Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-wq484 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-25T11:44:47.610Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Equilibria and Restoring Forces in Models of Vote Dynamics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2017

Michael D. McDonald  and
Robin Best
Michael D. McDonald*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Binghamton University, SUNY, Binghamton, New York 13902-6000
Robin Best*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Binghamton University, SUNY, Binghamton, New York 13902-6000
*
e-mail: mdmcd@binghamton.edu (corresponding author)
e-mail: rbest1@gmail.com
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Theories of voting tell us that party vote dynamics have two core components, long-run equilibria and more or less rapid returns to equilibria after short-run deviations. Statistical models used to represent these theories, however, tend to emphasize one component or the other. The unbalanced emphasis leaves the theoretical ideas underspecified and produces biased estimates of both long- and short-run components of vote dynamics. We specify the two components in the familiar form of an error correction model and demonstrate its advantages in terms of its theoretical consistency, simplicity, and precise prediction of whether something is wrong. We illustrate its usefulness by applying it to two sets of analyses reported in the literature and showing that it usually changes the conclusions reported in regard to both the equilibrium levels of party competition and the strength of restoring forces.

Type
Research Article
Information
Political Analysis , Volume 14 , Issue 4 , Autumn 2006 , pp. 369 - 392
Copyright
Copyright © The Author 2006. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Political Methodology 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

Authors' note: Ian Budge provided comments that sharpened our analyses and arguments in many ways. We are grateful to Yuliya Tverdova for pointing us to important insights about dynamic processes and to Silvia M. Mendes and Harvey Palmer for advice that honed our arguments and improved our presentation. Suggestions from referees helped us to clarify important points and improve our argument and presentation in several ways. Data for replication are available through the Center for Democratic Performance, Binghamton University.

