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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 March 2017
In October 2016, Russian President Vladimir Putin suspended the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), a bilateral treaty between Russia and the United States governing the disposal of surplus weapons-grade plutonium. A Russian Foreign Ministry director explained that the decision was prompted by a “dramatic change in the situation . . . brought about by the unfriendly steps taken by the United States.” He also cited “the United States’ obvious inability and unwillingness to honour its obligations . . . on time and in full.” The United States expressed disappointment at the suspension, arguing that continued implementation was in both states’ interests.
1 Ministry of Foreign Aff. of the Russ. Fed'n Press Release, Remarks by Mikhail Ulyanov, Director of the Foreign Ministry Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control and Representative of the Russian Federation at the First Committee of the 71st Session of the UNGA, New York, October 3, 2016 (Oct. 4, 2016), at http://www.mid.ru/en/general_assembly/-/asset_publisher/lrzZMhfoyRUj/content/id/2486599 [hereinafter Remarks by Mikhail Ulyanov].
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Unofficial Composite Text of the United States-Russian Federation 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, as Amended, U.S. Dep't of State, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/213493.pdf [hereinafter Composite Text].
5 Protocol to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation, Sept. 15, 2006, TIAS No. 11-713.1.
6 Protocol to the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation, Apr. 13, 2010, TIAS No. 11-713.2 [hereinafter 2010 Protocol]; see also Crook, John R., Contemporary Practice of the United States, 104 AJIL 680 (2010)Google Scholar.
7 Composite Text, supra note 4, Art. II(1). The PMDA defines “Disposition Plutonium” as “weapon-grade plutonium that has been (a) withdrawn from nuclear weapon programs, (b) designated as no longer required for defense purposes, and (c) declared in the Annex.” Id. Art. I(2).
8 Composite Text, supra note 4.
9 U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, Entry into Force of the U.S.-Russian Agreement to Dispose of Excess Weapon-Grade Plutonium (July 13, 2011), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/168287.htm [hereinafter July 13, 2011 Press Release].
10 Id.
11 U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, 2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (Apr. 13, 2010), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/04/140097.htm [hereinafter PMDA Press Release]; see Composite Text, supra note 4 (“One of the key objectives of the Agreement . . . is to reduce irreversibly stockpiles of weapon-grade plutonium from each side's nuclear weapons programs.”); see also Plutonium Disposition Program, Nat'l Nuclear Sec. Admin. (June 26, 2013), at https://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/factsheets/pudisposition [hereinafter Plutonium Disposition Program] (“Weapon-grade plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) are the critical ingredients for making a nuclear weapon. With the end of the Cold War, hundreds of tons of these materials were determined to be surplus to U.S. and Russian defense needs. Denying access to plutonium and HEU is the best way to prevent nuclear proliferation to rogue states and terrorist organizations. The most certain method to prevent these materials from falling into the wrong hands is to dispose of them.”).
12 PMDA Press Release, supra note 11.
13 July 13, 2011 Press Release, supra note 9.
14 PMDA Press Release, supra note 11; see also Crook, supra note 6, at 681.
15 Mike Eckel, As Putin Swipes at U.S. Over Plutonium Disposal, Nuclear Cooperation Takes a Hit, RadioFreeEurope (Apr. 23, 2016), at http://www.rferl.org/a/putin-swipes-us-plutonium-disposal/27692331.html. In 2013, the National Nuclear Security Administration, which bears responsibility for disposition, described a lack of adequate funding for the MOX disposition it was supposed to undertake: “The current strategy to implement this agreement [the PMDA] in the United States involves the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), under the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, building a Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication Facility, a capability to disassemble nuclear weapons pits and convert the resulting plutonium into a form suitable to be made into MOX fuel, and a Waste Solidification Building to handle the waste resulting from pit disassembly and MOX operations at the Savannah River Site (SRS). However, unanticipated cost increases for the MOX project and plutonium disposition program have prompted the Department to slow down the MOX project and other activities associated with the current plutonium disposition strategy while determining whether there are options to complete the mission more efficiently.” Plutonium Disposition Program, supra note 11.
16 Eckel, supra note 15.
17 Dep't of Energy, DOE/CF-0125, FY 2017 Congressional Budget Request: Budget in Brief 6 (Feb. 2016); see also Dep't of Energy, DOE/CF-0119 vol. 1, FY 2017 Congressional Budget Request: National Nuclear Security Administration (Feb. 2016). The dilute and dispose method “involves adding the plutonium to a nonradioactive substance, encasing it in glass or metal-can type containers or oil drums, and burying it at a federal waste site in New Mexico. Unlike with MOX, experts say this method could still allow for plutonium to be extracted some day and put back into weapons, though with difficulty.” Eckel, supra note 15.
