Constitutional transplantation, the process by which the constitutional practice of one society becomes an important source for the legal development of another, has figured importantly in the institutional evolution of new politics. In this article, I examine the constitutional experience of Israel and the United States, two societies that share a language of jurisprudential discourse while differing significantly in a number of polically relevant ways. In particular, the fact that both societies can be described as pluralistic only conceals the fact that they represent alternative models of pluralism that may render problematic the the transferablity of constitutional outcomes from one place to another. Thus, the literature of modern constitutionalism, which has tended to emphasize the rights-based liberal ethic of individualism, is arguably more compatible with an American model in which the principles of the “procedural republic” are more unproblematically embraced. To pursue this question, I look at two issues—the advisability of adopting a bill of rights and the appropriate stance of the regime on the question of free speech—that allow us to reflect upon the limits and possibilities of constitutional transplantation.

The claim made by antifoundationalist thinkers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, and more recently Richard Rorty is that the search for a standard or foundation for our moral and political judgments inevitably arrives at a distorting reductivism. This radical claim, if true, makes dubious the very possibility of political philosophy understood as the rational investigation of human affairs. A response to this claim which merely adduces the potentially harmful consequences of such a view is inadequate; our manifest need for such a standard in no way guarantees the existence of such a standard. An adequate response requires that we meet the premise of the antifoundationalist view. That premise resides in a certain understanding of Platonic thought, an understanding which I here undertake to show is mistaken.

The article is a comparative study of Hegel and Marx on the nature and function of the political state and it argues that Marx's critique of Hegel on this topic is aimed not at the “idealism” of the state, which concerns the principle of universal freedom, but rather at the “material” presuppositions of the state. Indeed, Marx's critique of political institutions is premised upon the way in which they are infected with the egoism and self-seeking of civil (bürgerliche) society. The relationship between the views of Hegel and Marx on these points is explored by (1) giving an exegesis of Hegel's conception of civil society as a foundation for freedom, (2) examining Marx's critique of Hegel's theory of the state, (3) distinguishing the Hegelian and Marxian philosophical conceptions of freedom, the individual, and community, and (4) evaluating the fairness and cogency of Marx's critique of Hegel.

Canada and India have hybrid systems of government. Both experienced constitutional crises in the 1970's. These crises have usually been treated as sui generis. It is the hypothesis of this article that the crises raise fundamental questions regarding the very nature of such systems, which are based on “parliamentary federalism,” a political system invented in Canada to provide strong central government. This hybrid system combines two classical models: British tradition, based on parliamentary supremacy and conventions, and American principles, which require a written constitution, the separation of powers and judicial review. The two models are contradictory, since parliamentary supremacy and constitutional supremacy are incompatible.

The “fall” of Lucrezia in Machiavelli's play La Mandragola is a puzzlement. She is presented as an intelligent and virtuous wife who by play's end not only agrees to commit adultery but murder as well. Any attempt to interpret the play must address the significance of Lucrezia and her fall. It is argued here, however, that the real deception is that Lucrezia does not undergo a conversion—she is of questionable character from the start. Upon examination, her similarity with the Goddess Fortuna reveals a deeper tale being told within the play. Machiavelh uses her to mock the Church, and St. Augustine in particular, and to deliver a frightening message that the free will is no match for the goddess.