References

Anderson, Christopher. 1995. Blaming the Government: Citizens and the Economy in Five European Democracies. Armonk, NY: M. E, Sharpe.Google Scholar
Axelrod, Robert. 1972. Where the Votes Come From: An Analysis of Electoral Coalitions, 1952-1968. American Political Science Review 66: 11–20.Google Scholar
Bartolini, Stefano, and Mair, Peter. 1990. Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885-1985. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Beck, Nathaniel. 1991. Comparing Dynamic Specifications: The Case of Presidential Approval. Political Analysis 3: 51–87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Beck, Nathaniel. 1992. The Methodology of Cointegration. Political Analysis 4: 237–48.Google Scholar
Budge, Ian, Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Volkens, Andrea, Bara, Judith, and Tanenbaum, Eric. 2001. Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945-1998. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Campbell, James E. 1985. Explaining Presidential Losses in Midterm Congressional Elections. Journal of Politics 47: 1140–57.Google Scholar
Campbell, James E. 1997. The Presidential Pulse and the 1994 Midterm Congressional Election. Journal of Politics 59: 830–57.Google Scholar
Converse, Philip E. 1966. The Concept of the Normal Vote. In Elections and the Political Order, ed. Campbell, Angus, Converse, Philip E., Miller, Warren E., and Stokes, Donald E. New York: John Wiley and Sons, pp. 9–39.Google Scholar
Dalton, Russell J., McAllister, Ian, and Wattenberg, Martin P. 2000. The Consequences of Partisan Dealignment. In Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies, ed. Dalton, Russell J. and Wattenberg, Martin P. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 37–63.Google Scholar
De Boef, Suzanna. 2001. Modeling Equilibrium Relationships: Error Correction Models with Strongly Autoregressive Data. Political Analysis 9: 78–94.Google Scholar
De Boef, Suzanna, and Keele, Luke. 2005. Dynamic Specification Revisited. Paper presented at the Society of Political Methodology, Florida State University.Google Scholar
De Boef, Suzanna, and Stimson, James A. 1995. The Dynamic Structure of Congressional Elections. Journal of Politics 57: 630–48.Google Scholar
Dorussen, Han, and Palmer, Harvey D. 2002. The Context of Economic Voting: An Introduction. In Economic Voting, ed. Dorussen, Han and Taylor, Michaell. London: Routledge, pp. 1–14.Google Scholar
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.Google Scholar
Durr, Robert H. 1992. An Essay on Cointegration and Error Correction Models. Political Analysis 4: 185–228.Google Scholar
Durr, Robert H. 1993. What Moves Policy Sentiment? American Political Science Review 87: 158–70.Google Scholar
Engle, Robert F., and Granger, Clive W. J. 1987. Cointegration and Error Correction: Representation, Estimation, and Testing. Econometrica 55: 251–76.Google Scholar
Erikson, Robert S. 1988. The Puzzle of Midterm Loss. Journal of Politics 50: 1011–29.Google Scholar
Erikson, Robert S., MacKuen, Michael B., and Stimson, James A. 2001. Macropartisanship: The Permanent Memory of Partisan Evaluation. In Controversies in Voting Behavior, ed. Niemi, Richard and Weisberg, Herbert. Washington, DC: CQ Press, pp. 364–70.Google Scholar
Erikson, Robert S., MacKuen, Michael B., and Stimson, James A. 2002. The Macro Polity. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Fiorina, Morris P. 1977. An Outline for a Model of Party Choice. American Journal of Political Science 21: 601–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hausman, J. A. 1978. Specification Tests in Econometrics. Econometrica 46: 1251–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jacobson, Gary C. 2004. The Politics of Congressional Elections, 6th ed. New York: Pearson/Longman.Google Scholar
Kiviet, Jan F. 1995. On Bias, Inconsistency, and Efficiency of Some Estimators in Dynamic Panel Data Models. Journal of Econometrics 68: 63–78.Google Scholar
Lewis-Beck, Michael, and Paldam, Martin. 2000. Introduction. Electoral Studies 19: 113–23.Google Scholar
Maddala, G. S. 1971. The Use of Variance Components Models in Pooling Cross Section and Time Series Data. Econometrica 39: 341–58.Google Scholar
McDonald, Michael D., and Budge, Ian. 2005. Elections, Parties, Democracy: Conferring the Median Mandate. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Meffert, Michael F., Norpoth, Helmut, and Ruhil, Anirudh V. S. 2001. Realignment and Macropartisanship. American Political Science Review 95: 953–62.Google Scholar
Meguid, Bonnie. 2005. Competition between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success. American Political Science Review 99: 347–59.Google Scholar
Nannestad, Peter, and Paldam, Martin. 1994. The VP-function: A Survey of the Literature on Vote and Popularity Functions after 25 Years. Public Choice 79: 213–45.Google Scholar
Nickell, Stephen. 1981. Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects. Econometrica 49: 1417–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Oppenheimer, Bruce I., Stimson, James A., and Waterman, Richard W. 1986. Interpreting U.S. Congressional Elections: The Exposure Thesis. Legislative Studies Quarterly 11: 227–47.Google Scholar
Paldam, Martin. 1991. How Robust is the Vote Function? A Study of 17 Countries over Four Decades. In Economic and Politics: The Calculus of Support, ed. Norpoth, Helmut, Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Lafay, Jean-Dominique. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 9–32.Google Scholar
Palmer, Harvey D., and Whitten, Guy. 1999. The Electoral Impact of Unexpected Inflation and Economic Growth. British Journal of Political Science 29: 623–39.Google Scholar
Palmer, Harvey D., and Whitten, Guy. 2002. Economics, Politics, and the Cost of Ruling in Advanced Industrial Democracies: How Much Does Context Matter? In Economic Voting, ed. Dorussen, Han and Taylor, Michaell. London: Routledge, pp. 66–91.Google Scholar
Perron, Pierre. 1989. The Great Crash, the Oil Price Shock, and the Unit Root Hypothesis. Econometrica 57: 1361–1401.Google Scholar
Powell, G. Bingham. 2000. Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Powell, G. Bingham, and Whitten, Guy. 1993. Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context. American Journal of Political Science 37: 391–414.Google Scholar
Price, Simon, and Sanders, David. 1993. Modeling Government Popularity in Postwar Britain: A Methodological Example. American Journal of Political Science 37: 317–34.Google Scholar
Samuels, David. 2004. Presidentialism and Accountability for the Economy in Comparative Perspective. American Political Science Review 98: 425–36.Google Scholar
Spafford, Duff. 1971. A Note on the “Equilibrium” Division of the Vote. American Political Science Review 65: 180–83.Google Scholar
Stokes, Donald E. 1966. Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency. American Political Science Review 60: 19–28.Google Scholar
Stokes, Donald E., and Iversen, Gudmund R. 1962. On the Existence of Forces Restoring Party Competition. Public Opinion Quarterly 26: 159–71.Google Scholar
Tufte, Edward R. 1974. Data Analysis for Politics and Policy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Google Scholar
Tufte, Edward R. 1975. Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections. American Political Science Review 69: 812–26.Google Scholar
Tufte, Edward R. 1977. Political Control of the Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Volkens, Andrea, Schnapp, Kai-Uwe, and Lass, Jürgen. 1992. Data Handbook on Election Results and Seats in National Parliaments of 26 Contemporary Democracies, 1945-1990. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum.Google Scholar
Waldendorp, Jaap, Keman, Hans, and Budge, Ian. 2000. Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945-1998). Amsterdam: Kluwer.Google Scholar
Waterman, Richard W., Oppenheimer, Bruce I., and Stimson, James A. 1991. Sequence and Equilibrium in Congressional Elections: An Integrated Approach. Journal of Politics 53: 373–93.Google Scholar
Whitten, Guy, and Palmer, Harvey D. 1999. Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting. Electoral Studies 18: 49–67.Google Scholar
Wlezien, Christopher, and Erikson, Robert S. 2002. The Timeline of Presidential Election Campaigns. Journal of Politics 64: 969–93.Google Scholar