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Economic Sanctions, International Law, and Crimes Against Humanity: Venezuela's ICC Referral

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2021

Dapo Akande ,
Payam Akhavan  and
Eirik Bjorge
Dapo Akande
Affiliation:
Professor of Public International Law, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford & Fellow, Exeter College, Oxford, UK
Payam Akhavan
Affiliation:
Senior Fellow at Massey College and Distinguished Visiting Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, Canada, and Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration
Eirik Bjorge
Affiliation:
Professor at University of Bristol Law School, UK
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Extract

Economic sanctions, unilateral and multilateral, have a long pedigree in international relations. From South Africa and Israel, to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, such measures have, with varying results, been used in diverse contexts to influence the behavior of states. Some would celebrate the use of economic sanctions as a means of punishing “rogue states” for human rights violations or threats to the peace, while others would condemn it as “imperialism” by powerful states against the weak. Leaving aside Chapter VII enforcement action by the UN Security Council, the imposition of unilateral sanctions raises far-reaching questions in respect of the rights and duties of states under international law. A novel issue that has emerged recently is whether, in certain circumstances, such measures could even qualify as crimes against humanity.

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Type
Current Developments
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 115 , Issue 3 , July 2021 , pp. 493 - 512
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press for The American Society of International Law

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Footnotes

*

The research assistance of Jeremy Pizzi and Kian Akhavan, students at McGill University, is gratefully acknowledged.

References

1 See Dugard, John, The Role of International Law in the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa, 18 Social Justice 83, 85–88 (1991)Google Scholar.

2 See European Community, Resolution on the Arab Economic Boycott of Israel (A3-0239/93), [1993] OJ, C 329/47, at 48.

3 See Reisman, W. Michael & Stevick, Douglas L., The Applicability of International Law Standards to United Nations Sanctions Programmes, 9 Eur J. Int'l L. 86, 101–07 (1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 See Gilbert Guillaume, Les grandes crises internationales et le droit 197–218 (1994).

5 See Borlini, Leonardo, North Korea's Gauntlet, International Law and the New Sanctions Imposed by the Security Council, 26 It. Y.B. Int'l L. 319 (2016)Google Scholar.

6 See Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott & Kimberly Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (3d ed. 2009).

7 See Schwartz, Jonathan B., Dealing with a “Rogue State”: The Libya Precedent, 101 AJIL 553 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 Wall, Christopher, Human Rights and Economic Sanctions: The New Imperialism, 22 Fordham Int'l L.J. 577 (1998–1999)Google Scholar.

9 See Rosalyn Higgins, Philippa Webb, Dapo Akande, Sandesh Sivakumaran & James Sloan, Oppenheim's International Law: United Nations 981 (2017); Alain Pellet, Le droit international à la lumière de la pratique: l'introuvable théorie de la réalité, 414 Recueul des Cours 220–28 (2021).

10 See Economic Sanctions in International Law (Laura Picchio Forlati & Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos eds., 2004); Thouvenin, Jean-Marc, Sanctions économiques et droit international, 57 Droits 161 (2013)Google Scholar; Antonios Tzanakopoulos, The Right to Be Free from Economic Coercion, 4 Cambridge J. Int'l & Comp. L. 616 (2015).

11 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 53(1)(a), July 17, 1998, 2187 UNTS 3 (entered into force July 1, 2002).

12 See Situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela I, Referral of the Situation in Venezuela Under Article 14 of the Rome Statute Submitted by the Republic of Argentina, Canada, the Republic of Colombia, the Republic of Chile, the Republic of Paraguay and the Republic of Peru (Int'l Crim. Ct. Sept. 26, 2018), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/180925-otp-referral-venezuela_ENG.pdf (hereinafter Referral I). Referral I alleged the commission of crimes against humanity by Venezuelan officials, based primarily on the May 29, 2018 Report of the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States and the Panel of Independent Experts on the Possible Commission of Crimes against Humanity in Venezuela, OEA/Ser.D/XV.19 (2018), available at http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/Informe-Panel-Independiente-Venezuela-EN.pdf.

13 Situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela II, ICC-01/20, Referral Pursuant to Article 14 of the Rome Statute to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela with Respect to Unilateral Coercive Measures (Mar. 4, 2020), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2020_00802.PDF (hereinafter Referral II).

