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5 - Mind the Gap: The Curious Case of Everyday Civil–Military Relations in Singapore
- Edited by Alan Chong, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Nicole Jenne, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
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- Book:
- Asian Military Evolutions
- Published by:
- Bristol University Press
- Published online:
- 18 January 2024
- Print publication:
- 20 March 2023, pp 90-109
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Summary
The SAF is arguably ‘the most impressive military force in contemporary Southeast Asia’ (Huxley, 2000, p 249). Yet, the threat of military intervention in Singapore’s political system, what Feaver (1999, p 214) terms the ‘civil–military problematique’ – wherein the ‘very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity’ – is unlikely (Tan, 2011, p 148). Scholars have contended that Singapore’s civil–military relations transcend Feaver’s problematique. Four decades earlier, Chan (1985, p 136) already noted ‘the most striking feature of the Singapore scene is the undisputed predominance of the civilian sector over the military.’ We broadly agree with Tan (2001, p 276), who explains that such control is achieved through ‘civil–military fusion’ whereby ‘the military, both in leadership and in structural terms, functions as an integral part of a centralized, bureaucratic state’; and also with Chong and Chan (2016), who observed civilian society is arguably built in the likeness of a quintessential military force, with a seeming permeation of martial values. We, however, suggest an alternative for such integration. Rather than one world enfolding the other into a hyphenated whole, a ‘civilianized military’ or ‘militarized civilian’, we argue that the foundational cultural values of Singapore society and government, and its armed forces, are the same, precluding separate ‘civilian’ and ‘military’ worlds in the first place.
In Singapore’s history, such ontologically distinct worlds never existed to a significant extent, nor did Singapore’s development allow them to be created. Consequently, there is no civil–military gap – a key concern in civil–military relations scholarship – in Singapore, transcending the civil–military problematique. While the military naturally plays a different role, it does not occupy a different world. Singapore presents a curious case of how its military evolution has existed within the operational role of the SAF as opposed to a changing relationship between different worlds.
8 - Permanent Residents Serving National Service: Round Pegs in a Square Hole?
- Edited by N. Vasu, Wen Ling Chan, Su Yin Yeap
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- Book:
- Immigration in Singapore
- Published by:
- Amsterdam University Press
- Published online:
- 11 December 2020
- Print publication:
- 02 December 2014, pp 175-198
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Summary
Introduction
National Service (NS) was introduced in post-independence Singapore in 1967 to provide an enduring source of trained manpower for Singapore's defence needs. Presently, all medically fit male citizens and second-generation Permanent Residents (PR) are required to serve NS. Aside from this latter group, foreigners do not need to serve NS. The sizeable increase in the number of foreigners in Singapore in recent years has drawn sharp attention to this fact. In a ministerial forum with then Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong held in 2010, university student and Operationally Ready National Serviceman Lim Zi Rui rued, “With all the changes in policies and the influx of foreign talent, I really don't know what I’m defending anymore.” His remark was an oblique reference to the perception that foreigners were benefiting from Singapore's prosperity and security provided by Singaporean citizensoldiers like him at no cost to themselves. Lim's remarks reflect a wider resentment towards the explosion of Singapore's foreign population of PRs and non-residents on temporary immigration passes.
Whereas in 2000 there were only just over a million foreigners in Singapore, by 2010 this figure had ballooned to over 1.8 million. In comparison, the number of citizens increased by only 244,800. This surge, as dramatic as it seems, belies the far more complex effects – both good and bad – of Singapore's immigration policies the other chapters explore. To the Singaporean, however, such a nuanced understanding is less relevant in light of the acutely palpable influx of foreigners who allegedly impinge on their lives. Many Singaporeans now see foreigners as competitors for limited opportunities, resources, and even living space. That the majority of these foreign competitors do not have to serve NS to enjoy these opportunities adds insult to injury. This perception of “free-loading” by foreigners at the expense of Singaporeans, or that the former views it as being less important than the latter, could result in a potential societal fault-line in Singapore. In particular, as the only category of non-citizens to have access to what are perceived to be similar state-sponsored benefits as citizens, PRs have been singled out from among the foreign population as a group that should share the burden of obligations expected of citizens, namely serving NS.