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7 - Gender norms & female participation in radicalization
- Edited by Abdul Raufu Mustapha, Kate Meagher
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- Book:
- Overcoming Boko Haram
- Published by:
- Boydell & Brewer
- Published online:
- 21 March 2020
- Print publication:
- 17 January 2020, pp 193-224
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- Chapter
- Export citation
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Summary
Introduction
The kidnapping of 276 school girls in April 2014 in Chibok in Borno State in northern Nigeria, brought the Jama‘atul Ahlul Sunna li Da‘wati Jihad, commonly referred to as ‘Boko Haram’, into global headlines. This singular event highlighted multiple dimensions of a chronic crisis: expanding Islamist terrorism in northern Nigeria, the government's ongoing failure to address the insurgency, critical data gaps on Islamist radical groups, as well as the position of women in northern Nigeria and in this group. Gender has become one of the many terrains on which battles – ideological and otherwise – are fought, often in the guise of Islamic purity. Yet, northern Nigerian women have not just been passive victims; they have contributed to resisting, and sometimes to shaping radicalism.
Much of the available literature has lamented women's victimization and celebrated their struggle for empowerment but has shied away from the other side of the coin: women's active participation in radical movements and their active engagement in forms of counter-radicalization. Sit-ins and protests led by women pressing government to ‘Bring Back Our Girls’ are an example of the agency of women and their resistance to forms of victimization such as the kidnapping of the girls in Chibok. At the same time, news about willing female suicide bombers in Boko Haram brought up a different side to women's presence in a charged public space, as perpetrators. Current studies of the role of women in Boko Haram tend to restrict their focus to the role of women as victims and perpetrators (Matfess 2017), yet the reality of women in northern Nigeria today transcends and challenges those binary perspectives. Victims can also be active agents of change and vice versa. Northern Nigerian women do not only exercise agency as participants in violent groups, but can also be agents of positive forms of change. The purpose of this study therefore is to examine how social norms shape the role of women in Boko Haram – both as victims and as willing participants – but also as active players in countering violent radicalization.
11 - Conclusion Toward a whole-of-society approach to counter-radicalizationAll Contributors
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- By Sarkin Kano, Kate Meagher, Kate Meagher, M. Sani Umar, Abubakar K. Monguno, Ibrahim Umara, Rahmane Idrissa, Julie G. Sanda, David Ehrhardt, M. Sani Umar, Zainab Usman, Sherine El Taraboulsi-Mccarthy, Khadija Gambo Hawaja, Murray Last, Kate Meagher, Ibrahim Haruna Hassan, M. Sani Umar, David Ehrhardt
- Edited by Abdul Raufu Mustapha, Kate Meagher
-
- Book:
- Overcoming Boko Haram
- Published by:
- Boydell & Brewer
- Published online:
- 21 March 2020
- Print publication:
- 17 January 2020, pp 304-324
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Introduction
As the Boko Haram insurgency heads into its second decade, it seems no quick end is in sight. What are the possible scenarios for the future trajectory of Boko Haram, and in particular what is its endgame? While predicting the future is a very hazardous business, plausible endgame scenarios can be envisioned based on reflection on the metamorphoses of Boko Haram, careful analysis of the dynamics of its current situation, and prognosis of its emergent trends. The formal declaration of the Boko Haram Caliphate and its territorial control over much of Borno State are no more. Yet the ‘technical military defeat’ proclaimed by President Muhammad Buhari in 2015 has not prevented Boko Haram from carrying out attacks not only in rural areas, but in big towns and even military bases, often killing Nigerian soldiers – as many as 100 soldiers in one attack. Negotiations leading to the release of Boko Haram captives in exchange for freeing incarcerated leaders of the insurgency came about more than a year after the proclamation of the technical defeat. It seems that decisive defeat leading to complete surrender and total cessation of hostilities is not on the immediate horizon. Yet what scenario is likely to unfold?
This chapter explores this question by drawing insights from the literature on the growth, decline, and end of past insurgent insurgencies and civil wars. Theoretically, one may argue that there are only a few possible outcomes to an insurgency: the government may defeat the insurgents; the insurgents may defeat the government; both parties may reach a negotiated settlement; there may be a stalemate; or the insurgency may transform into something else, such as organized crime. We suggest that rather than one distinct ending, Boko Haram is likely to continue its previous patterns of transformations and factionalization, precluding decisive outcomes. Unless distinctively different approaches are taken by the state, likely endgames include a negotiated settlement with some factions, the further entrenchment of the war economy with its continuous menacing of rural areas by others, and some elements potentially becoming absorbed into the global terrorist networks of the Islamic State.