14 On February 19, 2020, Referrals I and II were assigned to ICC Pre-Trial Chamber III on the grounds that “the two referrals appear to overlap geographically and temporally and may warrant assignment to the same Pre-Trial Chamber.” Decision Assigning the Situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela II and Reassigning the Situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela I to Pre-Trial Chamber III, at 3 (Int'l Crim. Ct. Feb. 19, 2020); Situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela I, ICC-02/18, available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2020_00598.PDF; Situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela II, ICC-01/20, available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2020_00596.pdf.

15 Michael Crowley & Anatoly Kurmanaev, Trump Imposes New Sanctions on Venezuela, N.Y. Times, Aug. 6, 2019, at A6.

16 Exec. Order No. 13,808, 82 Fed. Reg. 41,155 (Aug. 24, 2017).

17 See Galbraith, Jean, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 112 AJIL 103, 103 (2018)Google Scholar.

18 U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, The United States Sanctions Governors of Venezuelan States Aligned with Maduro (Feb. 25, 2019), at https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-sanctions-governors-of-venezuelan-states-aligned-with-maduro/index.html.

19 U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, The United States Sanctions Illegitimate Maduro Regime Security Officials Associated with Violence and Obstruction of International Humanitarian Assistance (Mar. 1, 2019), at https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-sanctions-illegitimate-maduro-regime-security-officials-associated-with-violence-and-obstruction-of-international-humanitarian-assistance/index.html.

20 See Galbraith, Jean, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 113 AJIL 601, 606 (2019)Google Scholar.

21 Id. at 606.

22 U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, The United States Sanctions Companies Enabling Shipment of Venezuelan Oil to Cuba (Apr. 5, 2019), at https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-sanctions-companies-enabling-shipment-of-venezuelan-oil-to-cuba/index.html.

23 U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, The United States Takes Action to End Cuba's Malign Influence on Venezuela (Apr. 12, 2019), at https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-takes-action-to-end-cubas-malign-influence-on-venezuela/index.html; U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, The United States Sanctions the Central Bank of Venezuela (Apr. 17, 2019), at https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-sanctions-the-central-bank-of-venezuela/index.html.

24 Galbraith, supra note 20.

25 Preliminary Findings of the Visit to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela by the Special Rapporteur on the Negative Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures on the Enjoyment of Human Rights (Feb. 12, 2021), at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26747&LangID=E.

26 Id.

27 WFP Venezuela Food Security Assessment, at 3 (Feb. 23, 2020), available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Main%20Findings%20WFP%20Food%20Security%20Assessment%20in%20Venezuela_January%202020-2.pdf.

28 U.S. Dep't of Treasury Press Release, Treasury Disrupts Corruption Network Stealing From Venezuela's Food Distribution Program, CLAP (July 25, 2019), at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm741.

29 See Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle: The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden 426 (1960); Alex von Tunzelmann, Blood and Sand: Suez, Hungary, and the Crisis that Shook the World 19 (2016).

30 See, for example, the argument by Nicaragua in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 ICJ Rep. 14 (June 27).

31 Referral II is currently at the preliminary examination stage, which is “a process of examining the information available in order to reach a fully informed determination on whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation pursuant to the criteria established by the Rome Statute.” In particular, under Rome Statute Article 53(1)(a), the prosecutor must consider whether: “The information available to the Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed.”

32 Referral II, supra note 13, paras. 40–52, 70–115, respectively.

33 Id. at 19–24.

34 See Boyle, Alan, Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law, 48 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 901 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

35 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, at 121, GA Res. 2625 (XXV) (1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration].

36 Referral II, supra note 13, para. 40.

37 Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 35.

38 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 ICJ Rep. 403, 437 (July 22, 2010); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 30, at 101–03; Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal, 83 ILR 1, 74 (Barberis, Bedjaoui & Gros, 1989).

39 Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 35, pmbl., para. 9.

40 Helen Keller, Friendly Relations Declaration (1970), in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, para. 8 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., online ed. 2009), at http://www.mpepil.com; Robert Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 AJIL 713, 717 (1971).

41 Keller, supra note 40, para. 8; see also Rosenstock, supra note 40, at 717.

42 Ian Brownlie, Legal Status of Natural Resources in International Law (Some Aspects), 162 Recueil des Cours 307 (1995).

43 Id. at 306.

44 Oppenheim's International Law Vol. I, at 432 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992); see also Lady Fox, The State: Its Concept as a Legal Person in International Law, in Satow's Diplomatic Practice 51, 65 (Sir Ivor Roberts ed., 7th ed. 2017).

