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About this Cambridge Elements Series

Philosophy of mind is a central branch, not only of philosophy, but of human inquiry generally. As well as exploring traditional philosophical problems about the mind, researchers in the field also engage directly with scientific work, constructing theories, proposing research programmes, and exploring the implications of scientific findings for our everyday view of the mind. Their work shapes our conception of ourselves and helps us understand who we are and how we can confront the challenges we face.

This series provides concise, authoritative introductions to contemporary work in philosophy of mind, written by leading researchers. It offers balanced, comprehensive coverage of the field, reflecting the diversity of projects and perspectives within it and including both established and emerging topics. It provides an entry point to the primary literature and will be the standard resource for researchers, students, and anyone wanting a firm grounding in this fascinating field. We are currently not accepting proposals for contributions to this series.

About the Editor

Keith Frankish, The University of Sheffield, is a philosopher specializing in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, and philosophy of cognitive science. He is known for his ‘illusionist’ theory of consciousness and for his work on the nature and function of conscious thought. He is the author of Mind and Supermind (CUP, 2004) and Consciousness (2005), together with numerous journal articles and book chapters. He has also edited, or coedited, several collections of essays, including The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science (CUP, 2012), The Cambridge Handbook of Artificial Intelligence (CUP, 2014) (both with William Ramsey), and Illusionism as a Theory of Consciousness (2017).