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Review Essay of Core Concepts in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Anglo-German Dialogues (edited by Kai Ambos and others, 2020)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 October 2020
The book Core Concepts in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Anglo-German Dialogues is the first volume of an Anglo-German project which aims ‘to explore the foundational principles and concepts that underpin the different domestic systems and local rules’. It offers comparative perspectives on German and Anglo-American criminal law and criminal justice as ‘examples of the civil law and the common law worlds’. The comparisons ‘dig beneath the superficial similarities or differences between legal rules to identify and compare the underlying concepts, values, principles, and structures of thought’. The review essay focuses on the topics of omissions, preparatory offences, and participation in crime, all of which extend the typical criminal liability. It presents the comparative German and Anglo-American perspectives discussed in the book with regard to each topic and adds the perspective of Israeli criminal law. It points out the features common to all these topics as an extension of criminal liability and discusses the underlying considerations that justify the criminalisation of omissions, preparatory offences, and participation in crime. In evaluating whether extending criminal liability in these contexts is justified, the review essay suggests reliance on two main notions: that of ‘control over the commission of the offence’ and that of ‘liberty (or personal freedom)’.
I wish to thank Celia Fassberg for valuable comments.
1 Ambos, Kai, Duff, Antony, Roberts, Julian, Weigend, Thomas and Heinze, Alexander (eds), Core Concepts in Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Vol 1 Anglo-German Dialogues (Cambridge University Press 2020)Google Scholar.
2 Kai Ambos and others, ‘Introductory Remarks’ in Ambos and others, ibid, 3, 5.
3 ibid.
4 ibid 6.
5 ibid 3.
6 ibid 5.
7 The Palestine Gazette, 28 September 1936, 633, 973.
8 For the exact sources of the Criminal Law Ordinance, see Abrams, Norman, ‘Interpreting the Criminal Code Ordinance, 1936: The Untapped Well’ (1972) 7(1) Israel Law Review 25CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Shachar, Yoram, ‘The Sources of the Criminal Code Ordinance 1936’ (1979–80) 7 Iyuney Mishpat [Tel Aviv University Law Review] 75 (in Hebrew)Google Scholar.
9 Laws of the State of Israel (Special Volume, Penal Law) 5737-1977.
10 Penal Law (Amendment No. 39) (Preliminary and General Part), 1994, Laws of the State of Israel, 1481, 348, 23 August 1994.
11 Antje du Bois-Pedain, ‘Participation in Crime’ in Ambos and others (n 1) 94, 94.
12 ibid 104.
13 ibid 106.
14 ibid 106; R v Jogee; Ruddock v The Queen [2016] UKSC 8, [2016] UKPC 7.
15 Du Bois-Pedain (n 11) 111.
16 ibid.
17 German Penal Code, s 25; Du Bois-Pedain (n 11) 112.
18 Du Bois-Pedain (n 11) 115.
19 ibid.
20 ibid 115–16.
21 German Penal Code, s 26.
22 ibid s 27. For a discussion of the secondary party under German criminal law, see Du Bois-Pedain (n 11) 112–13.
23 Du Bois-Pedain (n 11) 117.
24 Defined in Israeli Penal Law, s 29.
25 ibid s 29(c).
26 ibid s 29(b).
27 ibid s 30.
28 ibid s 31.
29 ibid s 32.
30 ibid s 34A(a)(1). The section provides an exception, according to which ‘had the … additional offence been committed with intent, the co-perpetrator shall bear liability for such as for an offence of indifference only’. In 2002 the Israeli Supreme Court was asked to review the constitutionality of this section on the ground that it infringes human dignity by enabling both the attaching of criminal liability that does not reflect the defendant's fault and stigmatising a defendant as a murderer on the basis of negligence. The Court, nonetheless, approved the constitutionality of the section: see Crim A 4424/98 Silgado v State of Israel 2002 PD 56(5) 529. For criticism of the court ruling in this regard, see Gur-Arye, Miriam and Weigend, Thomas, ‘Constitutional Review of Criminal Prohibitions Affecting Human Dignity and Liberty: German and Israeli Perspectives’ (2011) 44 Israel Law Review 63, 86–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dancig-Rosenberg, Hadar, ‘Partnership Responsibility for an Unintended Crime: Thoughts Concerning Blame, Proportionality and an Alternate Balancing Test: A Deontological Analysis in Response to Cr. 442/98 Silgado v. The State of Israel’ in Arad-Ayalon, Dror, Rabin, Yoram and Vaki, Yaniv (eds), David Weiner Book on Criminal Law and Ethics (The Israel Bar Publishing House 2009) 693–766Google Scholar (in Hebrew); Zimran, Adiel, ‘Trends in Israeli Constitutional-Criminal Law in Light of a Conceptual Analysis of “Human Dignity”’ (2019) 49 Mishpatim [The Hebrew University Law Review] 383, 404–07Google Scholar (in Hebrew). The Silgado ruling was overturned in 2019 with the reform of homicide offences enacted by Penal Law (Amendment No 137) 2019, Laws of the State of Israel 2779, 10 January 2019, 230. According to the Penal Law, s 301B(3), in cases where the further offence is murder the co-preparator will be liable for ‘homicide in circumstances of mitigated responsibility’.
31 Israeli Penal Law, s 34A(a)(2).
32 Du Bois-Pedain (n 11) 122.
33 ibid.
34 ibid 123–24.
35 ibid 126.
36 ibid 127.
37 ibid 128.
