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2 - The roles of the Ulama in radicalization & counter-radicalization
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- By M. Sani Umar
- Edited by Abdul Raufu Mustapha, Kate Meagher
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- Book:
- Overcoming Boko Haram
- Published by:
- Boydell & Brewer
- Published online:
- 21 March 2020
- Print publication:
- 17 January 2020, pp 33-63
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- Chapter
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Summary
Introduction
This chapter focuses on the religious dimensions of radicalization. More specifically, the chapter explores the roles of Muslim scholars known collectively as ulama – the plural of the Arabic term alim, which means the learned. The basic argument presented here is that the ulama can play active roles in promoting radicalization as well as counter-radicalization and deradicalization through the multiple roles they have historically played in Muslim societies. Over the last four decades, some Nigerian ulama have contributed to radicalization via four different but related mechanisms. First, they have created a climate of opinion in which individuals and social movements with radical tendencies have found in the discourses of the ulama the Islamic legitimation for their radical dispositions. Second, some ulama have also contributed to radicalization by creating division and raising tension among Muslims through polemical exchanges on religious beliefs and practices as well as social and political issues. Third, some ulama have contributed to radicalization through constructions of Muslim victimhood, often articulated in far-fetched conspiracy theories that provoke resentment and urge Muslims to react against the supposed conspirators. Fourth, some ulama have contributed to radicalization by ridiculing and demonizing their perceived enemies, including fellow Muslims who do not share their views. Demonization of the Other can provide a justification for physical violence.
But it is important to offer some caveats. The ulama are not a monolithic entity but a heterogeneous group with many significant differences that will be highlighted in the following pages. The majority of the ulama have not contributed to radicalization – indeed they can serve as important sources of counter-radicalization. The expression ‘some ulama’ has been repeated above to underscore the need to examine the specific factors that lead to radicalization. There is diversity in the motives, modes of operation, intensity and frequency in contributions of the individual ulama towards radicalization. Furthermore, the ulama are not the sole creators of radicalization in Nigeria. Other social groups, especially religious extremists, ethnic chauvinists, politicians, and journalists have also played their own parts. Despite the focus on the ulama, this chapter will be attentive to the interactions among the several factors that have collectively contributed to radicalization in Nigeria.
6 - Pathways to radicalization Learning from Boko Haram life histories
- Edited by Abdul Raufu Mustapha, Kate Meagher
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- Book:
- Overcoming Boko Haram
- Published by:
- Boydell & Brewer
- Published online:
- 21 March 2020
- Print publication:
- 17 January 2020, pp 169-192
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- Chapter
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Summary
Introduction
In this chapter we seek to understand the process of radicalization by examining the life-histories of 59 (former) members of the Nigerian Islamic terrorist group widely known as ‘Boko Haram’. Life histories offer more complex insights into the motives behind violent radicalization, rather than ‘labouring in vain for simplistic answers to equally simplistic questions about root causes of radicalization and violence’ (Horgan 2008). Attention to root causes of extremist violence remains important, but only where they are set in a richer social and policy context that reveals the interaction of causes to create paths into radicalization. Radicalization pathways are useful tools to combine root causes with a process-based analysis, channeling otherwise ordinary people into violent action. In this approach, root causes of radicalization are factors that either push people away from the non-violent ‘mainstream’ or pull them towards a violent organization.
Radicalization is most clearly analysed as a process that individuals go through, as they are pushed and pulled by root causes of radicalization triggered by a variety of historical contingencies, while others are hindered by barriers to violent action. Studying life histories of radicalized individuals has allowed us to identify some of the key causes and barriers in the pathways that Boko Haram members have taken and describe parts of the sequences in which these factors have pushed, pulled and hindered violent radicalization. Focusing on interacting causes plays an essential role in identifying suitable points of policy intervention. As Bjorgo (2005, 256) explains:
Addressing factors that cause a recurring problem is usually preferable to dealing with symptoms and consequences … The approach requires, however, that we can identify causes and mechanisms that are of such a nature that they are available for intervention and possible to change.
This chapter contributes to the growing body of empirical studies on the nature of Boko Haram membership and the radicalization paths that have led towards it (e.g. Onuoha 2014; Mercy Corps 2016; Botha and Abdile 2017; Ehrhardt 2019). Its contribution is empirical as well as theoretical, as it analyses the 59 narratives in the context of radicalization theory, and begins to formulate empirically driven models for Boko Haram's radicalization pathways.