18 FY 2017 Budget Request: NNSA Up 2.9%; Showdown with South Carolina Delegation on MOX Looms, Am. Inst. of Physics (Feb. 18, 2016), at https://www.aip.org/fyi/2016/fy-2017-budget-request-nnsa-29-showdown-south-carolina-delegation-mox-looms.
19 President of Russ. Press Release, Truth and Justice Regional and Local Media Forum (Apr. 7, 2016), at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51685.
20 Eckel, supra note 15.
21 See 2010 Protocol, supra note 6, Art. III(1).
22 U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, Daily Press Briefing (Apr. 11, 2016), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/04/255708.htm.
23 Eckel, supra note 15. In June 2015, U.S. Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz established a Plutonium Disposition Red Team “to assess options for the disposition of 34MT of surplus weapon-grade plutonium.” The Team's Final Report, published in August of that year, warned that electing the cheaper “Dilute and Dispose” process, over continued support of MOX, would have political ramifications perhaps less positive than its practical consequences. “The review team . . . believes that the Dilute and Dispose approach meets the requirements for permanent disposition, but recognizes that this assertion will ultimately be subject to agreement with the Russians, and that the decision will be as much political as technical.” However, it noted that “[t]he combination of evolving international circumstances and the fact that the U.S. has already accommodated a Russian national interest in a previous PMDA modification causes the Red Team to believe that the federal government has a reasonable position with which to enter PMDA negotiations.” Thom Mason, Final Report of the Plutonium Disposition Red Team (2015), at https://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/Pu-Disposition-Red-Team-Report-081315vFinal-SM.pdf.
24 See, e.g., U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham Press Release, Graham Opposes Obama Budget and Obama Proposal on MOX Funding (Feb. 9, 2016), at http://www.lgraham.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=C5871C66-556D-474B-89E8-70031346BC68 (“The Obama Administration's reckless proposal to terminate the MOX program, without a proven disposition plan in place, is both ill-conceived and dangerous. This isn't the first time they have proposed halting the MOX program, but given the fact their time in office is running short, thankfully it is their last.”); Derrek Asberry, Senate Committee Seeks $340 Million for MOX, Post & Courier (May 12, 2016), at http://www.postandcourier.com/archives/senate-committee-seeks-m-for-mox/article_22ee8f50-0605-5bef-ab6e-2b504ece73ba.html; Mary Orndorff Troyan, Congress Divided on MOX Funding, Greenville Online (Apr. 13, 2016, 5:22 PM), at http://www.greenvilleonline.com/story/news/politics/2016/04/13/congress-divided-mox-funding/82985230.
25 Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Statement of Administration Policy: S.2943—National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (2016).
26 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, H.R. 4909, 114th Cong., 1230–31, 1388 (2016).
27 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328 (2016).
28 President of Russ. Press Release, Draft Law Suspending the Russia-US Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement Submitted to the State Duma (Oct. 3, 2016), at http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/5300 [hereinafter Draft Law Submitted to State Duma].
29 President of Russ. Press Release, Law Suspending Russian-US Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) Signed (Oct. 31, 2016), at http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/53167.
30 Draft Law Submitted to State Duma, supra note 28; see also Ministry of Foreign Aff. of the Russ. Fed'n Press Release, Comment by the Foreign Ministry on the Presidential Executive Order Suspending the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (Oct. 3, 2016), at http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/kommentarii_predstavitelya/-/asset_publisher/MCZ7HQuMdqBY/content/id/2485021 (reiterating these complaints).
31 Remarks by Mikhail Ulyanov, supra note 1.
32 Id.; see also Draft Law Submitted to State Duma, supra note 28 (“The actions taken by the United States fundamentally changed the circumstances in which the Agreement and its protocols were signed. Therefore, the suspension of the Agreement is a reciprocal measure by the Russian Federation and does not violate the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Importantly, the plutonium covered by the Agreement remains outside the nuclear weapons sphere, which attests to Russia's commitment to limiting nuclear arms.”).
33 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
34 U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, Daily Press Briefing (Oct. 3, 2016), at https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/10/262717.htm.
35 White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest (Oct. 3, 2016), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/10/03/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-1032016.
36 White House Press Release, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest (Oct. 5, 2016), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/10/05/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-1052016.
37 U.S. Dep't of State Press Release, Daily Press Briefing (Oct. 5, 2016), at https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/10/262821.htm.
