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On Defense by Nuclear Deterrence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2020

Jan Narveson
Jan Narveson*
Affiliation:
University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, CanadaN2L 3G1
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Extract

War winning, however, is impossible precisely because of the fact that there is no defense now against all-out nuclear use and probably not for the foreseeable future. A nuclear war could therefore be controlled and won only if one side consciously chose to lose the war, an event as unlikely in the future as it has been rare or nonexistent in the past. It is not necessary to win a nuclear war in order to deter it; one has only to ensure that both are likely to lose it.

It takes (at least) two to make a war, and of those combatants, one (at least) must start it. If nobody starts the war, there won't be a war. This is as true in the nuclear era as it ever was. But if any given party is certain that he would lose any war initiated by him, then presumably he would not initiate a war. One way for A to make certain that B would lose any war B starts is by having an unstoppable superpowerful weapon of retaliation at hand.

Type
Research Article
Information
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume , Volume 12: Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Disarmament , 1986 , pp. 195 - 211
Copyright
Copyright © The Authors 1986

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References

1 Art, Robert, ‘The Case for the Mad-Plus Posture,’ Ethics 95 (1985), 499CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 This was originally written prior to Mr. Gorbachev's disarmament initiative of early January 1986, American response to which had not been announced at the time of writing.

3 This was also written prior to the American Congress’ recent resolution to cut down on budget deficits, which will have the effect of halting arms-race effects from the American side for the time being, at least.

4 My argument for this is spelled out more fully in ‘Getting on the Road to Peace: A Modest Proposal,’ Ethics 95 (1985), 589-605.

5 This assessment of the cruise was first broached in my ‘Why Doves Should Love the Cruise,’ Policy Options 6 (Toronto, Canada 1985), 4-7. A shorter version was published in Concerned Philosophers for Peace 11 (April 1985) (Box 42393, Portland Oregon 97242, U.S.A.).

6 Two have done so already: see Conrad Brunk, ‘Why Doves Should Loathe the Cruise,’ Policy Options 6, 4 (May 1985); and Lackey, Douglas, Concerned Philosophers for Peace 12 (December 1985).Google Scholar

7 Lackey, Douglas, ‘Immoral Risks,’ in Social Philosophy and Policy 3 (1985) 154-75CrossRefGoogle Scholar

8 See the same two as in note 6.

9 Mack, Eric, ‘Three Ways to Kill Innocent Bystanders: Some conundrums,’ Social Philosophy and Policy 3 (1985), 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar