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On the Use of Game Models in Theories of International Relations*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Richard E. Quandt
Richard E. Quandt
Affiliation:
Princeton University
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Among all the social sciences, the art of model building is perhaps best developed in economics.Models or theories are conceptualizations of and abstractions from reality; they rely intrinsically on ldquo;if-thenrdquo;statements and should lead to testable propositions if they are to be of any use at all.

It would be difficult to give a brief description of all the important characteristics of economic models, for there are numerous types, designed to describe or explain completely different aspects of economic reality. Most of them contain as essential ingredients some statements about the technical environment (e.g., marginal cost curves rise after a certain point) and some statements about human motivation (e.g., the entrepreneur desires to maximize profits; the consumer maximizes utility).The models themselves can have either descriptive or normative use. The Keynesian model or theory “explains” the factors diat cause the level of national income to be what it is and allows one to deduce the direction of change in national income resulting from changes in the parameters. The usefulness of such a descriptive model is determined by whether or not its conclusions are testable propositions. Normative models, most frequently encountered in economics in welfare economics and in operations research, also utilize statements about environment and motivations but do not pretend to predict; infact they merely prescribe. The test of the usefulness of such normative models is whether ornot their prescriptions are at least in principle imple—mentable.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 14 , Special Issue 1: The International System: Theoretical Essays , October 1961 , pp. 69 - 76
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1961

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References

1 Princeton University Conference on Arms Control and Limitation, October 1960.

2 Schelling, T.C., “The Strategy of Conflict: Prospectus for a Reorientation of Game Theory,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, II (September 1958), pp. 203–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 Ellsberg, D., “Theory of the Reluctant Duelist,” American Economic Review, XLVI (December 1956), pp. 909–23.Google Scholar

4 Obviously, the rules of a game cannot be divorced from reality content, even if they are as general as those of some games designed to be played. Cf. T. Schelling's paper in the present symposium; and Kaplan, M. A., Burns, A. L., and Quandt, R. E., “Theoretical Analysis of the ‘Balance of Power,’” Behavioral Science, v (July 1960), pp. 240–52.Google Scholar

5 It is not claimed that the distinction between isomorphic models and metamodels is obvious in concrete cases, or that mese categories are mutually exclusive. Nor is it intended to suggest that “gaming” approaches and the more orthodox game-theory approaches have much resemblance to each other beyond the fact that both deal with the nature of strategies and strategic responses.

6 Schelling, T. C., “Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, I (March 1957), pp. 19–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem, “The Strategy of Conflict,” op.cit.; and idem, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, Mass., 1960.

7 Schelling, T. C., “Reciprocal Measures for Arms Stabilization,” Daedalus, Vol. 89 (Fall 1960), pp. 892–915.Google Scholar

8 Suppose that the USSR is both superior to the United States in military technology and convinced that the United States will not be an aggressor. Any agreement which diminished the military disparity of the two countries might then be contrary to Soviet interests, since it would increase the relative ability of the United States to retaliate. Obviously, any agreement which increased the disparity would be against United States interests.

9 And, in addition, we are uncertain about the opponent's evaluation of our evaluation of our own and his payoffs, etc. How far this process can or should be carried is hard to say, but its relevance was seen, in a different context, some twenty-five years ago by Keynes, J. M. (cf. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, New York, 1936).Google Scholar

10 Cf. Schelling, , “The Strategy of Conflict,” p. 229, Fig. 5.Google Scholar

11 See Schelling's paper in this symposium.

12 This point is also stressed by Schelling in ibid.

13 Luce, R. D. and Raiffa, H., Games and Decisions, New York, 1957, ch. 6.Google Scholar

14 Kahn, H., “The Arms Race and Some of Its Hazards,” Daedalus, Vol. 89 (Fall 1960), pp. 744–80.Google Scholar