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Persons and Mysterianism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 April 2013

HAGIT BENBAJI
HAGIT BENBAJI*
Affiliation:
Ben Gurion University
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to argue against the widely held view that our concept of person is purely mental. Utilizing an Anscombian scenario, in which reports on one’s own actions are made on the basis of observation, I argue that such “pilots in their ships,” as it were, cannot self-ascribe bodily properties. The mere fact that we feel in our bodies unlike pilots in their ships cannot generate the intuition that we are bodily: as long as we conceive ourselves as purely mental, the fact that we are bodily beings remains an inexplicable mystery.

Cet article s’oppose à l’idée répandue selon laquelle notre conception de la personne est purement mentale. J’utilise l’un des scénarios imaginés par Anscombe, selon lequel les descriptions que nous faisons de nos propres actions sont tirées de l’observation. Je soutiens que si nous sommes, pour ainsi dire, comme un pilote dans son navire, nous ne sommes pas en mesure de nous attribuer à nous-mêmes des propriétés corporelles. Le seul fait de se sentir dans un corps, à la différence du pilote dans son navire, ne peut produire l’intuition que nous sommes corporels. Tant que nous nous concevons comme des êtres mentaux, le fait que nous soyons des êtres corporels demeure un mystère inexplicable.

Type
Articles
Information
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 52 , Issue 1 , March 2013 , pp. 165 - 188
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2013 

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