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Small States, Nationalism and Institutional Capacities: An Explanation of the Difference in Response of Ireland and Denmark to the Financial Crisis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 April 2015

John L. Campbell  and
John A. Hall
John L. Campbell
Affiliation:
Dartmouth College, Copenhagen Business School [john.l.campbell@dartmouth.edu].
John A. Hall
Affiliation:
McGill University, Montreal [john.anthony.hall@mcgill.ca].
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Abstract

This paper uses theories of small states (e.g. Katzenstein) and nationalism (e.g. Gellner) to explain why Denmark and Ireland responded to the 2008 financial crisis in different ways. In Denmark, a coordinated market economy with considerable corporatism and state intervention, the private sector shouldered much of the financial burden for rescuing the banking sector. In Ireland, a liberal market economy without much corporatism or state intervention, the state shouldered the burden. The difference stems in large part from the fact that Denmark had comparatively thick institutions and a strong sense of nationalism whereas Ireland did not. Lessons for the theories of small states and nationalism are explored.

Résumé

Cet article mobilise les théories des petits Etats (ex. Katzenstein) et du Nationalisme (ex. Gellner) pour rendre compte des différences de réaction à la crise financière de 2008 entre le Danemark et l'Irlande. Bien que le Danemark possède une économie de marché coordonnée et fortement marquée par le corporatisme et l'interventionnisme d'Etat, c'est le secteur privé qui a assumé une grande partie de la charge financière liée au sauvetage du secteur bancaire. Inversement, alors que l'Irlande dispose d'une économie de marché libérale faiblement marquée par le corporatisme et l'interventionnisme d'Etat, c'est pourtant l'Etat qui a assumé une grande partie de cette charge financière. L'article montre que cette différence provient en grande partie du fait que le Danemark, au contraire de l'Irlande, est doté d'institutions solides et d'un sens élevé du nationalisme. L'article explore les leçons à tirer de ces deux cas pour les théories des petits Etats et du Nationalisme.

Zusammenfassung

Dieser Beitrag stützt sich auf Kleinstaaten- (z.B. Katzenstein) und Nationalismustheorien (z.B. Gellner), um die unterschiedlichen Ansätze Dänemarks und Irlands zur Lösung der Finanzkrise 2008 zu erklären. In Dänemark, einer koordinierten Marktwirtschaft, mit starkem Korporatismus und staatlichen Interventionen, hat die private Marktwirtschaft die finanzielle Last der Bankenrettung getragen. In Irland, einer liberalen Marktwirtschaft ohne starkem Korporatismus und staatlichen Interventionen, war es der Staat. Der Unterschied liegt hauptsächlich darin, dass Dänemark im Gegensatz zu Irland vergleichsweise starke Institutionen und einen hohen Sinn für Nationalismus hatte. Die Rückschlüsse für Kleinstaaten- und Nationalismustheorien werden ebenfalls beleuchtet.

Keywords

CapacitiesDenmarkIrelandFinancial CrisisCapacitésDanemarkIrlandeCrise financièreKapazitätenDänemarkIrlandFinanzkrise
Type
Varia
Information
European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie , Volume 56 , Issue 1: Economic Culture in the Public Sphere , April 2015 , pp. 143 - 174
Copyright
Copyright © A.E.S. 2015 

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