Since the Council of Europe was established in 1949, more than forty conventions and agreements between Member States have been concluded within its framework, relating entirely or in part, directly or indirectly, to aliens. Usually these conventions and agreements concern nationals of the contracting parties only. Sometimes, as is particularly the case with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Five Protocols, all aliens within the jurisdiction of a Member State are covered, regardless of their nationality.

In his final speech at the Helsinki Conference (CSCE) in 1975, Prime Minister Wilson called the Final Act of the Conference a “moral commitment”, not an international treaty. Thus, the Act is not binding as a matter of international law, though it is quite clear from the historical context, and from the wording of the Final Act itself, that the participating states have some sort of obligation (“commitment”) to base their future conduct on the provisions of the Final Act. The Act formulates norms, rules intended to determine state behaviour, but these rules are not of a legal character. This is, apparently, the assumption underlying the Wilson statement, to which many similar statements could be added. As will be shown, a considerable body of state practice based on the same concept has developed, and points to the existence of non-legal (pre-legal, para-legal, moral, political) obligations as distinguished from legal ones. Is it a valid distinction, can a distinction really be made between legal and non-legal norms? If so, what constitutes the difference? What is the basis of obligation in both cases?

The Final Act of Helsinki and the pattern of international relations based upon it lend themselves very well to some reflections on the conditions which make it possible, and preferable, to root new efforts towards multilateral co-operation in existing international organizations, or to create new international organizations for this purpose, or, again, to avoid or postpone the structure of an international organization. Indeed, the importance of the international organization as a regulatory instrument should be substantiated by defining not only its potentialities, but also its limitations.

The events which provide the backdrop to the “Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran)” are clear and undisputed. They involve the violent occupation of the American Embassy in Tehran, and of the consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz. The occupation of the Embassy on 4 November 1979 led to the Embassy personnel and two other American citizens, a teacher and a businessman, being taking hostage, and subsequently to demands being addressed to America (e.g., for the extradition of the Shah and the return of his wealth) under the threat that failure to comply would result in the hostages being put on trial as spies.