45 Oppenheim's International Law Vol. I, supra note 44, at 434.

46 Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 Yale J. Int'l L. 1, 53 (2001).

47 Id. See also Lori Fisler Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence Over Domestic Affairs, 83 AJIL 1, 39–42 (1989); Gerhard Hafner, Bemerkungen zur Funktion und Bestimmung der Betroffenheit im Völkerrecht anhand des Binnenstaates, 31 Ger. Y.B. Int'l L. 187, 226 (1988).

48 Crowley & Kurmanaev, supra note 15, at A6.

49 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 30, para. 205.

50 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. DRC), 2010 ICJ Rep. 639, 671, para. 87 (Nov. 30) (“the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment is among the rules of general international law which are binding on States in all circumstances, even apart from any treaty commitments”); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 ICJ Rep. 3, 42, para. 91 (May 24) (“[w]rongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom and to subject them to physical constraint in conditions of hardship is in itself manifestly incompatible with the . . . fundamental principles enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights”).

51 Vaughan Lowe & Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Economic Warfare, in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, para. 37 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., online ed. 2013), at http://www.mpepil.com.

52 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 30, at 138, para. 276.

53 Venkateswara Subramanian Mani, Humanitarian Intervention Today, 313 Recueil des Cours 207 (2005).

54 Dire Tladi, The Duty Not to Intervene in Matters Within Domestic Jurisdiction, in The UN Friendly Relations Declaration at 50: An Assessment of the Fundamental Principles of International Law 87, 92 (Jorge E. Viñuales ed., 2020).

55 Nigel D. White, Autonomous and Collective Sanctions in the International Legal Order, 27 It. Y.B. Int'l L. 3, 24 (2017).

56 Thouvenin, supra note 10, at 171.

57 Second Report on the Law of Treaties, by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur, Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, Vol. 2, at 52, para. 6, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1963/ADD.1 (1963).

58 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 30, at 125–26, para. 244.

59 Id. at 126, para. 244.

60 Maziar Jamnejad & Michael Wood, The Principle of Non-intervention, 22 Leiden J. Int'l L. 345, 370 (2009).

61 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra note 30, at 126, para. 244.

62 Id. at 126, para. 245.

63 Jamnejad & Wood, supra note 60.

64 Referral II, supra note 13, para. 40.

65 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, para. 31, GA Res. 48/121 (1993).

66 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 ICJ Rep. 226, 254–55 (July 8).

67 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Economic Measures as Means of Political and Economic Coercion Against Developing Countries, Note, para. 2, UN Doc. A/48/535 (1993).

68 Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on the Promotion of International Law, para. 6, June 25, 2016, at https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2331698.

69 Id.

70 Joint Communiqué of the 14th Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Russian Federation, the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China, para. 6, Apr. 19, 2016, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1356652.shtml.

71 See, e.g., Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States, GA Res. 2131 (XX) (Dec. 21, 1965); Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States, GA Res. 3281 (XXIX) (Dec. 12, 1974); Unilateral Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion Against Developing Countries, GA Res. 46/210 (Dec. 20, 1991) (and subsequent annual reiterations).

72 Matthew Happold, Introduction, in Economic Sanctions and International Law 1, 6 (Paul Eden & Matthew Happold eds., 2016).

73 Patrick Wintour, China Imposes Sanctions on UK MPs, Lawyers and Academic in Xinjiang Row, Guardian (Mar. 26, 2021).

74 See, e.g., Rebecca Barber, An Exploration of the General Assembly's Troubled Relationship with Unilateral Sanctions, 70 Int'l & Comp. L. Q. 343, 377–78 (2021).

75 Referral II, supra note 13, para. 41.

76 Among numerous other authorities: Jean Combacau, Sanctions, in Encyclopedia of Public International Law 337, 338 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1986); Jean Salmon, Dictionnaire de droit international public 1017 (2001); Thouvenin, supra note 10; Tzanakopoulos, supra note 10.

77 Salmon, supra note 76.

78 James Crawford, Chance, Order, Change: The Course of International Law, 365 Recueil des Cours 66 (2013).

79 Higgins, Webb, Akande, Sivakumaran & Sloan, supra note 9, at 981; see also Jeremy Matam Farrall, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law 47–57 (2007). As regards terminology, however, Francophone international lawyers have traditionally tended to reserve the term “sanctions” for Security Council- or General Assembly-mandated action (but without questioning the general legality of, e.g., economic boycotts, suspension of arms shipments, and asset freezes). See Charles Rousseau, Le droit des conflits armés 597–98 (1983); see, however, Pellet, supra note 9, at 246.

