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Domestic constituents and the formulation of WTO negotiating positions: what the delegates say

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 April 2008

VALENTIN ZAHRNT*
Affiliation:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)

Abstract

The present article examines what influence various domestic constituents exert on the negotiating positions member states adopt in WTO trade rounds based on a survey of national delegations to the WTO. The findings show that in both developed and developing countries, a broad array of governmental and non-governmental actors substantially shape trade policy-making. At the cost of those ministries traditionally in charge of trade policy-making, many domestic constituents have increased their influence since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. This leads to a discussion of the problematic implications of these developments towards more participatory trade policy-making for WTO negotiations.

Type
Review Article
Copyright
Copyright © Valentin Zahrnt 2008

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