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The Technological Dimension of Decision Making: The Case of the Aswan High Dam

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Robert W. Rycroft  and
Joseph S. Szyliowicz
Robert W. Rycroft
Affiliation:
Modernization, and International Studies Program, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver
Joseph S. Szyliowicz
Affiliation:
Modernization, and International Studies Program, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver
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Abstract

This study examines the role of technological variables in the decisions by Egypt, the World Bank, and the United States regarding the selection and financing of the Aswan High Dam project. Three major decision-making models-rational choice, incremental, and organizational process-are assessed according to their appropriateness for and applicability to the “technological dimension.” This dimension is defined in terms of three major components-design, impact, and management issues. Despite a tendency of the literature to associate the rational-choice model with highly technical decisions, this study illustrates the dominance of “satisficing,” “muddling through,” and “bounded rationality” behavior for each of the major participants. The technological dimension is found to be important, but clearly secondary to the primacy of politics.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 33 , Issue 1 , October 1980 , pp. 36 - 61
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1980

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References

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