11 - Conclusion Toward a whole-of-society approach to counter-radicalizationAll Contributors
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- By Sarkin Kano, Kate Meagher, Kate Meagher, M. Sani Umar, Abubakar K. Monguno, Ibrahim Umara, Rahmane Idrissa, Julie G. Sanda, David Ehrhardt, M. Sani Umar, Zainab Usman, Sherine El Taraboulsi-Mccarthy, Khadija Gambo Hawaja, Murray Last, Kate Meagher, Ibrahim Haruna Hassan, M. Sani Umar, David Ehrhardt
- Edited by Abdul Raufu Mustapha, Kate Meagher
-
- Book:
- Overcoming Boko Haram
- Published by:
- Boydell & Brewer
- Published online:
- 21 March 2020
- Print publication:
- 17 January 2020, pp 304-324
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- Chapter
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Summary
Introduction
As the Boko Haram insurgency heads into its second decade, it seems no quick end is in sight. What are the possible scenarios for the future trajectory of Boko Haram, and in particular what is its endgame? While predicting the future is a very hazardous business, plausible endgame scenarios can be envisioned based on reflection on the metamorphoses of Boko Haram, careful analysis of the dynamics of its current situation, and prognosis of its emergent trends. The formal declaration of the Boko Haram Caliphate and its territorial control over much of Borno State are no more. Yet the ‘technical military defeat’ proclaimed by President Muhammad Buhari in 2015 has not prevented Boko Haram from carrying out attacks not only in rural areas, but in big towns and even military bases, often killing Nigerian soldiers – as many as 100 soldiers in one attack. Negotiations leading to the release of Boko Haram captives in exchange for freeing incarcerated leaders of the insurgency came about more than a year after the proclamation of the technical defeat. It seems that decisive defeat leading to complete surrender and total cessation of hostilities is not on the immediate horizon. Yet what scenario is likely to unfold?
This chapter explores this question by drawing insights from the literature on the growth, decline, and end of past insurgent insurgencies and civil wars. Theoretically, one may argue that there are only a few possible outcomes to an insurgency: the government may defeat the insurgents; the insurgents may defeat the government; both parties may reach a negotiated settlement; there may be a stalemate; or the insurgency may transform into something else, such as organized crime. We suggest that rather than one distinct ending, Boko Haram is likely to continue its previous patterns of transformations and factionalization, precluding decisive outcomes. Unless distinctively different approaches are taken by the state, likely endgames include a negotiated settlement with some factions, the further entrenchment of the war economy with its continuous menacing of rural areas by others, and some elements potentially becoming absorbed into the global terrorist networks of the Islamic State.
10 - Endgames The evolution of Boko Haram in comparative perspective
- Edited by Abdul Raufu Mustapha, Kate Meagher
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- Book:
- Overcoming Boko Haram
- Published by:
- Boydell & Brewer
- Published online:
- 21 March 2020
- Print publication:
- 17 January 2020, pp 277-303
-
- Chapter
- Export citation
-
Summary
Introduction
As the Boko Haram insurgency heads into its second decade, it seems no quick end is in sight. What are the possible scenarios for the future trajectory of Boko Haram, and in particular what is its endgame? While predicting the future is a very hazardous business, plausible endgame scenarios can be envisioned based on reflection on the metamorphoses of Boko Haram, careful analysis of the dynamics of its current situation, and prognosis of its emergent trends. The formal declaration of the Boko Haram Caliphate and its territorial control over much of Borno State are no more. Yet the ‘technical military defeat’ proclaimed by President Muhammad Buhari in 2015 has not prevented Boko Haram from carrying out attacks not only in rural areas, but in big towns and even military bases, often killing Nigerian soldiers – as many as 100 soldiers in one attack. Negotiations leading to the release of Boko Haram captives in exchange for freeing incarcerated leaders of the insurgency came about more than a year after the proclamation of the technical defeat. It seems that decisive defeat leading to complete surrender and total cessation of hostilities is not on the immediate horizon. Yet what scenario is likely to unfold?
This chapter explores this question by drawing insights from the literature on the growth, decline, and end of past insurgent insurgencies and civil wars. Theoretically, one may argue that there are only a few possible outcomes to an insurgency: the government may defeat the insurgents; the insurgents may defeat the government; both parties may reach a negotiated settlement; there may be a stalemate; or the insurgency may transform into something else, such as organized crime. We suggest that rather than one distinct ending, Boko Haram is likely to continue its previous patterns of transformations and factionalization, precluding decisive outcomes. Unless distinctively different approaches are taken by the state, likely endgames include a negotiated settlement with some factions, the further entrenchment of the war economy with its continuous menacing of rural areas by others, and some elements potentially becoming absorbed into the global terrorist networks of the Islamic State.