The conclusion of the Treaty of Amsterdam and its progress through the ratification procedures of the 15 member States of the European Union provides an occasion to re-examine a familiar question. What is meant by the claim by the European Court of Justice that the European Com-munity Treaties have created “a new legal order of international law”1 or, more radically, “a new legal order”?2 Is EC law to be regarded as a particularly effective system of regional international law, or has it been created as, or mutated into, an entirely new species of law? If there are indeed two legal orders, to what extent are they still capable of cross-fertilisation? What about “European Union law”? Have the Treaty on European Union and now the Treaty of Amsterdam eroded the dichotomy between the two legal orders of public international law and EU law? Is public international law itself taking on some of the characteristics which have made EC law an attractive as well as an effective system for regulating relations between sovereign States? Are the two streams converging?

It has been suggested1 that those reading this article are likely to fall into two groups: those who regard my proposition as obvious but feel that if I go on, as I evidently intend to, they will be driven to the opposite conclusion; and, on the other hand, those who take the view that my thesis can scarcely be taken seriously, but that they had better pay careful attention, just in case there is something in it.

It is a well-known facet of litigation that the first step is often more important than any to follow. Virtually all legal systems bestow on litigants a variety of interim and provisional remedies. These remedies have a number of different functions and rationales but two in particular are thought to be fundamental.1 First, protective remedies provide a litigant with a degree of protection by ensuring that the status quo is preserved while the litigation is proceeding; second, these remedies secure the position of a litigant not only during the course of an action but also once it is over and he has judgment in his favour. This second function is usually achieved, in one way or another, by tying up and freezing the property of the other party to the action.2 However, protective remedies also serve other functions. Some remedies exist to promote the interest of a party in the advancement of his case (e.g. orders for disclosure of evidence), whereas others provide a litigant with part of the overall final remedy or judgment that he is seeking to gain from the action (e.g. interim payment or interim damages).

The name “lender of last resort” owes its origins to Sir Francis Barings, who in 1797 referred to the Bank of England as the “dernier resort” from which all banks could obtain liquidity in times of crisis.1 The lender of last resort (“LOLR”) role of the central bank remains a major rationale for most central banks around the world, in both developed and developing countries.2 While other central bank functions have recently come under fire (e.g. banking supervision), the importance of having the LOLR under the umbrella of the central bank is seldom contested.3 It is the immediacy of the availability of central bank credit (the central bank being the ultimate supplier of high-powered money) that makes the LOLR particularly suitable to confront emergency situations.

In December 1995 Eritrean and Yemeni armed forces clashed in one of the islands situated off the coast of these two States in the Red Sea (Greater Hanish1). Behind the incident was a dispute concerning, inter alia, the territorial sovereignty over several uninhabited islands in the area, the definition of the maritime boundary between the two States and the use of the waters surrounding the islands by fishermen of both States.2 Undoubtedly, this dispute is deeply rooted in the history of the two States, and their peoples.

The conclusion and adoption of the Statute of a permanent International Criminal Court2 (“Statute”) in Rome in July 19983 represent a turning point in the enforcement of legal norms regulating armed conflict. Th e Rom e Conference was the latest, and most important, chapter in a long saga concerning the broader issue of the conclusion and adoption of a Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, an important part of which was the establishment of an international criminal court to try such crimes.4 The International Law Commission (ILC), the UN organ responsible for the preparation of the Code,5 decided to separate the two objectives and to proceed with the drafting of a statute for an international criminal court that was distinct from the Draft Code of Crimes: the ILC envisaged a court that would exercise jurisdiction in respect of crimes of international concern which existed as such in various treaties already in force.6 This approach is reflected in the provisions of the Statute adopted at Rom e concerning the jurisdiction of the Court, as explained below.7

Three main tasks can be identified for comparative law. The first is to investigate differences between legal systems and, in particular, to distinguish between “real” differences, where the outcomes of the application of principles diverge between legal systems, and “superficial” differences, where similar outcomes are masked by the conceptual structures of the relevant systems. The second is to trace developments in the relationships between legal systems and thus to explore tendencies of convergence or divergence (in terms of “real” differences), noting that in some areas convergence may be required under international legal instruments. The third task is to explain and to evaluate such developments: why do systems converge or diverge? Is convergence desirable or undesirable?

