There is accumulating evidence that President Nixon appreciates more fully than his immediate predecessors the moral and political limits of American power and influence in the larger world, primarily because he understands the vital distinction between national security and political reform. He knows that the U. S. Government's mandate abroad is far more limited than it is at home.

It was in his speech in Rumania in August, 1969 that Mr. Nixon most clearly distinguished the proper domains, of domestic and foreign policy: “We seek normal relations with all countries, regardless of their domestic systems. We stand ready to reciprocate the efforts of any country that seeks normal relations with us.” He added: “We know mankind cannot build a just and lasting peace until all nations recognize and respect the sovereignty and rights of other nations.”

When viewed within the perspective of a possibly new American foreign policy, two sets of dramatic and apparently unrelated current events display a clear relationship. On the one hand are particular influences upon the thought of the radical left in America and elsewhere, notably the neo-Marxist ideas of men like Herbert Mareuse'and the Third World revolution ideas of men like Frantz Fanon. On the other hand there are recurring references to differences in the way clerical defections are taking place in the United States and Europe. An interesting framework for unifying these apparently unrelated phenomena suggests itself from the broader perspective of traditional Western political theory.

Dean Acheson, President Truman's Secretary of State from 1949-1953, is generally considered to have been one of the ablest men to have held that position in the twentieth century. His memoirs recall the qualities of mind and the at times testy temperament which, together with the role he played in great events, made him also a very controversial Secretary. He did not suffer fools gladly, and was at times impatient and tactless with lesser mortals who failed to grasp what he considered to be elementary truths of world affairs. Although he has mellowed somewhat, he still believes that he was correct on all the great decisions in which he had his way, and the memoirs do not include a single significant case in which he acknowledges having been wrong.