38 ibid.
39 ibid.
40 ibid 129.
41 ibid.
42 I have elaborated on the nature of the perpetrator elsewhere: see Gur-Arye, Miriam, ‘Commission of an Offence: Various Modes’ (1990) 1 PlilimGoogle Scholar [Israel Journal of Criminal Justice] 29 (in Hebrew). See also Kremnitzer, Mordechai, ‘The Perpetrator in Criminal Law: A Profile” (1990) 1 PlilimGoogle Scholar [Israel Journal of Criminal Justice] 65 (in Hebrew).
43 For elaboration on the nature of accessorial liability, see Gur-Arye, Miriam, ‘A Theory of Complicity – Comment’ in Gavison, Ruth (ed), Issues in Contemporary Legal Philosophy: The Influence of H.L.A. Hart (Oxford University Press 1987) 304–10Google Scholar; Dancig-Rosenberg, Hadar, ‘The Justifications of Criminalizing Secondary Parties: Towards Rationales-based Doctrine’ (2017) 46(1) MishpatimGoogle Scholar [The Hebrew University Law Review] 5 (in Hebrew).
44 I have elaborated on the notion of committing an offence through an innocent agent elsewhere: see Gur-Arye, Miriam, ‘Committing an Offence through Another’ in Barak, Aharon and others (eds), Festschrift in Memory of Judge Sussman (Daf-Chen 1984) 319 (in Hebrew)Google Scholar. See also Eldar, Shachar, Human Tools – Perpetrating Crime through Others and Heading Criminal Organizations (Am-Oved 2009) 19–34 (in Hebrew)Google Scholar.
45 Du Bois-Pedain (n 11) 126.
46 ibid 130.
47 ibid.
48 Stefanie Bock and Findlay Stark, ‘Preparatory Offences’ in Ambos and others (n 1) 54, 54.
49 ibid.
50 ibid 56.
51 ibid.
52 ibid 57.
53 ibid 65–84.
54 ibid 58.
55 ibid 58.
56 Defined in the Serious Crime Act 2007 (UK).
57 Defined in s. 1 Criminal Law Act 1977 (UK).
58 The offences are defined in s 30 German Penal Code, and discussed in Bock and Stark (n 48) 60.
59 Defined in s 111 German Penal Code, and discussed in Bock and Stark (n 48) 60.
60 Bock and Stark (n 48) 59.
61 ibid 60 and the clarification at footnote 42 (emphasis added).
62 ibid 67 (emphasis added).
63 ibid.
64 ibid 55.
65 See the text following n 43.
66 Bock and Stark (n 48) 71.
67 ibid.
68 ibid 74.
69 ibid.
70 For an elaboration of the nature of public incitement and its relation to attempted instigating, see Kremnitzer, Mordechai and Ghannyim, Khaled, ‘Incitement not Sedition’ in Kretzner, David and Hazan, Francine Kershman (eds), Freedom of Speech and Incitement against Democracy (Kluwer Law International 2000) 177Google Scholar; Gur-Arye, Miriam, ‘Can Freedom of Expression Survive Social Trauma: The Israeli Experience’ (2003) 13(1) Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 155, 192–202Google Scholar.
71 Bock and Stark (n 48) 87.
72 In the same spirit see Kremnitzer, Mordechai, ‘Justified Deviations from the Requirement of Mens Rea’ (1996) 13(1) Bar-Ilan Law Studies 109, 120–25Google Scholar.
73 Israeli Penal Law, s 33.
74 ibid s 34c; s 27 provides that compulsory punishments are not applied to attempt.
75 ibid s 33.
76 Defined in the Israeli Penal Law, s 499.
77 ibid s 500(8).
78 Kai Ambos, ‘Omissions’ in Ambos and others (n 1) 17, 21.
79 ibid 27.
80 ibid 28.
81 ibid 32–33.
82 ibid 33.
83 Israeli Penal Law, s 18(c).
84 ibid ss 322–323.
85 ibid ss 325–326.
86 Ambos (n 78) 34.
87 ibid (emphasis in original).
88 ibid 35.
89 ibid 39.
90 ibid 41.
91 ibid 44.
92 Almog, Oz, The Sabra: A Profile (Am Oved 1997)Google Scholar (in Hebrew); Kaplan, Danny, ‘Commemorating a Suspended Death: Missing Soldiers and National Solidarity in Israel’ (2008) 35 American Ethnologist 413CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gur-Arye, Miriam, ‘The Impact of Moral Panic on the Criminal Justice System: Hit-and-Run Traffic Offenses as a Case Study’ (2017) 20 New Criminal Law Review 309CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
93 See Maya Nestelbaum, ‘Why Did Passers-by Not Jump into the Yarkon River to Rescue Yasmin Fingold?’ Globes, 9 May 2009, http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did¼1000447417.
94 Thou Shalt Not Stand Idly by the Blood of Thy Neighbour Act 1998, s 4.
95 When the bill was presented in the Knesset by MK Hanan Porat, he emphasised that ‘[w]e witness, fortunately enough not in Israel, that in New York and other cities in the world, those who see a person bleeding to death and pass by, indifferent, without giving him any help’ (emphasis added) (from the Israeli Parliament discussion of the proposed Act, ‘Thou Shalt Not Stand Idly by The Blood of Thy Neighbour’, 1995 (first reading)).
96 Ambos (n 78) 44.
97 Bock and Stark (n 48) 56.
98 Ambos (n 78) 39.
