This article presents an overall view of the performance of the Argentine economy under the policies inaugurated in April 1976. Section I describes the conditions prevailing at the beginning of 1976, the main goals and arguments of the new economic authorities. Section II explores the implementation of the economic program and how the government insisted on its basic goals under rapidly changing conditions. Finally, Section III summarizes the author's views on the consequences of the present economic program and provides suggestions on an alternative development strategy. A brief Statistical Appendix with basic data on the Argentine economy and relevant economic variables of the period under analysis is also included.

There are a number of reasons why Mexico attracts students of economic development. Boasting an impressive rate of economic growth that has been sustained for four decades, yet plagued with discouraging and mounting problems of surplus labor and maldistribution of income, Mexico is one of the prime cases that has sparked the discussion over the distinctions between “economic growth” and “economic development.” Furthermore, Mexico affords a classic test of the validity of some dependency writers’ claim that periphery countries’ subjugation to external control varies directly with the length and intensity of contact with center nations (Frank, 1972: 10). The sudden revelation of Mexico's potential as an energy supplier, the growing concern with the magnitude and consequences of illegal Mexican migration to the United States, and the increasing recognition of the uniqueness and importance of the Mexico-U.S. border economy add further appeal for economists, political scientists, and sociologists.

Since the late sixties, Guatemalans have murdered each other at an astonishing rate. This wave of politically related terrorism and assassinations began to grow rapidly in 1966 and has continued, fluctuating in intensity, to the present. In 1967, for instance, incidents of violence averaged 70 per month, causing some 30 monthly deaths; in 1971 the figures had risen 60%. This article describes the historical antecedents of this conflict, its development as right-wing terrorists sought to counterbalance leftist guerrilla insurgency and the subsequent evolution of violence. Seeking an explanation for why violence was greater in some areas than in others, the essay examines two structural theories which suggest that conflict may be most intense where the strength of contending political parties is most nearly equal and where socioeconomic change is greatest.