2 results
A More Confident or Overconfident Foreign Policy Actor?
- from TIMOR-LESTE
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- By Selver B. Sahin, RMIT University
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2012
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 10 May 2012, pp 341-358
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Summary
The year 2011 in Timor-Leste was marked by the national leadership's growing confidence in the governance of the country's challenging institutional and political affairs. This confidence, which is essentially about the ability to demonstrate sovereign state identity, has developed against a background of compounding tensions between the Gusmão-led Parliamentary Majority Alliance (AMP) government and the UN mission (United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste, UNMIT) and the flow of increasing offshore petroleum revenues over the past few years. It has been manifest in the emphasis Timorese leaders placed on different platforms throughout 2011 on three key policy objectives prioritized in the context of a broader nation-building process: phasing out the foreign military and civilian presence; joining ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations); and setting a model for “post-conflict” development. A most recent example of this approach can be noted in Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão's speech in September before the UN General Assembly, where he proudly cited the national petroleum fund's $8.9 billion balance to “transform Timor-Leste from a low income country to an upper middle income country” over the next two decades by maintaining the recent high economic growth rates.
Indeed, Timorese political leaders, enabled by a bourgeoning oil and gas wealth, have already acted in considerable autonomy from the UN mandate. This is evident in the fields of justice and security sector reform, where the Gusmão government has largely ignored UNMIT's advice on clearly delineating the roles of the military and the police, and establishing accountability for the crimes committed during the 2006 violence. Already marginalized from the political process, the UN mission is planning to pull out following the completion of the presidential and parliamentary polls in 2012. The drawdown of foreign troops and civilian support staff signifies the political leadership's claim for Timor-Leste's transition from conflict to development. It has also constituted a significant component of the government's efforts to allay the objection of some ASEAN members to the admission of their small and still institutionally weak state.
Timor-Leste in 2009: Marking Ten Years of Independence or Dependence on International “Assistance”?
- from TIMOR-LESTE
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- By Selver B. Sahin, Social Sciences and Planning of RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2010
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 18 May 2010, pp 345-364
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Summary
The progress on tackling the residual problems of the 2006 political and security crisis helped Timor-Leste enjoy relative stability in 2009. This is evidenced by the generally calm security environment with almost no instances of violence, closure of all the camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the availability of critical commodities such as fuel and rice at affordable prices subsidized by the government. The improvement in the security environment is also mirrored in positive public perceptions reported in a country-wide opinion survey, in which over four-fifths (87 per cent) of 1,120 respondents indicated in December 2008 that they felt safer in their communities compared to 2006.
Little progress, however, was made towards addressing the structural problems that triggered the 2006 crisis. These include the reforming of the security institutions, strengthening the rule of law, and alleviating poverty. The already-flawed security sector reform, focusing on the handover of policing responsibilities from UNPOL (United Nations Police) to PNTL (National Police of Timor-Leste), was complicated by increasingly strained relations between the AMP (Parliamentary Majority Alliance) government and UNMIT (United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste) in 2009. The release of an ex-militia member on 30 August, the day that marks the tenth anniversary of the UN-sponsored vote for independence, once more highlighted the continuing challenge of establishing an independent justice system with the capacity to sustain the rule of law within society.
According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates, the country achieved a 12.8 per cent growth rate in the non-oil gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008, which has proudly been cited by the country's leadership to illustrate the economy's improving health. But this growth was largely driven by increased domestic consumption, fuelled by the government's injection of more oil money into the economy in the form of public transfers, subsidies, and infrastructure spending rather than an improvement in the production capacity of the economy. Furthermore, most of the recovery and development initiatives have so far been concentrated in the capital Dili, while there has been almost no substantial improvement in the infrastructure and living conditions for the majority of the population residing in dispersed rural areas, something which I also personally witnessed during my short visit to the country three and a half years after my first visit in February 2006.
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