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The Strength of Two Hands: Conflicting Stakeholder Pressures and Corporate Philanthropic Giving

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 April 2020

Liang Zhang*
Affiliation:
Xi'an Jiaotong University, China
Zhe Zhang
Affiliation:
Xi'an Jiaotong University, China
Ming Jia
Affiliation:
Northwestern Polytechnical University, China
Yeyao Ren
Affiliation:
Xi'an Jiaotong University, China
*
Corresponding author: Liang Zhang (13772073171@163.com)

Abstract

We develop a stakeholder framework that examines how firms respond to the conflicting demands that arise from governments and investors in the context of corporate philanthropic giving. We argue that firms that experience such conflict exhibit a decoupling response in philanthropic giving. Furthermore, we identify the boundary conditions of the relationship between the conflicting pressures and the decoupling response. Drawing on stakeholder salience literature, we argue that this relationship will be weakened when CEOs perceive government demands as more salient (such as those with a communist ideology) and when CEOs are less sensitive to investor claims (such as those with fewer career concerns). We find empirical support for our arguments using a sample of 8,857 Chinese listed firms from 2006 to 2015. Our study contributes to the literature on stakeholder theory, decoupling, and corporate philanthropy.

摘要

摘要

我们建立了一个利益相关者框架,研究了企业在慈善捐赠中如何应对来自政府和投资者相互冲突的需求。我们认为,面临这种冲突的公司在慈善捐赠方面会表现出一种脱钩反应。进一步,我们识别了相互冲突的压力与脱钩反应关系的边界条件。基于利益相关者显著性文献,我们认为,当CEO认为政府的要求更加突出(比如具有共产主义意识形态的CEO),或者当CEO对投资者的要求不敏感(比如对职业生涯担忧较少的CEO)时,这种关系将会减弱。利用2006年至2015年8,857家中国上市公司的样本,我们验证了上述观点。这项研究对利益相关者理论、脱钩文献和企业慈善文献做出了贡献。

Аннотация

АННОТАЦИЯ

Мы разрабатываем концепцию заинтересованных сторон, которая исследует, каким образом компании реагируют на противоречивые требования, которые выдвигают правительства и инвесторы, в контексте корпоративной благотворительности. Мы утверждаем, что компании, которые сталкиваются с такой проблемой, демонстрируют реакцию ослабления зависимости в благотворительной деятельности. Кроме того, мы определяем граничные условия для взаимосвязи между противоречивыми требованиями и ответной реакцией ослабления зависимости. Опираясь на научную литературу по особому значению заинтересованных сторон, мы утверждаем, что эта взаимосвязь будет ослаблена, когда генеральные директора воспринимают требования правительства как более существенные (как те, кто придерживаются коммунистической идеологии) и когда генеральные директора менее восприимчивы к требованиям инвесторов (как те, кто не слишком заинтересованы в карьерном росте). Мы находим эмпирическую поддержку наших предположений на основании выборки из 8857 китайских компаний, зарегистрированных на бирже, в период с 2006 по 2015 гг. Наше исследование вносит свой вклад в научную литературу по теории заинтересованных сторон, ослаблению зависимости и корпоративной благотворительности.

Resumen

RESUMEN

Desarrollamos un marco de grupos de interés que examina como en el contexto de demandas conflictivas que surgen de gobiernos e inversionistas en el contexto de donaciones filantrópicas corporativas. Discutimos que las empresas que experimentan ese conflicto exhiben una respuesta de desacoplamiento en donaciones corporativas. Además, identificamos las condiciones límite de la relación entre las presiones conflictivas y la respuesta de desacoplamiento. Basándonos en la literatura de relevancia de grupos de interés, discutimos que esta relación será debilitada cuando los CEOs perciban exigencias del gobierno como más destacadas (como aquellas con ideología comunista) y cuando los CEOs son menos sensibles a las demandas de los inversionistas (como aquellos con menos preocupaciones profesionales). Encontramos soporte empírico para nuestros argumentos usando una muestra de 8.857 empresas chinas que cotizan en bolsa entre 2006 y 2015. Nuestro estudio contribuye a la literatura de teoría de grupos de interés, desacoplamiento, y filantropía corporativa.

Type
Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2020 The International Association for Chinese Management Research

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Footnotes

Accepted by: Senior Editor Till Talaulicar

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