80 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Int'l L. Comm'n Y.B., Vol. 2, pt. 2, at 129, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (2001).

81 Id. at 131.

82 Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council Under Article 84 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates v. Qatar), Judgment, para. 49 (Int'l Ct. Just. July 14, 2020), at https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/173/judgments.

83 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 80, at 70.

84 James Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law 572 (9th ed. 2019).

85 Jean Combacau & Serge Sur, Droit international public 252–54 (13th ed. 2019).

86 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 80, at 128.

87 James Crawford, The Relationship Between Sanctions and Countermeasures, in United Nations Sanctions and International Law 57 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2001).

88 Resolution on the Arab Economic Boycott of Israel, supra note 3, at 48.

89 See, e.g., Jarna Petman, Resort to Economic Sanctions by Not Directly Affected States, in Economic Sanctions in International Law, supra note 10, at 370–71.

90 See e.g. Guillaume, supra note 4, at 197–218; Rousseau, supra note 79, at 597.

91 See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 93 AJIL 470, 498–99 (1999).

92 See, e.g., Guillaume, supra note 4, at 9–43.

93 See Government of the UK, UK Sanctions Relating to Myanmar, at https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/uk-sanctions-on-burma.

94 Referral II, supra note 13, paras. 47–52.

95 UN Charter, Art. 1(3), June 26, 1945, 1 UNTS 16 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945).

96 See Rüdiger Wolfrum, Purposes and Principles, Article 1, in The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary Vol. 1, at 108 (Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Georg Nolte, Andreas Paulus & Nikolai Wessendorf, 3d ed. 2012) (regards the provision as “more appropriate for political objectives rather than for legally binding obligations”).

97 UN Charter, supra note 95, Art. 55.

98 Id. Art. 56.

99 Higgins, Webb, Akande, Sivakumaran & Sloan, supra note 9, at 815.

100 Oppenheim's International Law Vol. I, supra note 44, at 988–89.

101 Rüdiger Wolfrum & Eibe H. Riedel, International Economic and Social Co-operation, Article 55(c), in The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary Vol. 1, supra note 96, at 1570.

102 Id. at 1573.

103 Id.

104 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].

105 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].

106 Id. Art. 1(2), ICCPR, supra note 104, Art. 1(2).

107 Id.

108 James Crawford, Third Report on State Responsibility, at 20, para. 39, UN Doc. A/CN.4/507 (2000). See also Eritrea v. Ethiopia, Ethiopia's Damages Claims, 140 ILR 376, 396–97, paras. 19, 21 (Hans van Houtte, George H. Aldrich, John R. Crook, James C.N. Paul & Lucy Reed, 2009).

109 Philippe Cahier, Changement et continuité du droit international, 195 Recueil des Cours 9, 41 (1985).

110 UN Hum. Rts. Comm'n, General Comment No. 36: Article 6: Right to Life, para. 26, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (Sept. 3, 2019).

111 ICCPR, supra note 104, Art. 2(1) (emphasis added).

112 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 ICJ Rep. 136, 178–79 (July 9, 2004).

113 UN Hum. Rts. Comm'n, Munaf v. Romania, para. 14.2, UN Doc. CCPR/C/96/D/1539/2006.

114 Campbell McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law 310 (2014).

115 UN Hum. Rts. Comm'n, General Comment 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, para. 10, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004).

116 Even the European Court of Human Rights, which has adopted the most restrictive view of “jurisdiction” of any of the international and regional human rights tribunals, accepts some form of the personal model of jurisdiction: Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), App. Nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, Decision, para. 303 (Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. Dec. 16, 2020).

117 General Comment 36, supra note 110, para. 63 (emphasis added).

118 Id., paras. 22, 63.

119 ICESCR, supra note 105, Art. 2(1).

120 Crawford, supra note 84, at 614.

121 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note 112, para. 112.

122 This is explicable against the background of “the programmatic requirements for the fulfilment of this category of rights.” Id. at 213 (sep. op., Higgins, J.).

123 Ben Saul, David Kinley & Jacqueline Mowbray, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Commentary, Cases and Materials 967 (2014).

124 UN Comm'n on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 8: The Relationship Between Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, para. 1, UN Doc. E/C.12/1997/8 (1997).

