization about anall-German intention behind the Soviet promotion of the merger (p. 210 and throughout). In general, Krisch's conclusions on Soviet aims and strategies in postwar Europe(pp. 200 ff.) seem vague and speculative.
7 That thesis is the main argument of Richard Loewenthal's diplomatic history of the Easternrelations of the Federal Republic: “Vom kalten Krieg zur Ostpolitik,” in Loewenthal, R. and Schwarz, H. P., eds., Die zweite Republik (Stuttgart: Seewald 1974), 604–99Google Scholar.
8 The hypotheses and methods of the study of internal war might be applied to the confrontationwithin divided nations. Cf. Eckstein, Harry, ed., Internal War: Problems and Approaches (New York-London: Free Press 1964)Google Scholar.
9 See, for example, Nolte's treatment of the critics of West German rearmament (pp. 296–319).
10 A good example of the confrontation's domestic impact in the F.R.G. is the history ofthe SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) in the 1950's. Although theyhad been among the anti-Communist founders of the F.R.G., West Germany's SocialDemocrats were suspected of being a weak spot—if not possibly traitors—in theconflict with “Moscow” and “Pankow.” (In order to avoid having to speak of the governmentin East Berlin, West Germans called the East German Government “Pankow,” after the district where many of the party elite lived.) That suspicion was oneof the reasons the SPD abandoned its independent program for German reunification anda socialist economy in 1959–1960. Nolte does not mention this episode at all.
11 The English text of this decision of July 31, 1973, is reprinted in Hess (fn. 1), 34–60.
12 Art. 6 of the G.D.R.'s constitution of 1949, permitting prosecution of boycott agitation (Boykotthetze) against democratic institutions, organizations, and politicians (of the G.D.R.); Art. 21, sec. 2 of the basic law of the F.R.G., banning anti-constitutional parties.
13 Ernst Nolte's history mentions neither the use of the penal code nor the banning ofthe West German Communist Party in 1956. This decision of the F.R.G.'s constitutional court (Entscheidungen des Bundesverjassungsgerichts, V, 85–393) provides an interestingexample of a perception of Marxism-Leninism as a counter-ideology to Westerndemocracy.
14 See Kirchheimer, Otto, Political Justice (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1961)Google Scholar, for a discussion of the legal-political warfare between East and West Germany, andits implications for penal law.
15 Nolte, , Three Faces of Fascism: Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism (London: Weidenfeld 1965)Google Scholar; original, German, Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche (Munich: Piper 1963)Google Scholar. See Epstein's, Klaus review article, “A New Study of Fascism,” World Politics, XVI (January 1964), 302–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
16 Nolte rejects with firmness all dualistic models of a confrontation between “freedom- capitalism” and “socialism.” To him, the latter is also part of the Western system andits tradition.
17 This is the basis for Peter Ludz's, Christian thesis of “the G.D.R's lack of legitimacy.” Seehis Two Germanys in One World (Paris: Atlantic Institute for International Affairs 1973), 23–25Google Scholar.
18 The SED regime tried to compensate by stressing, in its propaganda and cultural policy, the “national heritage” of humanistic and progressive traditions.
19 Such research is especially needed for the G.D.R., which, in comparison with the F.R.G., has been neglected by Western analysts. The reason may be its inaccessibility, butalso the analysts' tendency to focus on the ally. An adequate though outdated sketchof the situation of the G.D.R. is given by David Childs (Tilford, 59–75).
20 Cf. Tucker, Robert C., “Communist Revolutions, National Cultures, and the Divided Nations,” Studies in Comparative Communism, VII (Autumn 1974), 235–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
21 The one professed attempt to apply the “political culture” approach to East and West Germany's foreign policies and interrelations is Merkl, Peter, German Foreign Policies, West and East (Santa Barbara, Cal.: American Bibliographical Center-Clio Press 1974)Google Scholar. Unfortunately Merkl's attempt is not successful.
22 Cf. the list of descriptive criteria in Bundesministerium für Fragen, Gesamtdeutsche, ed., Materialien zum Bericht zur Lage der Nation 1974 [Material for the Reporton the State of the Nation] (Bonn 1974), 71–80Google Scholar.
23 Ludz (fn. 17), and Materialien zum Bericht zur Lage der Nation 1974 (fn. 22), writtenby a team under Ludz's leadership. Schweigler's Ph.D. dissertation, “National Consciousnessin Divided Germany” (Harvard University 1972)Google Scholar has been published in German under the title Nationalbewusstsein in der BRD und der DDR (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag 1973)Google Scholar.
24 For an example of how the political reality may be considered equivalent to policy statements, see Starrels, John M., “Nationalism in the German Democratic Republic,” Canadian Review of Studies of Nationalism, 11 (Fall 1974), 23–37Google Scholar.
25 In addition to the material presented by Ludz (fn. 17) and Schweigler (fn. 23), seethe findings of the most recent public-opinion polls on West German identity in Materialien zum Bericht zur Lage der Nation 1974 (fn. 22), 88–129.
26 Cf. Connor, Walker, “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?” World Politics, XXIV (April 1972), 319–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar; however, Connor concentrates on the impact of ethnicity.