The 1985 European Communities Directive on Product Liability1 aims to harmonise member State product liability rules and to improve the level of protection of victims by basing the liability of producers for physical injury and damage to personal goods on the proof that the victim's damage was caused by a defect in the product supplied. On 19 May 1998, ten years after the deadline for transposition, France finally enacted legislation incorporating the Directive into national law.2 The Directive was incorporated into English law by Part I of the Consumer Protection Act 1987.

If a defendazCnt to legal proceedings conceals or dissipates his assets before a judgment is given, the execution of the ensuing judgment may become impossible. To preserve the possibility that a future judgment will be executed, both English and Japanese courts have power to grant interim relief freezing a defendant's assets. As is well known, this is achieved in England by the Mareva injunction, which is now called simply “freezing injunction” with the implementation of the new Civil Procedure Rules. In Japan, it is the kari-sashiosae order available under the Civil Interim Relief Law (Minji Hozen Ho)1 which serves this purpose.

The “revenue rule” is a “well-settled principle of international law that one nation's courts will not enforce the tax claims of another jurisdiction”.1 The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has recently held, however, that using US foreign or interstate telecommunications to devise a scheme to defraud a foreign revenue authority is wire fraud under US law. In United States v. Trapilo2 the Second Circuit reversed the dismissal of indictments against alleged smugglers charged with using telephones and fax machines to effect tax-evasive importation of alcohol into Canada. Under Trapilo, which conflicts with a contrary First Circuit decision on almost identical facts, 3 the entire breadth of US wire and mail fraud precedent may apply to punish violations of foreign tax laws. Moreover, the decision substantially erodes the revenue rule.

In the aftermath of the 1995 referendum on Quebec unilateral secession, 1 the then Minister of Justice, Allan Rock, proposed that the legality of a province's attempting to secede unilaterally be referred to the Supreme Court of Canada for a judicial opinion, pursuant to that Court's special advisory jurisdiction.2 Accordingly, on 30 September 1996, the Governor General in Council submitted three questions of law, discussed in detail below, concerning the legal authority of Quebec, under both Canadian and international law, to secede from the Canadian federation. In addition to the government of Canada, two provinces, the two territories, and a number of special interest groups and individuals (all given leave to intervene) submitted written arguments and rejoinders over the course of 1997.3 The government of Quebec did not participate in the hearing and submitted no argument. Accordingly, the Court appointed an (from Quebec) to represent the secessionist interest. The Court heard argument from 16 to 19 February 1998. On 20 August 1998 the Court released its unanimous opinion, rather earlier than expected.4 The Court rejected the legal right of Quebec to separate unilaterally under Canadian constitutional law, and the right to do so under international law as recognised in Canada. Given the latter holding, the Court did not consider further the third question relating to reconciling a possible conflict between the two legal orders. The following extended case comment proposes to outline and discuss briefly the reasoning of the Court, in what is a significant exercise of judicial power in the service of constitutional affairs. The structure of this comment will follow that of the Court's resaoning, dealing first with a preliminary objection, then turninh to question 1(introduction and discussion) and then to Question 2 and 3.5

In September 1997 the government of the United Kingdom announced new policies on the dumping of offshore installations. The new policies centred on a general prohibition of dumping of offshore installations for all but those instances where there was absolutely no alternative.1 They were presented as a sea change from the policies of the previous Conservative government which had required each case to be assessed on its merits and were hailed by some at the time as a major development.2 To date this has been a development with little legislative substance at the UK domestic level.3 At the international level, however, it appears to have produced more substantive changes, primarily by enabling the government to play an important role in the development of new rules under the Ospar Convention 1992.4 And, while the full extent of the United Kingdom's influence on the exact developments is not clear, it is clear that the new rules contain developments which are of importance not only to the parties to the Ospar Convention, but to the international law on the dumping of offshore installations generally. These legal developments will be considered below.

The Treaty of Amsterdam, expected to come into force this year, opened up new horizons in relation to European civil procedure. Article 65 of the revised EC Treaty will bring various aspects of civil procedure within the scope of Community law, in so far as they are “necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market”.1 It states:

The other development under the justice and home affairs pillar of the Union relevant to European civil procedure is the so-called Brussels II Convention: the Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters signed on 28 May 1998. This Convention continues the work of the 1968 Brussels Convention by extending similar principles to the field of matrimonial matters. The earlier Convention is seen as the general convention and the 1998 Convention as a lex specialis which follows the principles of the earlier Convention as far as possible.