125 Id., para 16.

126 Referral II, supra note 13, paras. 49–51.

127 Marc Bossuyt, The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions on the Enjoyment of Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33 (2000).

128 Id., para. 40.

129 Saul, Kinley & Mowbray, supra note 123, at 106–07.

130 Mortimer N. S. Sellers, Economic Sanctions Against Human Rights Violations, in Economic Sanctions in International Law, supra note 10, at 485.

131 Cleveland, supra note 46, at 53.

132 Lowe & Tzanakopoulos, supra note 51, para. 37.

133 ICCPR, supra note 104, Art. 1(2); ICESCR, supra note 105, Art. 1(2); Crawford, supra note 108, at 20, para. 39.

134 Brownlie, supra note 42, at 307.

135 Referral II, supra note 13, paras. 31–51.

136 Prosecutor v. Delalić, et al. (Čelebići Camp Case), IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber, Judgment, para. 406 (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo. Nov. 16, 1998), available at https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/981116_judg_en.pdf (endorsing the statement of the chair of the Drafting Committee of the Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court).

137 Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law 113 (1992); see also Lena Grover, Interpreting Crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 161 (2014).

138 Articles on Crimes Against Humanity, Art. 3(1), Y.B. Int'l. L. Comm'n, Vol. II, pt. 2, UN Doc. A/74/10 (2019).

139 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331.

140 Rome Statute, supra note 11, Arts. 7(1)(e), 7(2)(d), (g). See also Prosecutor v. Stakić, IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, para. 302 (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo. Mar. 22, 2006) (making a similar point that under customary international law the crime of deportation occurs only where the forcible transfers are carried out without grounds permitted by international law).

141 Jonas Nilsson, Crimes Against Humanity, in The Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice 284, 287 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2009). See also Antonio Cassese, et al., Cassese's International Criminal Law 92 (3d ed. 2013) (“Indeed, while ICL concerning war crimes largely derives from, or is closely linked with, IHL, ICL concerning crimes against humanity is to a great extent predicated upon international human rights law.”).

142 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Art. 6(c), annexed to the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 UNTS 279, No. 251.

143 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stakić, supra note 140, para. 277 (“The protected interests underlying the prohibition against deportation include the right of the victim to stay in his or her home and community and the right not to be deprived of his or her property by being forcibly displaced to another location. The same protected interests underlie the criminalisation of acts of forcible transfer, an ‘other inhumane act’ pursuant to Article 5(i) of the Statute.”).

144 See Margaret M. de Guzman, Crimes Against Humanity, in Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law 121 (William A. Schabas & Nadia Bernaz eds., 2011) (“Crimes against humanity . . . owe strong allegiance to international human rights law.”); William Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone 186 (2006) (“Crimes against humanity also have much in common with international human rights law, and the language of the relevant provisions reflects this.”).

145 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, Vol. II, pt. 2, 103–04, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.l (1991). The ILC's 1996 final Draft Code of Crimes returned to the standard terminology of “crimes against humanity.”

146 William Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute 147–48 (2d ed. 2016).

147 Referral II, supra note 13, para. 77 (citing Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, para. 78, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/63 (2014)).

148 UN Hum. Rts. Council, Report of the Detailed Findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, para. 1121, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/CRP.1 (2014).

149 Id., para. 1119.

150 Id., paras. 1122–24.

151 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), Art. 55, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950) (providing that: “To the fullest extent of the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.”).

152 Rome Statute, supra note 11, Art. 7(1).

153 Id. Art. 7(2)(a).

154 Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, para. 76 (June 15, 2009), at https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_04528.PDF.

155 Rep. Int'l L. Comm'n, Commentary to Article 2 of the Draft Articles on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity, 35, para. 18, UN Doc. A/74/10 (2019) (the report will appear in the forthcoming Yearbook of the International Law Commission, Vol. 2, pt. 2 (2019)).

156 Guénaël Mettraux, International Crimes and the Ad Hoc Tribunals 165 (2005).

157 Crawford, supra note 108, at 20, para. 39.

158 Reisman, W. Michael, Assessing the Lawfulness of Nonmilitary Enforcement: The Case of Economic Sanctions, 89 ASIL Proc. 350, 351 (1995)Google Scholar; see also Kofi Annan, We the Peoples: The Roles of the United Nations in the Twenty-First Century, Report of the Secretary-General, para. 231, UN Doc. A/54/2000 (2000) (observing “it is usually the people who suffer, not the political elites whose behaviour triggered the sanctions in the first place”).